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V

Aside from several short essays, the sources

A

ethics are limited to two:

Human Nature

Treatise of

and Ari Inquiry Concerning the P rinciples

of

comprise several hundred pages

Hume

in

which

Morals

Hume's

of

(1739

(1751).

-

1740),

These

investigates the

nature of "moral sentiments" and moral evaluations; yet, even a
careful study of this material does not

takes these to be.
interpretations of

make

it

clear just what

This has resulted in almost as

Hume on

many

Hume

different

these issues as there have been com-

mentators.

With regard

to the

both as to its nature and

what kind of a feeling

moral sentiment

its origin.

is the

Concerning the former question,

moral sentiment?

emotion (or "passion")or something akin
part of this thesis
to

I

will

show

that

Hume

to

it

is a

Is

it,

for

sensation?

Hume, an

In the first

is inconsistent in

maintain both that the moral sentiment

pain and that

there are questions

itself,

is a kind of

attempting

pleasure or

genuine emotion or passion.

The second, and

Hume's moral sentiment

I

think

more important,

is its origin.

Hume

interpreted as holding a moral sense theory.

is

In

issue concerning

almost universally
such a theory the

VI

mora l sentim ent
different

from

is

all

taken to be a unique kind of feeling, sensibly

other kinds, which

is

plating certain actions and characters.

issue from a moral sense,

experienced when contem-

This moral feeling

is said to

an "internal" counterpart to the physical

senses; whereas our physical senses are sensitive to external objects,

our moral sense

is affected

by the ideas of actions and characters.

will argue in this thesis that, contrary to the usual inter-

I

pretations,

Hume

Treatise

Though Hume himself refers on occasion

of a

.

moral sense,

only to what
sense.

is

is not

it

developing a moral sense theory in the

seems clear

to

me

that

commonly accepted as being

he

is

to the

workings

there referring

the results of a

Rather than countenancing the existence

of a

moral

mysterious

internal faculty which produces our moral sentiments, Hume's third

book of the Treatise

is

largely devoted,

I

believe, to an "explication"

and a "resolution" of the so-called "moral sense" into the most basic
principles of

human

this thesis, the

nature.

On

moral sentiment

the interpretation
is

no longer taken

I

shall present in
to be a

sensibly

unique feeling which issues from a distinct faculty; rather, the very
basic and instinctive

human

feelings of propensity for pleasure and

aversion to pain are, under certain restrictive conditions, defined by

Hume

to be

moral sentiments.

The next issue

to be

considered

is the

connection between

Vll

moral sentiments and moral evaluations
interpretations of

Hume on

general classes.

According

in the

in

Hume.

The most common

this question can be divided into
to the first, a

moral evaluation consists

very experiencing of the moral sentiment.

Although there

strong textual support for this view,

I'

that such an interpretation is not the

most consistent

Hume

given, relative to other things
of

moral

evaluation.

Hume's several

My main

is

shall argue in this thesis

has

to

that can be

say concerning the nature

argument for

indications that our

two

this will be

moral sentiments

in

based on

themselves

are frequently not sufficient indicators of moral value, and that we
can

make

at all.

moral evaluation without experiencing

a

This suggests

consist in a

mere

for

that,

Hume,

a

a

moral sentiment

moral evaluation need

not

feeling or sentiment, as this first interpretation

holds.
9

We

are thus led to the second type of interpretation of

on the nature

of

moral evaluation,

in

Hume

which a moral evaluation

is

an actual judgment about what sort of (moral) sentiment would result

from the contemplation
though there
that

it

Hume

too

is textual

must

of a certain character or action.

support for this interpretation,

be rejected.

Roughly,

my

argument

I

Once
will

again,

show

will be this.

clearly and frequently denies that moral judgments are "con-

clusions of reason.

"

Now

a conclusion of reason for

Hume

is the

Vlll

belief in (or assent to) a proposition.

But the distinguishing char-

acteristic of this second interpretation is the claim that a moral

judgment for
tion.

Hume

involves the assent to a certain factual proposi-

Therefore, we must reject this interpretation as being in-

consistent with one of

Hume's clearest requirements

for

moral

judgments.
I

will then offer

my

own interpretation

of

Hume

judgment, one which seems to share the strengths

on moral

of the

two standard

accounts, while avoiding those inconsistencies which ultimately

caused their rejection.

In

my

interpretation

I

attempt to strike that

balance between feeling and judging, between passion and reason,
that
fit

Hume seems

what

Hume

to be seeking;

whether

my

account does more closely

says must, in the end, be decided by the reader.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Aside from several short essays, the sources
ethics are limited to two:

A

Human Nature

Treatise of

and An Inquiry Concerning the Principles

of

comprise several hundred pages

Hume

nature of

in

which

Mor als

takes these to be.
interpretations of

This has resulted

Hume on

make

it

(1739-1740),

(1751).

These

investigates the

moral sentiments' and moral evaluations;

careful study of this material does not

Hume's

of

yet,

even a

clear just what

Hume

almost as many different

in

these issues as there have been

commen-

tators.

With regard
both as to

its

to the

nature and

what kind of a feeling

moral sentiment

moral sentiment?

emotion (or "passion") or something akin
part of this thesis
to

I

will

show

that

Hume

it

is a

Is

it,

for

to sensation?

is

maintain both that the moral sentiment

pain and that

there are questions

Concerning the former question,

its origin.

is the

itself,

Hume, an
In the first

inconsistent in attempting

is a kind of

pleasure or

genuine emotion or passion.

The second, and

Hume's moral sentiment

I

think

more

is its origin.

important, issue concerning

Hume

is

almost universally

2

interpreted as advocating what

Such theories

may

"moral sense" theory

is called a

take a variety of forms.

However, they have

common

the contention that the

feeling,

sensibly different from all other kinds, which

moral

which

is

said to issue

is often

ex-

from

moral sense

is

moral sense,

to external objects,

contrary

to the usual inter-

pretations,

Hume

Treatise

Though Hume himself refers on occasion

.

is not

moral sense,

only to what is

our

affected by the ideas of actions and characters.

will argue in this thesis that,

I

sense.

a

In

taken to be an "internal" counterpart to the physical senses;

is

whereas our physical senses are sensitive

of a

in

feeling is a unique kind of

perienced when contemplating certain actions and characters.

such theories this moral feeling

^

it

developing a moral sense theory

seems clear

to

me

commonly accepted as

book of the Treatise

is

to the

workings

that he is there referring

being the results of a moral

Rather than countenancing the existence

internal faculty which produces our

in the

of a

mysterious

moral sentiments, Hume's

largely devoted,

I

third

believe, to an "explication"

and a "resolution" of the so-called "moral sense" into the most
basic principles of

human

nature.

On

the interpretation

present in this thesis, the moral sentiment

is

a sensibly unique feeling which issues

from

rather, the very basic and instinctive

human

I

shall

no longer taken to be

a distinct faculty;

feelings of propensity

3

for pleasure and aversion to pain are, under
certain restrictive

conditions, defined by

The next issue

Hume
to be

to be

moral sentiments.

considered

is the

moral sentiments and moral evaluations
interpretations of

Hume

general classes.

According

in

connection between

Hume.

The most common

on this question can be divided into two
to the first,

sists in the experiencing of the

a

moral evaluation con-

moral sentiment;

an interpretation will vary according

to the

the details of such

commentator's under-

standing of the nature and origin of the moral sentiment.
interpretation of

on moral evaluation

There are numerous passages

places.
to

Hume

in

is

Such an

found in several

Hume which

can be taken

support this "Emotionist" interpretation, as Pall Ardal terms

it:

So that when you pronounce any action or character to be
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution
of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
from the contemplation of it (T, p. 46 9). 3

To have

the sense of virtue,

nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character
The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration (T,
p.

is

472).

Language must
invent a peculiar set of terms in order to
express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation
which arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its contrary (I, p. 95).
.

.

.

moral deliberations

circumstances of the case
are to be laid before us ere we can fix any sentence of blame
The approbation which then ensues cannot
or approbation
be the work of the judgment but of the heart; and it is not a
speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling
or sentiment (I, p. 188).
In

.

.

.

.

.

.

all the

4

Such passages constitute strong support
for the plausibility
of the Emotionist interpretation of

theless, in this thesis
the

most consistent

I

moral evaluation

in

that can be given, relative to other
things

for this will be based on

moral sentiments

in

Never-

shall maintain that this interpretation
is not

has to say concerning the nature of moral
evaluation.

ment

Hume.

Hume's several

we can make

experiencing a moral sentiment

at all.

a

My main

argu-

indications that our

themselves are frequently not

tors of moral value, and that

Hume

sufficient indica-

moral evaluation without

For example;

In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are
variable,
according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with
regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the

present disposition of our mind. But these variations we
regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as
if we remain'd in one point of view.
Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least,
of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable (T, p. 582)

The case

is the same, as when we correct the different
sentiments of virtue, which proceed from its different distances from ourselves. The passions do not always follow
our corrections; but these corrections serve sufficiently to
regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when
we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and

virtue (T,

The case

p.

585)

is here the same as in our judgments concerning
external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance
But tho' the appearance of objects to our senses be the original
standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say,
that they actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the
appearance by reflection, arrive at a more constant and

5

establish'd judgment concerning them. In like manner, tho'
sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,
and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter
than that with persons near and contiguous; yet we neglect
all these differences in our calm judgments concerning the

characters of

men

(T,

p.

603)

There is no necessity that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration.
Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star which,
though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the
sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the
senses neither with light nor heat (I, p. 57)

These and other passages suggest
need not consist

in a

mere

that, for

Hume,

a

moral evaluation

feeling or sentiment, as the Emotiunist

interpretation holds.

This leads to the second type of interpretation
of

moral evaluation

account.

On

in

Hume, which Ardal terms

this type of interpretation,

judgments that something

is the case.

of the

nature

the "Reflectivist"

moral evaluations are actual
Such an interpretation

is

suggested by passages such as the following:

manner

moral determinations] external
beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure; and tis evident, a
beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when
seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought

In like

[to that of

,

'

We

however, that it appears to us
less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in
such a position, and by that reflexion we correct its momentary appearance (T, p. 582).

nearer

to us.

say

not,

Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as represented

6

in history; but

we say not upon

that account, that the former
laudable than the latter. We know, that
were we to approach equally near to that renown' patriot,
d
he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection and

character

is

more

admiration (T,

582).

p.

We blame

equally a bad action, which we read of in history,
with one perform'd in our neighborhood t'other day: The

meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T, p.

In his

584).

Five Types

of Ethical

Reflectivist interpretation of

argues

that,

for

Hume,

Hume

Theory

according to Hume, that what most

tion of all

owing

to the

it

I

"

shall later show,

men approve

to

Hume

agree.

given by

moral

between the contempla-

actual or imagined state of affairs and

a certain sort of feeling or sentiment that he has

contemplation.

is

in fact

the view that "a

is a causal relation

some

is not,

similarity in the emotional constitu-

Geoffrey Hunter when he attributes

judgment states that there

it

thereby virtuous.

is

plausible Reflectivist interpretation

tion by the speaker of

Broad

This kind of inter-

humans, most men's moral determinations do

A more

a

would call forth an emotion

most men.

pretation, however, is inadequate; as

is that,

Broad gives

D.

to evaluate x as virtuous (vicious) is to judge

of approval (disapproval) in all or

it

C.

on moral evaluation.

that "x is such that the contemplation of

Rather,

,

when he does

However, Hunter's formulation

fails to

the

emphasize

7

that the

sort

-

contemplation by the speaker" must be

of a

namely, contemplation from the moral point

this entails will also be a topic of

Kydd remedies

Hume;

this deficiency in

concern in

very special

of view.

this thesis.

What

Rachael M.

her (Reflectivist) interpretation of

for one to judge that x is good is for one
to judge that "x is the

kind of thing which, considered without regard
to the special relation
in

which

pleasure

stands to

it

in

me

my

personal interests, arouses

fee

.mgs

of

or any other disinterested spectator of like sus-

ceptibilities.

Yet,

I

will

be rejected also.

show

that all such Reflectivist interpretations

Roughly,

my

argument

will be this.

Hume

and frequently denies that moral judgments are "conclusions
"

reason.

assent

Now

to) a

a conclusion of reason for

proposition.

Hume

of

is the belief in (or

moral judgment

involves the assent to a certain factual proposition.

we must reject

clearly

But the distinguishing characteristic of a

Reflectivist interpretation is the claim that a

Hume

must

all Reflectivist

for

Therefore,

interpretations as being inconsistent

with one of Hume’s clearest requirements for moral judgments.
I

will then give

my own

ment, one which seems

to

interpretation of

Hume

on moral judg-

share the strengths of both the Emotionist

and the Reflectivist accounts, but which avoids those inconsistencies

which ultimately caused their rejection.

Any such attempt must

8

reconcile the following strains in Hume;

Morality, therefore,
(T,

p.

is

more properly

470).

felt

than judg'd
of
5

The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions
reason (T, p. 458).

of

our

'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language, or
communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not
correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook
our present situation (T, p. 582).

The passions do not always follow our corrections;

but these
corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract
notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in
general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).

The Emotionist account goes wrong by emphasizing

the

former two

notions at the expense of the latter two, while the Reflectivist interpretation

makes

the reverse mistake.

to strike that balance that

account does

more

closely

decided by the reader.

Hume seems
fit

what

In

my

interpretation

to be seeking;

Hume

I

attempt

whether

my

says must, in the end, be

9
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CHAPTER

II

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL SENTIMENT
1

Although

I

will later argue that

it

is

Hume's view

not be experiencing the moral sentiment in order to

judgment, the concept of the moral sentiment
judgment.

Hume

not have grounds for

making

a

moral

involved in such a

is

moral judgment,

will investigate the nature of this

Hume

a

need

the

moral

doubts the existence of such men) could

experiential evidence necessary to support
I

make

Moreover, one who had never experienced

sentiment (although

that one

In the present chapter

moral sentiment.

classifies the objects of

calls "perceptions, " into two kinds:

it.

for he would lack the

human consciousness, which he

impressions and ideas.

Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence,
we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend
our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make
their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint
images of these in thinking and reasoning
(T, p. 1).
all

.

.

The moral sentiment
sections
sion

2

Hume

and

is,

3 of this

according
chapter

I

to

Hume, an impression.

will inquire into the kind of

takes the moral sentiment to be, and

Hume's description

of the

.

I

him

in

impres-

will argue that

moral sentiment both as

(or pain) and as a passion involves

In

a kind of pleasure

an inconsistency.

However,

11

in the

present section

concerned with Hume's distinction

will be

I

between impressions and ideas.

This will be important not only

to

our present understanding of the nature of impressions
themselves,
but in

Chapter

III

where

through sympathy

is

become necessary
a

the conversion of an idea into an impression

examined, and later

in

Chapter VI, where

moral sentiment from

to distinguish a

it

will

the idea of

moral sentiment.
Impressions and ideas

may

be simple or complex,

where

a

simple impression has no other impression as a constituent, and a

complex impression

is

analogous for ideas.

is not

simple; the distinction

Hume's thorough-going empiricism

pression in statements
first

one which

to the effect that "all

is

finds ex-

our simple ideas

in their

appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are

correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent"

A complex

adea might not

itself "exactly

(T, p.

4).

represent" any prior im-

pression, but the simple ideas which are the ultimate constituents
of the

complex ideas must.
It

is

one of Hume's most critical failings that he does not

give an adequate account of the difference between impressions and
ideas;

are they different

in kind

or merely in degree?

Hume

often

tends to stress the difference as one of degree;

Thus

in sleep,

in a fever,

in

madness, or

in

any very violent

12

emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our
impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish
them from our ideas (T, p. 2).
All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. impressions and ideas, which differ from each other~only in
their different degrees of force and vivacity (T, p. 96).

This suggests the following interpretation.

All

human perceptions

are of the same kind; however, perceptions can differ
strength or intensity.

boundary.

On

the scale of intensities there is an idealized

All perceptions with intensities that fall below this line

are classified as ideas, while

all

perceptions with intensities above

the line are classified as impressions.
the

in their

most intense idea

is

Thus, on this interpretation,

less intense than the least intense im-

pression.

clear that this simple picture will not do for Hume.

It is

the first place,

Hume's very

definition of an idea introduces a kind

distinction between impressions and ideas;
faint

images

In

of /impressions]in thinking

"By ideas

I

mean

and reasoning" (T,

Not only are ideas less lively than impressions, but

p.

"all our

the
1).

simple

ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions,

which are correspondent
(T,

p.

4).

to

Hume maintains

them, and which they exactly represent"
that,

in

some

sense, ideas are rep-

resentative while impressions are not; this is not consistent with

maintaining that the only difference between impressions and ideas
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is

"

"force and vivacity.

The intensity interpretation
treatment

is also inconsistent

Hume's doctrine

of belief.

of belief is highly

and undergoes alterations as the Treatise progresses.
do no

more

than sketch enough of the doctrine to show

bility with the intensity

view

of the distinction

with Hume's

complex,

Here
its

I

can

incompati-

between impressions

and ideas.

The objects

of belief for

Hume

are propositions; he begins an

investigation of "the nature of the idea or belief" by asking "Wherein

consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposi-

tion?"

more

(T, p.

95).

Hume

ideas; he tells us that for you and

osition is for you and

lem Hume poses

same proposition

I

to

is this.

in that

theless, your conception
not.

equates a proposition with a set of one or
I

to entertain the

have the same ideas

(T,

Quite clearly, you and

we can "conceive

may

I

p.

conception of an idea"

be attended with belief while

103).

As an

The prob-

the (same) ideas"; never-

is that a "belief is a

(T, p.

95).

can entertain the

What, then, would constitute such a difference

Hume's answer

same prop-

more

in

mine

is

our conceptions?

vivid and intense

illustration of this,

Hume

offers the following:

This definition will also be found to be entirely conformable
Nothing is more evident,
to everyone's feeling and experience.
than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more strong.
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firm and vivid, than the
loose reveries

"

-

*

"* u ”‘’

realizes, however, that there
can be variations in the

liveliness of an idea without
variations in belief.

science fiction writer's conception
of a colony on

that

vivid and lively than

such a colony exists.

of such a colony
I

may

my

how

is:

For instance, a

Mars

will be far

own, though neither one of us
believes

Again, the liveliness of

vary from time

believe that any such colony exists.

answer

“

°>

s,'

more

If

vzt “

s:

Hume

m

ea^tmh

of a

lively or intense

to time,

my own

conception

though at no time do

The next question Hume must

must an idea

be in order to con-

stitute a belief?
9

Hume

begins to answer this question by observing
that an

idea which constitutes a belief affects
our emotions and actions in a

way which

a

mere

idea does not.

When

I

merely entertain

the thought

of a lion bearing

down on me,

affected; but

believe that such a thing is actually happening,

will

if I

most probably

my

emotions and behavior remain un-

feel fear and run.

with a situation in which

Hume's terminology,

I

I

The

latter is to be

see a lion bearing down on

have the impression of a

me

I

compared
(i.

e.

lion bearing

,

in

down on

15

me); there can be

The effects

little

of the belief

this provides

Hume

how such an impression

doubt

resemble the effects

will affect

me.

of the impression, and

with an essential clue:

The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an
equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making
an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. For as
the different degrees of force make all the original difference
betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence
be the source of all the differences in the effects of these
perceptions, and their removal, in whole or in part, the cause
of

every new resemblance they acquire.
idea approach the impressions

make an
it

them

will likewise imitate

Wherever we can
and vivacity

in force

in its influence on the mind;

and vice versa, where it imitates them in that influence, as
in the present case, this must proceed from its approaching
them in force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes
an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make
it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but a more
vivid and intense conception of any idea (T, pp. 119-120;
italics mine).

Hume's answer then

is that

approximates that

an impression.

of

The inconsistency

Even

in the

an idea becomes belief when

in

present passage

of force

make

an idea.

"

tailed) idea of the lion and

intensity

Hume's position now becomes apparent.

Hume

all the original

Consider, then,

its

difference betwixt an impression and

my
my

insists that "the different degrees

(sufficiently and appropriately de-

impression

of the lion.

The only

"original difference" between them will be in their intensities.
it

would seem,

if

the intensity of

my

Thus,

idea were augmented a sufficient
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amount, the idea would become an impression,

must be
in

the case

order for

must

my

if

I

of the Treatise

,

of belief,

which comprises a

does he say or imply that an

becomes thereby an impression;

approaches an impression

rather, a

in force and vivacity, "

it

impression and has a "like influence on the passions,

"imitates [an impression] in its influence on the mind"
the language

we would expect

an impression.

idea

Hume,

be those of an impression its
intensity

Hume's account

in

idea which is believed

is

that this

be that of an impression.

large part of Book

to an

seems

idea were a belief, for, according
to

its effects to

But nowhere

belief

it

of

Hume

The implication

if

his view

were

-

is

"equal"

" it

this is not

that a belief

of this is that, though a lively

may approximate an impression

in intensity,

identity as an idea rather than an impression.

it

This

will retain its
is

incompatible

with the view that impressions and ideas "differ from each other
only in their different degrees of force and vivacity" (T,

To further cloud
turn-about

in

Book

operation of the

ments

human

[of others] "

When any

Hume appears

"Of the Passions,

II,

ability to "receive by

the issue,

p.

96).

complete

when he discusses

faculty he calls "sympathy,

communication

(T,

"

to do a

p.

"

which

the

is the

[the] inclinations and senti-

316).

affection is infus'd by sympathy,

it is

at first

known
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only by

its effects, and by those external
signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of
it.
This
idea is presently converted into an impression,
and acquires
such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very
passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original

affection (T, p.

317).

idea of a sentiment or passion, may
be so inliven'd
as to become the very sentiment or passion (T,
p. 319).
,

.

.

.

,

the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the

very impressions they represent

sympathy there
impression (T, p.

In

Hume

.

is

(T,

p.

319).

an evident conversion of an idea into an

370).

saying here that a sufficiently intense idea of a passion

is

(passions are impressions), as generated by sympathy, will be the

passion

itself; this is not

only compatible with the view that the only

difference between an impression and an idea

quires

..

is intensity,

it

re-

1

it.

Hume
of belief and

does attempt to account for this difference

sympathy.

Our

in the effects

beliefs concern the "external" world,

and the ideaswhich constitute such beliefs are "copies"
sions which are forced on us by external agents

-

of

impres-

these impressions

are the sensations we receive through our five "physical" senses.

Our control over such impressions
cause ourselves

to

is

very limited, and we cannot

have any impression

starting with the idea of that sensation;

of a certain sensation by

we cannot cause ourselves

actually to experience physical pain by an act of the imagination.
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Such

is not the

case, according to

Hume, with those impressions

which are the passions, or

affections"; although any idea of a passion

we may have must

from or copy some prior im-

that

be derived

pression of that passion, such an impression

may

be generated by

sufficient enlivening of a prior idea;

no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by
become the very sentiment
or passion. The lively idea of any object always approaches
its impression
But this is most remarkable in the
opinions and affectations; and 'tis there principally that a
lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections
depend more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of
the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they
arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every
lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of
'

tis

C sympathy] be so inliven'd as to

.

sympathy

(T, p.

.

.

319).

Nevertheless, this explanation does nothing

present difficulty:

in his

to

resolve the

account of belief, augmenting an idea to

the intensity of an impression does not convert the idea to an im-

pression, whereas on his account such a conversion does occur in
the case of

sympathy

-

the

former account

is

incompatible with the

intensity interpretation of the distinction between impression and
idea, while the latter requires

consistency

is a

the objects of

them.

it.

The

serious shortcoming in Hume's attempt to describe

human consciousness and

However,

failure to resolve this in-

the principles which relate

this difficulty is not one with

Hume's

ethical theory
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as such, and in what follows

I

will

assume, with Ilume,

that the

distinction between impressions and
ideas has been clearly and

consistently made.

2

Book

II

of the

Treatise

"Of the Passions,

,

classification of the impressions.

pression

(T,

p.

" is

devoted to a

The moral sentiment

is

an im-

470); as such, an adequate understanding of its nature

should at least enable us to place that sentiment within
Hume’s classification of the impressions.

sentiment

himself never does this

never directly mentioned

is

Of Morals,
developed,

Hume

is this

it

in

in

Book

Book

".

II;

of

nor

moral

Book

in

morals

is

division of the impressions ever mentioned in

Therefore,

if

we are

to

III

attempt

with what he says about the various types of impressions

II.

.

.

to

Hume,

the

moral sentiment

is

one of pleasure or

the distinguishing impressions, by which

moral good or

evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures"
471).

the

moral sentiment we must compare what Hume says about

According
pain;

Book

where the moral sentiment theory

connection with the moral sentiment.
to place the

in all of

-

Hume very

often equates the pleasurable

a .certain feeling of "satisfaction,

"

(T,

p.

moral sentiment with

and the painful moral sentiment
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with a certain feeling of "uneasiness.

"

However, Hume maintains

that there are different kinds of
pleasures and pains, or feelings
of

satisfaction and uneasiness:

For, Jirst,

'tis evident, that under the
term pleasure, we
comprehend sensations, which are very different
from each

other, and which have only such a
distant resemblance, as
is requisite to make them be
express'd by the same abstract
term. A good composition of music and a
bottle of good wine

equally produce pleasure; and what is
more, their goodness
determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall
we say upon
that account, that the wine is harmonious,
or the music of
a good flavour? In like manner an
inanimate object, and the
character or sentiments of any person may,
both of them,
give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is
is

different,

this'

keeps our sentiments concerning them from being
confounded,
and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not
to the other.
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises
from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind,
which
makes us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an
enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem
and respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered
in
general, without reference to our particular interest,
that
it causes such a feeling or sentiment,
as denominates it
morally good or evil (T, p. 472).

The pleasures and pains derived from one "physical" sense
will be different in kind than those derived

Hume

from another.

Further,

maintains that there are certain distinct kinds of pleasures and

pains which are not associated with the operation of the physical
senses; to such pleasures and pains
different origins:

wit,

Hume

has assigned

at least three

beauty, and morality.

No one has ever been able

to tell

what wit

is.

.

.

'Tis only

21

by taste we can decide concerning
it, nor are
any other standard, upon which we
can
this

Now what

kmd.

wit in a

is this taste

we possest of
form a judgment of
from which true and false

,

manner receive

their being, and without which
no
thought can have a title to either of these
denominations?
Tis plainly nothing but a sensation of
pleasure from true wit
an o uneasiness from false, without
our being able to tell
the reasons of that pleasure or
uneasiness.

The power

of

bestowing these opposite sensations is,
therefore, the very
essence of true and false wit; and consequently
the cause of
that pride or humility, which arises
from them
(T, p.

297)

beauty like wit, cannot be defin'd, but is discerned
only
by a taste or sensation
beauty is nothing but a form, which
produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of
parts, which
conveys pain ..
(T, p. 299).
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious;
Why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a
particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the
pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or
virtue.
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel
a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation
of
a character
The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our
approbation is imply' d in the immediate pleasure they convey
.

Again,

.

.

to us (T,

p.

we are

understand that the pleasures and pains derived from

to

contemplation of

471).

wit,

beauty, and

morals

differ

from each other, as

well as from those derived from the physical senses.

derived from a good joke

is different

beautiful painting, and both differ

from

from

that derived

the pleasure

The pleasure
from

a

produced by the

contemplation or observation of a moral character.

There are yet other sources

of

pleasure and pain;

Hume

in-

sists that the satisfaction or frustration (or the prospect thereof) of
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certain passions and desires can also cause
pleasure or pain.

For

instance, the satisfaction of our hunger
gives us a certain pleasure;
the satisfaction of our lust gives a different
kind of pleasure-

Of this kind of passion is the desire of punishment
to our
enemies, and ot happiness to our friends; hunger,
lust, and
a few other bodily appetites.
These passions, properly
speaking, produce pleasure and pain, and proceed
not from
them, like the other affections (T, p. 439).

This helps explain Hume's view that we often experience

pleasures or pains that are not moral sentiments upon contemplating
certain

human characters or

actions.

Such pleasures and pains pro-

ceed from the belief that a character or action contributes
satisfaction of a particular desire.

to the

For example, suppose

that

I

t.

desire to be elected to a certain office, and

campaigning vigorously on

my

behalf.

I

faction or pleasure upon witnessing this
I

believe

it

will aid in the satisfaction of

I

witness an acquaintance

will feel a certain satis-

mode

my

of

behavior because

desire to be elected.

Such a feeling of pleasure will not be the moral sentiment because
it

originates from the prospective satisfaction of a personal desire:

Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises
from characters and actions, of that peculiar kind, which makes
us praise or condemn. The good qualities of an enemy are
hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and
respect. 'Tis only when a character is considered in general,
without reference to our particular interest, that it causes
such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good
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or evil (T,

p.

472; second set of italics
mine).

The pleasures and pains we derive
from contemplation
behavior's tendency

to

desires are different
view;

enhance or retard fulfillment

in

of

of a certain

our particular

kind from those derived from
a disinterested

we cannot experience those peculiar pleasures
and

pains which

are the moral sentiments unless we
consider a character or action
in general,

without reference to our particular
interest"

by adopting the moral point of view.

I

-

that is,

will later return to a

more

detailed examination of this condition
for the experiencing of the

moral sentiment.

3

Where,
the

then, are the peculiar pleasures and pains
that are

moral sentiments

impressions?

placed

in

Hume's

classification of the

To attempt an answer requires

classification in

some

main classes; those

Hume

to be

detail.

Hume

that

we examine

this

divides the impressions into two

that are "original" and those that are "secondary.

also calls the former "impressions of sensation" and the latter

"impressions of reflection" or "passions" (also "sentiments,
'emotions,

"

and "affections").

The impressions

such as without any antecedent perceptions arise
the constitution of the body,

from

"

of sensation "are
in the soul,

the animal spirits, or

from

from
the
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application of objects to the external
organs" (T,

275).

p.

These

include the sensory sensations and
"all bodily pains and
pleasures.

Such "bodily" pains and pleasures are
those

that are derived

"

from

the physical senses.

should be clear that these pleasures and
pains are not the

It

moral sentiments; unlike

the latter, the

former perceptions arise

spontaneously inasmuch as they are not connected
in any way

any antecedent perceptions
idea of a razor cutting
tactile

pain,

pain, nor can

it

my

my

(i.

impressions or ideas).

can never generate

(T, p.

7)

razor

me

to

my

the

the idea of

the impression of that
It

flesh that will cause in

"natural and physical" (T,

processes, the impression of pain.
is

in

me

Though

visual impression of a razor fast approaching.

"unknown"

via

,

flesh can generate in

is the actual application of the

me,

e.

to

In contrast, the

p.

275)

moral sentiment

always caused by antecedent impressions or ideas of a character

or action:

from a primary constitution of nature certain characters
and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a
pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure (T,
p. 296)
.

.

.

An

action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious;
because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of

why?

a particular kind
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing
but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character (T, p. 471).
.

.

.

The pain or pleasure, which arises from

the general survey
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or view of any action or quality of the
mind, constitutes
vice and virtue (T, p. 614).

its

Thus, the moral sentiment, being caused by an
antecedent im-

pression or idea, cannot be classified as an
original impression.

The secondary impressions, unlike
are prompted by antecedent perceptions; so

moral sentiment should

fall

the original impressions,
it

would seem that the

within this category.

Hume

further

divides the secondary or reflective impressions
into the "direct"

and the "indirect.
ately

from good or

these passions

The direct passions are "such as arise immedi-

"

may

from pain or pleasure"

evil,

(T, p.

276);

be induced by pain or pleasure that is actual,

or merely by the prospect

(i.

e.

idea) of pain or pleasure.

The

type of direct passion that will be produced depends on whether the

pain or pleasure

is

probability which
direct passions

actual or potential, and,

we associate with

Hume

lists "desire,

despair and security"

(T,

The mechanism

dependents"

(T,

p.

potential, on the

occurrence.

Under

the

aversion, grief, joy, fear,

277).

p.

of the indirect passions is

"under the indirect passions
vanity, love, hatred,

its

if

I

more complex;

comprehend pride, humility, ambition,

envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their

277).

which are a composition

By "dependents" Hume means passions
of two or

more

of the indirect passions;
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for instance, love

mixed with humility

hate mixed with pride
the indirect passions

contempt.

is

Hume

is the

passion of esteem, and

In describing the operation
of

concentrates on four of them: pride,

humility, love, and hate.

An
passion

indirect passion

directed; for

is

must have an

Hume,

object, that to which the

this is the object

whose idea

"excited" in us when we experience
the passion.

or hate, the object

is

is

In the case of love

always another "person or thinking being,

"

l

while with pride and humility the object

is

always

self;

our affections

for inanimate objects and animals are
not, according to

stances of love.

the

human

An

primary impulse"

is

some

Hume

(T, p.

attributes

280, p.

329),

to "an original

it

inseparable from

constitution.

indirect passion also has a cause, which is
distinct from

the object.

provides

in-

This restriction on the possible objects of
these

indirect passions is inexplicable;
quality or

Hume,

me

The cause

of

my

love, or pride, is

with pleasure, and the cause of

quality which provides

of an indirect passion

the passion.

me

but,

hate, or humility,

in idea with the object of

refer to the cause of our love (or hate)

as the reason why we love (or hate) someone.

extremely varied,

my

quality which

with pain; moreover, the cause

must be associated

We commonly

some

Hume

Such reasons

may

be

argues, they always involve something

associated with the person which gives us pleasure or pain.

For
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my

instance,

come

mistress

to associate

object of

my

may

provide

me

with sensual pleasures.

such pleasures with her, and she becomes the
Or,

love.

quently bites me.

I

these events with

my

my

neighbor might own a dog which fre-

soon come to associate the unpleasantness
neighbor, and

I

may come

to hate

a cause that is closely related to self.

will be one's

own character

The association

at all.

If

my

her charms,

weak

to

of the

mistress

nility

These most often

cause of an indirect passion with that

is

if it is

to

produce the senti-

very sparing or unpredictable with

association of her with sensual pleasure

produce the passion

about his dog's

him and

my

ill

manners,

it.

traits or possessions.

passion's object must be a strong one

ment

of

him for

Similarly, the pleasures and pains that invoke pride c

must have

I

of love.

this

Or,

if

my

might weaken

may

be too

neighbor knows nothing

my

association of

his dog's painful attacks enough to prevent the production of

hate in me.

Because the association between object and cause must

be so strong,

someone on

Hume

believes that

we never come

to love or hate

the basis of single actions alone; these passions are

aroused only

if

we believe

a certain quality of

that the person's actions arise because of

mind or character which

aspect of that person.

Only then

is a relatively

will the association

permanent

between the

pleasures or pains which his actions have caused us and our idea of
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the person himself

become strong enough

to

allow the production of

love or hate.

Thus, part of Hume's explanation of the mechanism
of the
indirect passions involves an association of ideas,
between that of

certain pleasures or pains and that of the object; but

Hume

relies on what he calls an "association of impressions.

"

also

Different

passions have different sensations, but these sensations share varying degrees of resemblance.

According

to

Hume, when we ex-

perience one passion we have a tendency to consequently experience
other passions which resemble

it:

All resembling impressions are connected together, and no
sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief
and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy
to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle
be compleated (T, p. 283).

Thus, when we experience pleasure, we tend
passions.

When our pleasure

results

to

experience pleasant

from something which we closely

associate in idea with a certain person or our

self,

we tend

to ex-

perience the pleasant sentiment of love or pride, with that person
or self as

its object; a

parallel

mechanism underlies

of the unpleasant sentiments of hate and humility.

fond of referring to this

mechanism

the production

Hume

is quite

of the indirect passions as "a

double relation between impressions and ideas.

"
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What

once both evident and disturbing

is at

from Hume's

lists of the direct

pleasure or pain.

is the

absence

and indirect passions of any kind

Granted, we have no reason to assume that

considers these lists to be complete.
that a

man who

of the

human mind

But

it

is

of

Hume

extremely doubtful

claims that "the chief .spring or actuating principle
is

pleasure or pain" (T,

p.

574) would neglect to

include species of pleasure or pain in such lengthy lists of the
direct

and indirect passions

-

unless he does not believe that they belong

there.
In truth,

Hume

cannot include pleasures or pains in the direct

or indirect passions because pleasure and pain are, according
the efficient causes of the direct and indirect passions;
to

"

to

him,

'Tis easy

observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded

on pain and pleasure, and that

any kind,

'tis

(i.

e.

order

only requisite to present

pleasure or pain]
physical

in

,

"

(T,

p.

438).

impressions

to

produce an affection

some gooa or

evil

[i. e.

Such pleasures or pains

may

of sensation),

they

may

are derived from wit, beauty, or morals, or they

of

some
be

be those that

may

be produced

by the actual or prospective satisfaction or frustration of passions

or desires.

Hume

For example,

in the section

tells us that "a suit of fine clothes

"Of the direct passions"

produces pleasure from

their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the
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impressions

of volition

itself a direct passion,

and desire"

(T,

p.

439).

is

not

but rather is a part of the hidden mental

process which concludes with the experiencing
Again, in

The pleasure

Hume

s detailed

such a passion.

of

discussion of the indirect passions

he endeavors to show that these passions always involve

in their

efficient cause "a pleasure or uneasiness separate

the passion"

(T, p.

"a pain or pleasure independent of the passion" (T,
pp.

295),

298-299).

from

These pains and pleasures are not themselves indirect

passions; rather, they are crucial elements in Hume's explanation
of the origin of the indirect passions.

Norman Kemp
David

Hume

,

Smith, in his critical study The Philosophy of

recognizes the difficulties encountered

in

attempting to

place the non-bodily pleasures and pains in Hume's classification of
the impressions.

He also rightly points out

implication than by express statement" that

that

is

it

Hume

"more by

distinguishes

between "bodily pains and pleasures and the pleasures and pains
that arise

from objects immediately upon their mere contemplation.

Nevertheless, Smith does not believe that this difficulty in classification extends to the moral sentiments because he does not hold that
the

moral sentiments are pains or pleasures

all

passions,
In

it

is

at all,

though, as are

"pleasure and pain upon which they are 'founded

1

.

Smith's view, both the moral and the aesthetic sentiments

"2
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can be identified as being the passions which
we experience
ggjkg mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in
action
and external forms, and may accordingl be
further described
y
as being modes of approval and disapproval
T hey constitute
our delight in the beautiful, our revulsion from the
ugly or
disordered, our sentiments of praise and blame in
the presence of virtue and vice. As thus immediately arising
upon
an act of contemplation, they have to be classed
with the
direct, not with the indirect passions. 4
.

In

my

next chapter

I

show

will

that the

moral sentiment does indeed

share some important characteristics of the direct passions.
ever,

Hume

is insistent

throughout the Treatise on equating the moral

sentiment with a "peculiar” kind of pleasure or pain.
is

How-

As

such, there

no consistent way to classify the moral sentiment as a passion,

either direct or indirect.
I

from

have argued that Hume's exclusion of pleasures and pains

his lists, in

Book

II,

of the direct

and indirect passions

is a

strong indication that he does not believe that they belong there.

However, there
which

is a single

Hume seems

impression

passage

at the beginning of

to be saying that the

Book

moral sentiment

is

II

in

an

of reflection:

The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds,
viz the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense
,

of beauty and deformity in action,

composition, and external
objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred,
grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from
being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently
rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions,
properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion.
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as to become, in a manner,
imperceptible (T,

This passage does nothing
of the

moral sentiment.

to

ease the problem of the
classification

Hume

points out a few lines later that
the

calm-violent distinction is "vulgar and
specious.

concern

is with the

consistent

way

276).

p.

direct-indirect distinction.

to classify the

"

The legitimate

There

moral sentiment, be

it

is still

no

calm or other-

wise, as direct or indirect, and thus
no consistent way to classify
it

as an impression of reflection, or
passion.

There remains

Hume
I

is

at this point to offer a

so unclear as to the status of the moral
sentiment.

once again find myself

that

"Hume

odds with

which he expounds

in

ethics in which he
if

at

Kemp

Smith.

Smith contends

it;

when he

was primarily interested.

"5

started,

If

Smith

Book

III

it

was

his

is right in

indeed the development of the ethical theory which

offers in

In this,

thought out the teaching of the Treatise in the
reverse

order from that

this,

conjecture as to why

Hume

predates and motivates the development of the

theories of the understanding and the passions, Hume's total
failure
in placing the
all the

more

moral sentiment

astounding.

at all plausible that

if

in his

|

of

impressions becomes

Further, in conjunction with this,

Smith

is

correct

sentiment as a direct passion that
that but for two

scheme

in identifying the

Hume

would declare,

is

it

moral
in

Book

minor, and for the present point, irrelevant,

II,
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exceptions "none of the direct affections seem to
merit our particular
attention" (T, p. 439)?

With

ments

I

think not.

mind,

this in

am

I

inclined to take

in his introduction to the

tells us that

"explain the principles of
lieves, is

at face value.

There he

intention to develop "a science of man,

is his

it

Treatise

Hume's pronounce-

human

nature.

"

" to

Such a science, he be-

necessary for the development of every other science,

even such as "mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion.
In treating of the understanding and the passions in

respectively,

Book

Hume

"

can be considered

how these basic principles
sciences which deal with

case that of "morals.

I

am

not,

I

and

II,

attempts to develop this science of man; and

"Of Morals,

III,

Books

"

of

to be

human nature can

more

specific

an illustration of
be used to develop

human phenomena

-

in this

"

however, without hopes, that the present system

of philosophy

new force as

fi. e.

,

Hume's science

of

man}

will acquire

advances; and that our reasonings concerning
whatever has been said concerning
the understanding and the passions (T, p. 455).

morals

it

will corroborate

This way of proceeding would be analogous to a scientist concluding
a text on the physics of
of sound

-

wave motion with

a section on the

phenomenon

the basic physical principles developed in the first part

of the text would be applied in the second section to a specific kind

34

of

wave motion, sound.
It

is likely

not have in

then that, in writing Books

mind any particular application

I

specific, and exhibits

Book
in

II.

Book

It

III

some

is

does

of others.

This

neglected to be

more

Hume

is not

more

specific

concerned with morality, and the moral sentiment.

sentiment as a passion
is not.

Hume

confusion, about the moral sentiment in

Perhaps here Hume has come

it

Hume has

does not, of course, explain why

where

II,

of his basic principles,

such as the science of morals, to the exclusion
provides some explanation of why

and

is too

to believe that the status of the

obvious to consider

in detail.

In omitting a consideration of this question

either by design or not,

Hume overlooks

the

it

is a

Of course,

from Book

III,

very serious conflicts

which arise from holding both that the moral sentiment
of pain or pleasure and that

moral

legitimate passion.

is a

species
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CHAPTER

III

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL SENTIMENT
1

Hume's moral sentiment,
pleasure or pain.

The question

I

then, is a "peculiar" kind of

wish

moral sentiment derives from

not this

mentioned
treating

in

my

Hume

examine now

is

a

"moral sense.

"

Introduction, the conventional

as a moral sense theorist.

such an interpretation, however,

moral sense.

to

"

Most

often, the

is the

One

As

I

wisdom concurs

in

difficulty in appraising

vagueness

moral sense

whether or

is

of the

term

described as an

"internal" counterpart to our physical senses; yet, such a description

by analogy suffers

all the

what a physical sense

A

more from

the difficulties in saying just

is.

classic, and perhaps the first, formulation of a

sense theory

is

moral

found in the works of Frances Hutcheson (1694-1746).

Hutcheson describes the moral sense as follows:
That as the Author of Nature has determin'd us to receive,
by our external senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of
Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our
Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures
of Beauty and Harmony ... in the same manner he has
given us a MORAL SENSE, to direct our Actions, and to
give us still nobler Pleasures
We mean by (the moral
sense] only a Determination of our Minds to receive
amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur
to our Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage
or Loss to redound to our selves from them ... ~
.

.

.

1
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Hutcheson insists that these pleasures or pains
which are
sentiments are different

in kind

the

moral

from those derived from our physical

senses, or from views of our own interests and
desires.

We must

then be said to have the "power" of receiving
such pleasures and
pains, and this

"Power

MORAL

call’d a

SENSE.

of receiving these Perceptions

may

be

"3

That the Perceptions of moral Good and Evil, are perfectly
ent from those of natural Good, or Advantage every
one must convince himself, by reflecting on the different
Manner in which he finds himself affected when these objects occur to him. ^

some Actions have

Men

an immediate Goodness; or,
which I call a Moral one, we
perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation of such Actions in
others, and are determin'd to love the Agent, (and much
more do we perceive Pleasure in being conscious of having
done such Actions ourselves) without any View of further
natural Advantage from them. 3
.

.

.

to

that by a superior Sense,

Hutcheson maintains that empirical investigation reveals
that,

in fact,

all

actions whose contemplations invoke the pleasant

sentiment of approval have a

common

quality:

feeling of benevolence, or love of others.

contingent matter.
tution of our

is

nature of our creator, God,

If it

This, however, is a

Though Hutcheson argues

moral sense

most
it

in

they spring from a

that the actual consti-

keeping with our idea of the

could logically be otherwise:

be here enquir'd 'Could not the

DEITY have

given us a
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different or contrary determination of Mind,
viz to approve
Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?'
It
is certain, there is nothing in this
surpassing the natural

Power

of the

DEITY.

^

Hutcheson recognizes
(i.

e.

,

modes

of

at least five different types of

"determinations of our minds

or disagreeable ideas") in human beings:
I

have called the

physical

to

senses

receive amiable

external senses (which

senses), the sense of beauty and

harmony

in objects, a public or a social

sympathy, the moral sense, and a

sense of honor.

senses

reduced

to a

Each

of these

primary

in that

none can be

combination of the others; the pleasures and pains pro-

duced by each are unique.
point out that the

In particular,

moral sense

of sympathy, for, he argues,

through sympathy

According

is

is not to "reflect

to

Hutcheson

is

careful to

not a manifestation of the sense

merely

to

share the feelings of others

upon Virtue or Vice.

"7

Hutcheson, the underlying mechanism of the

moral sense, no less than those
mystery.

is

of the other senses,

The causes are hidden,

must remain

a

but the effects are clear;

This natural Determination to approve and admire, or hate
and dislike Actions, is no doubt an occult Quality. But is
it any more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should
raise Esteem, or Contempt, than that the motion, or tearing
of Flesh should give Pleasure, or Pain; or the Act of Volition
should move Flesh and Bones? In the latter case, we have
got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and
elastic Fluids, like the Indian's Elephant, and Tortoise, to
bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further.
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and you find the whole as difficult as at
first, and equally
a Mystery with this Determination
to love and approve, or
hate and despise Actions and Agents,
without any Views
of interest, as they appear benevolent,
or the contrary. 8

C.

D.

flections on

Broad,

Moral

-

in his

Sense Theories

moral sense theories.

for

important article entitled "Some Rein Ethics, "9

He shows

provides a taxonomy

that there are two possible

interpretations of the epistemological status of the moral
sense.

The

first is

what he calls the "Naively Realistic Account"

moral sense; such an account

of the

moral sense

is

of the

analogous to

a naively realistic account of ordinary sense perception.

Roughly,

such an account holds that there are objective sensible qualities
present

in

external objects, independent of any perceiver, which can

be perceived just as they are through the appropriate physical sense.

On

a naively realistic account of the

moral sense, there

exist as

objective properties of characters and actions certain ethical characteristics, such as rightness, which can be apprehended directly

by the moral sense.

The alternative account
"Dispositional Account.

"

of the

moral sense Broad terms

Here again there

certain account of sense perception.

is

the

an analogy with a

The dispositional account

of sense perception denies that sensible qualities exist objectively
in external objects.

Rather, to say that a thing has quality x

is to
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say something like "that thing
will present an x-ish
appearance

normal perceivers under standard
conditions.
account of the moral sense, that sense

is

"

On

to

a dispositional

a faculty which provides

us with unique emotions or sensations
when we contemplate char-

acters and actions.
It

is

exceedingly difficult to stamp Hutcheson's
moral sense

theoiy as either naively realistic or
dispositional.

most incisive examination
article "Hutcheson's

Perhaps the

of this question is William K.

Moral Sense Theory"™; Frankena

Frankena's
is led to

conclude there that "Hutcheson's general
epistemological position
{Jis

is

one which he]

supported

never quite explicitly formulates.

in his

"

Frankena

conclusion by Henning Jensen, who finds strains

of both types of accounts in Hutcheson;

The naively realistic side of his theory, according to which
moral sense would cognize some empirical characteristic, remains undeveloped.
Worse still, a naively realistic
terminology in his moral sense doctrine conflicts with the
the

fact that a naively realistic theory is entirely foreign
to his
general epistemological position. 11

2

What kind

of

moral sense theory Hutcheson holds

clear; but there can be no doubt that he is a

This certainty

is

not provided

moral sense

is not

theorist.

merely by Hutcheson's usage

of the

41

term "moral sense,
itself to

"

for to

advocate a moral sense theory.

moral sense theory

a

employ certain terminology

is

is not in

Rather, the criterion of

summarized by Broad as

follows:

would hold] that there is a peculiar kind
of experience
which human beings are liable to have when
they contemplate
certain acts, and that this can take
either of two
Clt

forms

viz.

a

,

pro-form and an anti-form.

[it]

that this ^experience is of the nature
of feeling,

opposite
would hold

where

feeling" is used to include both sensation
and emotion
as distinguished from thought. 12

Hutcheson
still

of

is insistent

nobler

'

on pointing out that our moral feelings are

and "perfectly different" from

which we are immediately conscious 13

;

it

all others,
is this

a difference

which marks him

as a moral sense theorist.

The issue
a

I

wish

moral sense theory

Hume

has borrowed

much? Those

to turn to

in the

Treatise

much from

that interpret

now

Hume

III

of the

There

.

is little doubt that

is;

how

as proposing a moral sense

Hume

improving on Hutcheson's exposition.

Book

whether or not Hume holds

Hutcheson; the question

theory in the Treatise often regard

maintains that

is

as doing nothing

more

For example, Kemp Smith

T reatise

is a

masterly restatement,

with a clarity and self-consistency beyond anything possible to

Hutcheson, of Hutcheson's own main theses ....

main theses

is that

man

is fitted

than

" 14

One

of these

with a specifically moral sense,
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which affords him a "peculiar" and unique kind

Hutcheson
as

occult

must

'

is

in that,

of pleasure and pain.

content to regard the operations of this
sense

as with our physical senses,

its

"explanation"

be limited to a description of initial conditions
and effects.

Hume

shares this same view with respect

to

human senses and mental

qualities:

to me it seems evident, that the essence of mind
being
equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it
must
be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers
and
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments,
and the observation of those particular effects, which result

For

from

If

Hume

different circumstances and situations (T,

its

indeed believes that there

expect that Book

III

is a

p.

xvii).

moral sense, we would

of the Treatise could offer little

more

than a

detailed account of this sense's "particular effects which result

from

its different

circumstances and situations.

"

This, as we shall

see, is not the case.

cannot be denied that Hume's terminology in Book

It

the Treatise is often that of a
entitled Section

sense.

"

II

of

Moreover,

clearly be

Book
it

III

seems

moral sense theory.

that

Hume,

of

He has even

"Moral distinctions deriv'd from

marked as advocating

moral sense:

III

a

moral

unlike Hutcheson, can

a dispositional account of the

"Vice and virtue, therefore,

may

be compar'd to

sounds, colours, heat, and cold which, according to modern philos-
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ophy, are not qualities in objects, but
perceptions in the mind
(T,

p.

469).

Yet
taking

'

1

Hume

believe that in this case

at his

word.

we should

Rather than relying on what he says,
we

should look at what he does; and what he
does,
fit

comfortably

be careful in

at all with the

claim that he

I

maintain, does not

is advocati

a

sense theory.

A

faculty; though

we may, through experimentation, describe

moral

sense, for Hume, is a "primary" and
"original"
the

operations of a sense in terms of general principles,
for instance,
that

we always perceive as such-and-such color

a light of such-and-

such wavelength, we cannot resolve a sense into
more basic principles of

human

nature, for this would be to deny

distinct faculty.
it.

A

sense

With this in mind,

I

is

as

wish

it is,

to

draw

its

status as a

and we cannot hope to explain
attention to the following

passages taken from the section "Moral distinctions deriv'd from
a

moral sense":

may now

be ask'd in general concerning this pain or
pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and evil. From what
It

principles

,

is

it

deriv ed, and whence does

it

arise in the

reply, first "that rtis absurd to"
imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments
are produc'd by an origina l quality and primary constitution
Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual

human mind ? To

this

I

,

maxims, by which nature

is conducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe,
and every thing is carry'd on in the easiest and most simple

manner.

"Tis necessary, therefore, to abridge these

.

.

.
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primary impulses, and
upon which

all

Thus we are

some more general principles,
our notions of morals are founded
(T, p 473)
find

brought back to our first position that
virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and
vice by the pain,
that any action, sentiment or character
gives us by the mere
still

view and contemplation. This decision is very
commodious;
because it reduces us to this simple question.
Why any
action
sentiment upon_the general view or sul^ ^ives
3
a certain satisfaction or uneasiness in order
to shew the
,

origin of its

It

moral rectitude or depravity

reasonable

is

.

.

.

(T,

pp

475-

ask for a description of the way a certain

to

sense operates under certain conditions; for instance, we might
ask

what we would perceive, through our sense
light of a given wavelength.

^

moral sense,

Similarly,

is legitimate to

it

if

of sight,

we assume

when exposed
that

to

we possess

ask what feelings would be produced,

through this sense, when we consider a certain act of unprovoked
But we cannot reasonably ask why a certain sense works

violence.
the

way

it

does

would have

-

it

is not

to be like.

even clear what an answer

We

do not ask

to this question

why we perceive

a certain

wavelength as a certain color; we do not expect a moral sense
theorist to ask

why certain actions and characters provoke

sentiments that they do.

"Why

[jdoes^

Yet,

Hume poses

the

moral

just such a question;

any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey,

give a certain satisfaction or uneasiness ... ?".
I

will

show

in the

following sections that

Hume answers

his
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own question by resolving
principles" of

moral sense

human

the

moral sense

some more general

into

nature; he cannot be satd to
countenance a

at all in the

Treatise

.

My

argument for

on Broad's criterion for a moral
sense theory,

to the effect that

such a theory must hold that the moral
sentiment
all others.

I

will

show

that exactly the

same

this will rely

is a feeling unlike

kind of pleasures and

pains which are for Hume, under the
proper conditions, the moral

sentiments are, under other conditions, non-moral
sentiments; that
is,

there

is

no uniquely moral sentiment at

all.

3

In describing the operation of a sense,

we are sometimes

able to enumerate certain conditions which
must obtain in order for
the sense to function.

For instance, illumination

the operation of our sense of sight.

when

required for

tells us that " 'Tis only

a character is considered in general, without
reference to

our particular interest, that
as denominates
see

Hume

is

Hume

as a

it

it

causes such a feeling or sentiment,

morally good or evil"

(T, p.

moral sense theorist must view

the claim that, as a matter of act, the

472).

Those who

this statement as

moral sense does not operate

unless one has first adopted the moral point of view.
Unfortunately,

moral

Hume

is

notoriously vague in describing the

point of view, which he also

commonly refers

to as a

"general
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view or survey.

At least, we know that the moral
point of view

involves an "overlooking" of personal
interests and desires (T,
P,

The pains and pleasures which derive from
the satisfaction

582).

or frustration of our personal desires,
or the prospects thereof, are
not the

moral sentiments.

in its relation to

retard
will be

my

If I

contemplate an action or character

myself, according to

its

tendency to promote or

personal welfare, the pleasures or pains which
follow

interested" sentiments.

The moral sentiment, on

the other

hand, arises only upon considering an action
or character in relation
to society as a whole,

in

which each member's interests count

equally with every other's.
objective viewpoint.

There

is

This

is

commonly

called "taking an

"

an important point to be

made

here.

that there is a difference between one's adopting the

It

is

obvious

moral point

of view and one's believing that one has; the latter need not
imply

the former.

We

see examples every day of people who have become

so habituated to a certain interested point of view that they cannot

consider matters objectively, though they
do so.

Yet,

moral point

many such
of view.

make an honest

people do believe that they have adopted the

Consider, for instance, the majority of lawyers

who argue sincerely against no-fault insurance, or
of doctors

effort to

the majority

who argue sincerely against socialized medicine.

I
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think

is safe to

it

assume

many

that

of these people are being

influenced by personal interest, though they themselves
realize this.

Hume shows

himself

to be well

aware

may

not

pos-

of this

sibility:

Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently
concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded
with other motives which the mind, from vanity or selfconceit, it desirous of supposing more prevalent (I,
p. 117).

It

is

important to understand

that,

Hume, we must

for

successful in adopting the moral point of view
the

moral sentiment.

we believe

If

the pleasures and pains which

may

sentiments, not the moral, though

we are

to

we have adopted

that

point of view in a certain consideration

if

when we

in fact

be

experience

the

moral

have not,

be aroused in us will be interested
"

'Tis true, these sentiments,

from

interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run
into one another"
If

(T, p.

Hume's were

further explanation of

view

is a

472).

a

moral sense theory, there could

why successful adoption

moral point

prerequisite for the operation of the moral sense;

be explained in no other

way than

to attribute

constitution" or "original quality" of
not follow this course.
"

of the

be no

'Tis only

We

human

will see that

when a character

is

it

to a

nature.

it

of

could

"primary
Yet

Hume

Hume's statement

that

considered in general, without

does
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reference to our personal interest, that
sentiment, as denominates

tion

of the operation of a

(albeit incomplete) of the

it

causes such a feeling or

it

morally good or evil"

moral sense;

it

is not

a descrip-

is rather a definitio n

moral sentiment.

4

Emulating the scientist

Hume undertakes
to

compile a

the

search for general principles,

an empirical investigation of sorts; he endeavors

list of

the characters or actions which tend to produce

moral sentiment

Hume

in his

finds that all

in objective

observers.

qualities of the

From

his compilation,

mind" which tend

cause the

to

pleasurable moral sentiment can be classified as one or more of
the following 15

;

those that are immediately "agreeable" to the

possessor, those that are immediately agreeable

to those

who come

into contact with the possessor, those that tend to be "useful" to

the possessor, and those that tend to be useful to others.

By
to the

qualities of the

possessor

pleasant.

mind

Hume means

that are

those whose immediate sensation

As examples, Hume

offers the following:

courage, tranquillity, delicacy of taste
other qualities which,

joyment" or pleasure

Hume

"immediately agreeable"

tells us,

to others,

(I,

pp.

is

cheerfulness,

74-83).

There are

bestow "an immediate en-

"communicating, on

[their]

first
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appearance, a lively joy and satisfaction

comprehension
lists

[them]

of

"

to

everyone who has any

«, p. 84); as examples of these

Hume

good manners, wit, ingenuity, eloquence,
modesty, decency,

cleanliness, and grace.

The idea

of any quality

which

falls

under

either of these two categories tends
to produce a pleasant
sentiment
in us

if

we adopt

the

moral point

of view.

By "useful” Hume means contributing

Some

qualities of

mind tend

to happiness and welfare.

to be useful to their

possessor, such as

pride, perseverance, patience, vigilance,
and frugality.

The ideas

of these qualities too

produce the pleasant moral sentiment

objective observer.

Some

in

an

qualities tend to be useful in promoting

the welfare of society at large, such as
benevolence, honesty, and
fidelity.

It

is

with respect to this category that

Hume

introduces a

distinction between what he calls "natural" and
"artificial" virtues.

A

natural virtue

it

is

is a

quality of

immediately agreeable

agreeable

to others,

it

mind which

to the

tends

to

is

possessor,

one of the following:
it

is

immediately

prompt actions which are useful

to the

possessor or others, independently

Some

actions, however, are useful to society only within the context

of an accepted

expression

in

system

of the actions of others.

of conventional behavior.

our laws of property which,

the limits of justice and injustice.

Hume

This system finds
believes, define
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The only difference betwixt the natural virtues
and justice
lies in this, that the good, which results
from the former
arises from every single act, and is the object
of some
natural passion; Whereas a single act of
justice, consider'd
in itself,

may

often be contrary to the public good;
and »tis
only the concurrence of mankind, in a general
scheme or
system of action, which is advantageous
and 'twas with
a view to this advantage, that men, by their
voluntary
conventions, establish'd it (T; p. 579).
.

Hume

believes that initially there is no

.

.

human propensity toward

acts of justice as such; there is only a view to self-interest.

ever,

men come

to see that certain

mutually accepted conventions

are essential to the furtherance of this self-interest.

system
of

is established,

mind or

As with

perform acts

former three types

a pleasant sentiment

view, a quality of

if

Once

this

there can be developed in us a certain quality

inclination to

the

How-

of

of justice for their

own sake.

mental qualities, we experience

we contemplate, from

mind which tends

to

the

moral

point of

prompt actions which promote

the welfare of society, either "naturally" or "artificially" (as a

contributor to the system of justice).

These categories are not mutually exclusive.
in addition to

Cheerfulness,

being pleasant to the possessor, conveys an immediate

satisfaction to others in contact with the possessor; and benevolence,

according

to

Hume,

is

pleasant to the possessor as well as being

useful to others.

The question Hume poses

is this;

by what principles do
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such types of mental qualities cause

in us a pleasant

contemplated from the moral point of
view?

prompted by

a

more

Hume's

the stage as follows.

to the

We

possessor or

to others.

is

Hume

sets

experience pleasant sentiments when
we

observe or contemplate actions which we
believe
This

solution is

careful consideration of those
qualities of mind

which are useful, either

own welfare.

sentiment when

will

accounted for by self-interest.

promote our
But there are

cases where we ignore our own interests and
desires, by adopting
the

moral

point of view, and still receive a pleasure

or contemplating actions or characters which
tend
others.

How

can this be?

the "true origin of

Hume’s answer

morals"

(T,

p.

is the

from observing

to be useful to

principle of sympathy,

575).

Now

as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where
the
agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own
interest is not concern'd, or that of our friends,
please
oniy by sympathy; It follows, that sympathy is the
source
of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial
virtues
Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle
in human nature
and that it produces our sentiment of
morals in all the artificial virtues. From thence we may
presume that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues;
and that qualities acquire our approbation, because of their
tendency to the good of mankind (T, pp. 577-578).

end

is

.

Hume

.

then considers those qualities of mind which are

immediately agreeable
here too sympathy

l

.

to the

possessor or

is essential to

to others;

he finds that

an explanation of how a pleasant
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sentiment can be aroused from a non-interested
consideration of
these qualities.

In

each case, the pleasure we receive from
a non

interested view of the pleasure of others can
only be explained by

an appeal to sympathy:

The person

is a stranger; I am in no way
interested in him
under any obligation to him: His happiness concerns
not me, farther than the happiness of every
human, and
indeed of every sensible creature; That is, it affects
me
only by sympathy. From that principle, whenever
I discover
his happiness and good, whether in its causes or
effects,
I enter so deeply into it,
that it gives me a sensible emotion

nor

lie

(T, pp.

Hume

588-589).

takes few pains to conceal his feeling of self-satis-

faction with his appeal to

sympathy

to

account for the pleasant

sentiments associated with those qualities of mind commonly called
"virtues":

'Tis very happy, in our philosophical researches, when we
same phaenomenon diversified b}^ a variety of cir-

find the

cumstances; and by discovering what is common among them,
can the better assure ourselves of the truth of any hypothesis
we may make use of to explain it. Were nothing esteem'd
virtue but what were beneficial to society, I am persuaded,
that the foregoing explication of the moral sense (viz.
in terms of sympathy] ought still to be receiv'd, and that
upon sufficient evidence; But this evidence must grow upon
us, when we find other kinds of virtue, which will not admit
of any explication except from that hypothesis (T, p. 588).
,

Unfortunately,

Hume's good

feelings might have diminished

considerably had he realized the seriousness of the ambiguity with
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which he would burden future
readers.

The

difficulty lies in deter-

mining the nature of the relationship
between a sympathetic sentiment
moral sentiment. Hume, it is
true, does clearly tell
us that

sympathy "produces our sentiment

sympathy
that

"To

is the chief

of

morals"

(T, p.

source of moral distinctions"

that principle [viz.

sympathy]

577 ), that
(T,

p.

618),

therefore, we are to

,

ascribe the sentiment of approbation,
which arises from the survey
of all those virtues, that
are useful to society, or to the
person

possess'd of them"

(T,

p.

619).

The crucial question

is:

is the

sentiment derived from sympathy
merely a cause of the moral
sentiment, or
to

answer

is

it

identical to the

this question,

Humean sympathy

it

is

moral sentiment?

necessary

to

examine

In attempting

the nature of

in detail.

5

Concerning sympathy, which
by communication another's
believes that "No quality of
in itself, and in its

is the

human

ability to "receive

inclinations and sentiments,

human nature

consequences"

(T, p.

is

"

Hume

more remarkable,

both

316).

To this principle we ought to ascribe the great uniformity
we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of
those
of the same nation ... A good-natur'd man
finds himself in
an instant of the same humour with his company; and
even
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the proudest and

most surly take a tincture from their
countrymen and acquaintance. A chearful countenance
infuses a sensible complacency and serenity
into my mind;
as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden
damp upon
me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage,
mirth
and melancholy; all these passions I feel more
from communication than from my own natural temper and disposition (T, pp.

But

Hume

is not

316-317).

content to pass off our ability to sympathize as

an "occult" quality; rather, he insists that sympathy
"must be
trac'd up to

The

its first

principles"

first principles to

(T,

which

p.

317).

Hume

is led

involve the re-

lationship between ideas and impressions, and the possibility of
the conversion of the

former

to the latter.

No one

of us can ex-

perience directly the impression of another's passion.

observe
(T, p.

is

What we can

"external signs in the countenance and conversation"

317).

We know from

our own personal experience that we

tend to exhibit a certain set of external signs when we are ex-

periencing a certain passion.

Thus, according

to

Hume, we come

to associate the ideas of certain passions with certain signs.

we observe

certain signs in another, we

process of association (which "operates

come

to have, via the

in so silent

and im-

perceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of
the idea of the appropriate passion.

When

it"

(T,

305)),

p.

At this point, however, we

conceive of the passion as belonging to the other person

(T,

p.

still

319),
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and hence the vivacity of our idea of this
passion will be a function
of the vivacity of our idea of that
person.
It

is a

corollary to Hume's principle of association
that an

impression will "infuse" a like degree
closely related idea.

Hume

of vivacity or intensity on a

claims, ;n his discussion of sympathy,

that

'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression
of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and that
our
consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own
person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that anything

can

in this

particular go beyond it. Whatever object,
thei efore, is related to ourselves must be conceived
with
a like vivacity of conception ... (T, p. 317).

Because the impression

of one's self is so vivid, the ideas of

objects which are associated with ourselves will be

more or

intense, depending on the strength of the association.

less

Two im-

portant factors in determining the strength of such an association

are resemblance and contiguity; that

is,

we tend

to "identify"

more

with objects that resemble us, and which are near to us in space

or time.

We

tend to

more

closely associate the idea of ourselves

with the idea of an animal than with the idea of an inanimate object;
within the animal kingdom itself

we tend

to

form closer or more

distant associations, depending on the degree of resemblance born
to us.

Even

in the

case of human beings, the force with which we

associate the idea of another person with the idea of ourselves

is
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increased where that person resembles
ns
or language" (T,

318),

p.

in

"manners, or character

and where that person

is

near to us

in

distance or time:

The stronger

the relation is betwixt ourselves
and any
object, the more easily does the
imagination make the
transition, and convey to the related
idea the vivacity of
conception, with which we always form the
idea of our
own person (T, p. 318).

When we sympathize

with another person, then, we first

receive the idea of that person exhibiting certain
signs (either from
direct observation, or from

are carried thence

to

some other

indirect information).

We

an idea of a passion as affecting that person.

This idea will be more or less intense, depending on
the degree
of association

which binds that person

to ourselves.

tion is of sufficient degree, the intensity with
which

If

this associa-

we conceive

of

ourselves will be transmitted to our idea of the other person, and
to

our idea of his passion, and

in so

doing "This flatter]

idea is

presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree
of force and vivacity, as to

become

the very passion itself, and

produce an equal emotion, as any original affection"
"This

is the

nature and cause of sympathy" (T,

Based on

this description of

p.

(T,

317).

319).

sympathy as "nothing

lively idea converted into an impression" (T, pp.

p.

but a

385-386),

Hume
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explains

how we can sympathize with passions which are nonFor example,

existent.

am immediately
imagine
to

should

if I

come upon

a

person

in tears,

carried to a lively idea of the sorrow which

to be affecting that

person, and which

may

such a degree as to become the very sorrow

mechanism would

be unaffected

if,

unbeknownst

I

be "inliven'd"

itself.

to

I

me,

This
I

were witnes-

sing tears of joy rather than of sorrow.

Similarly,

I

am

able to sympathize with passions that

conceive to affect a person

For supposing

I

at a later time;

saw

a person perfectly

unknown to me, who,
while asleep in the fields, was in danger of being trod
under foot by horses, I shou'd immediately run to his assistance; and in this I shou'd be actuated by the same
principle of sympathy, which makes me concern'd for the
present sorrows of a stranger
Sympathy being nothing
but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis evident,
that, in considering the future possible or probable condition
of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be
sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to
ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence
(T, pp. 385-386).
I

.

Although

my

concern here

principle of sympathy as such,

over

its

examination without

difficulties.

appears

in

As we have
Book

II

it

is

.

.

not with an appraisal of

would be inappropriate

at least pointing out

seen,

Hume's account

some

of

to

Hume's

pass

of its severe

sympathy, which

of the Treatise, relies on his contention that "the
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idea, or rather

impression

of ourselves is always
intimately present

with us, and that our consciousness gives
us so lively a conception
of our

own person,

in this particular

that 'tis not possible to imagine,
that any thing

can go beyond

"

it.

But in this

Hume

tradicts that for which he so carefully'argues
in Book

flatly conin his

I,

"

section "Of personal identity.

There are some philosophers [amusingly enough, the
Hume
of Book II is one of them]
who imagine we are every moment
intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that
we feel
,

its

existence and

continuance in existence; and are
beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of
perfect identity and simplicity
Unluckily all these
positive assertions are contrary to that very experience,
which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self,
its

certain,

.

after the

manner

it

is

.

its

.

here explain'd

(T,

p.

251).

may

venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions,
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity
There is properly no simplicity in the mind at one time,
nor identity in different
They are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind; nor have we the
most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are
represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd"
(T, pp. 252-253).
I

.

Kemp Smith
is

aware

.

.

argues that there

of this inconsistency.

^

is

some evidence

Smith points

to

that

Hume's

Hume

use, in

his account of sympathy, of the phrase "our consciousness gives us

so lively a conception of our own person,

"

which Smith finds

"cumbersome" and "non-committal" when compared

with the

to be

more
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phrase "the idea, or rather impression
of ourselves"

definite
(T,

p.

Says Smith,

317).

natural to suppose that his later

"it is

uneasy awareness of the contradiction between
necessitated these alternative wordings.

awareness has

not,

in the

difficulty,

(see T, pp.

because of

it.

I

have alluded

Treatise

,

"

the

two Books has

In any case,

prompted him

to resolve the

635-636) and his account of sympathy suffers

to the

second difficulty in

my

the distinction between impressions and ideas.

Hume's several pronouncements
between impressions and ideas

I

second chapter:

pointed out that

that the only "original difference"

is

degree of vivacity

is belied

account of belief, wherein an idea, though augmented
to a level of

an impression, retains

its identity

sympathy, however, the conversion from idea
take place.
belief and

Hume admits
sympathy

Hume's

is

in intensity

as an idea.

to

by his

In

impression does

that this difference in the capacities of

"surprising and extraordinary" (T,

but he offers nothing in his account of

p.

sympathy which helps

320),

to

explain this difference.
Finally,

it

is

which can be traced

interesting to note the sequence of explanations
in the Treatise.

our moral sentiments by appealing
sympathy.

Again,

Hume

Hume

to a

attempts to account for

principle

insists on tracing

more

sympathy

basic:

to its "first

60

principles.

"

This leads him to the principle of association,
which

is

developed

to

seek no further for principles more basic than that

in

Book

At

I.

first,

Hume

pretends to be content
of association;

Here

is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the
mental world
will be found to have as extraordinary effects as
in the natural,
and to shew itself in as many and as various forms.
Its

effects are

everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes,
they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into original
qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain”
Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to
restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes
into obscure and uncertain speculations (T,
pp. 12-13).

Sadly enough, Hume's self-restraint

is not

sections later, he can't help admitting that
to

complete.
M

'Twou'd have been easy

have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn,

why upon our conception
all the

of

any idea, the animal spirits run into

contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are

related to

it"

(T,

p.

60).

Sadder yet,

Hume

then proceeds to

give just such an anatomy lesson in explaining
in

Only a few

how certain errors

reasoning occur.

6

What, then,

and sympathy?

is the

Hume

relationship between the moral sentiment

tells us he is

seeking

sense into "some more general principles"

to

(T,

resolve the moral
p.

473); later,

we are

61

told that

sympathy "produces our sentiment

artificial virtues
(T,

pp.

.

.

also gives rise to

.

(T, p.

(T,

the general tenor of

Hume's

as equating

On such an
human

"sympathy

588), that

moral distinctions"

the

p.

618).

in all the

of the other virtues"

From

is the chief

source of

such statements, and from

exposition, one might be led to interpret

moral sentiments with sympathetic sentiments.
moral sense

interpretation, the

is

more

nothing

than

ability to sympathize.

Such an interpretation

is

given by Ingemar Hedenius.

Hedenius holds that Hume's attempt
a

many

morals

577-578), that sympathy provides an "explication of
the

moral sense"

Hume

of

more general

to

"reduce the moral sense

to

principle, that of sympathy, inevitably leads to an

interpretation of all sympathy as moral approval or disapproval. "18

On Hedenius'

interpretation, for one to experience a

or the moral sentiment,

is for

moral

feeling,

one to experience "a sympathetic

consciousness of the pleasure or pain of others. "18 Hume does seem
to be saying just that in several places.

For example, immediately

after telling us that "the distinction of vice and virtue
a considerable

insisted on,

"

Every

dependence on the principle

Hume

of

.

.

.

has also

sympathy so often

gives an explanation as follows:

quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which
gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which
produces pain, is call'd vicious. This pleasure and this
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may

pain

arise from four different sources.
For we reap
a pleasure from the view of a character,
which is naturally
itted to be useful to others, or to the
person himself, or
which is agreeable to others, or to the person
himself
(T, p.

Hume

591)

then points out in several places that "the
happiness of

strangers affects us by sympathy alone"

seems

when

to be saying,

character,

I

consider

and on others; and

sympathy,

I

am

Contrary
such a view.

in

its

I

(T,

p.

619).

Thus,

Hume

contemplate a certain quality of mind or

likely (or actual) effects on its possessor

sharing their pleasures or pains through

thereby experiencing the moral sentiment.
to

Hume

Hedenius,

I

do not believe that

Hume

ever held

holds that we cannot experience the moral

sentiment unless we first take the moral point of view.

Certainly,

however, we can sympathize with others without taking the moral
point of view; in fact,

Hume

insists that

we sympathize more with

loved ones and close acquaintances than with strangers.
the

moral sentiment cannot

Hume
(T,

p.

also tells us that
481).

Hence,

be identified with sympathetic sentiment.

we are able

to

sympathize with animals

Imagine the situation, then,

in

which we are contem-

plating the character of a dog which has a habit of mauling cats.

We

consider the pain and terror of his victims, and experience

similar feelings through sympathy.

more

If

moral sentiments were no

than sympathetic sentiments, we must be said to be experiencing
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the

former

in

the present case.

only the characters of

Hume

But

believes that

human beings which can arouse

is

it

in

us the

moral sentiment.
Finally,

sentiment

is a

we must remember

that

Hume

holds that a moral

"peculiar" kind of pleasure or pain.

However, sym-

pathy extends, not only to (non-sensational)
pleasures and pains, but
to all the passions,

direct and indirect.

The minds

of all men are similar in their feelings
and
operations, nor can any one be actuated by any
affection, of
which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible.
As
in strings equally wound up, the
motion of one communicates
itself to the rest; so all the affections
readily pass from one
person to another, and beget correspondent movements

in

When
I

I

every human creature

sympathize with a person

feel anger;

joyful.

though

when

I

575-576).

pp.

in his

anger, according to Hume,

sympathize with a person

Through sympathy,

Hume

(T,

I

tells us that the

come

to

in his joy,

I

too

experience passions;

experience of each passion

own way, pleasant or unpleasant

(T,

themselves pleasures or pains.

Thus, the feelings that

p.

is,

am

but,

in its

590), passions are not

I

experience

through sympathy cannot, in general, be moral sentiments.
If

Hume

does not

mean

to identify

moral sentiments with

sympathetic sentiments, what does he mean

to

do?

Most commen-

tators conclude that sympathetic feelings do not constitute moral
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sentiments, but rather are causal
elements

moral sentiments by the moral sense.

My

in the

production of

sympathy allows

me

to

share the unpleasant emotional effects
which are visited upon those

who come

into contact with a cruel character,
and

feelings induce in

sentiment.

my

sympathetic

me, via the moral sense, an unpleasant
moral

The moral sense remains

a

mysterious faculty; there

no explanation of how or why our
sympathetic feelings trigger

IS

moral sense, or why sympathetic feelings
experienced outside

this

the

moral point

for instance,
the

view do

not.

Nevertheless, this

Kemp Smith seems

to attribute to

word "seems" because Smith's account,

others,
the

of

is

is the

Hume.

like that of

I

view which,
use here

most

extremely vague on the relationship between sympathy
and

moral sentiment.

The Moral Effects

For instance,

of

Sympathy,

"

we

in

Smith's section entitled

find the following explanation:
«>

What [Hume]

maintaining is that sympathy ... is a
u niver sal influence, as being the influence that
renders man
the specific type of creature that he is, namely, a creature
is

so essentially social that even in his most self-regarding
passions sympathy keeps others no less than the self
constantly before the mind. It 'give Os] U s the same
pleasure, and therefore a pleasure that counts together with
our own in our estimates of advantage and loss, and so
ultimately also in our moral judgments of approval and
disapproval. 20

A

bit

further on. Smith continues:
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The verdict

[viz.
in a moral judgment] is
owing to the
peculiar fabric and constitution of
our species; and in
particuiar to the operation of sympathy,
whereby we enter
into the sufferings of others
as into suffering of our own. 21
,

But this interpretation does not answer
the questions that

Hume

believes need answering:

"it

may now

be ask'd in general

,

concerning this pain or pleasure, that
distinguishes moral good and

From what

evil.

in the

principles

is

human mind?" "Why

it

derived, and whence does

it

arise

[does] any action or sentiment upon

the general view of survey, give a certain
satisfaction or un-

easiness?" To
to trigger a

find only that

mysterious moral sense

origin of morals, "nor does

it

source or moral distinctions.
given us far

sympathetic feelings are necessary

more

is not to

explain

"

I

think

how"sympathy
Hume,

is,

in the

is the chief

Treatise

I

it

and, true to his word, finds

turns out, there

what there

has

think he tells us what the

"some more general

principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded.

As

,

than a description of the initial conditions neces-

sary for the operation of the moral sense;

moral sense

"discover the true

is will be

is for

Hume

examined

no unique moral sense

"

at all;

in the following section.

7

For Hume,

it

is

only qualities of mind or characters which

66

can accurately be said to be virtuous
or vicious

Tis evident, that when we praise any
actions, we regard
only the motives that produced them, and
consider the
actions as signs or indications of certain
principles in
the mind and temper ... the ultimate
object of our praise
and approbation is the motive, that produc'd
them
(T,

p.

417).

any action be either virtuous or vicious,
'tis only as a
sign of some quality or character. It
must depend upon
durable principles of the mind, which extend
over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character
(T, p. 575)

If

But a quality of mind for

Hume

tion to behave in certain

ways or

is

nothing but a tendency or disposito

have certain passions;

in

them-

selves, such dispositions are not "real existences"
which can be

perceived

in

any direct way through the physical senses.

according

to

Hume, we have no idea

of

Hence,

mental qualities or characters

independent of their expected behaviorial consequences; we can

contemplate a mantal quality or character only by contemplating
certain actions or passions which

This
end

'

is

why Hume says

(T,

p.

that "Virtue is consider'd as

619); a virtue,

independent of

its

we associate with

that quality.

means

being a mental disposition, is nothing

behaviorial consequences (real or imagined).

Thus, even

if

there were a uniquely moral sense,

it

affected only by ideas of those behaviors or passions which
ate with certain mental qualities.

important point:

to an

But now

Hume makes

could be

we associ-

a very
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Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have
no
friendship, pleases us only by sympathy
(T, p. 576).
means

the

an end can only be agreeable, where the
is agreeable; and
the good of society, where our own
interest is not concern'd or that of our friends,
pleases
only by sympathy ... (T, p. 577).
.

.

.

to

end

.

.

.

.

.

.

(T,

Hume

is

.

the public good is indifferent to us, except so
far as

sympathy interests us
.

.

in

it

(T,

p.

618).

the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy
alone
p.

619).

saying that

if

we overlook our own personal

suppress the enlivening power

sympathy, there

of

is

desires, and

no way that the

observation or contemplation of the emotional condition of others

can emotionally affect

us.

whom

is

the

moral sense

How

different this is

from Hutcheson,

"a Determination of our Minds to receive

amiable or disagreeable Ideas

of Actions,

when they occur

to

Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss

redound

to

for

our selves from them"

(italics mine).

our
to

For Hutcheson,

the idea of actions (inclusive of consequences) pleases or displeases

us directly, through the moral sense.

If

Hume

is truly a

moral

sense theorist, why cannot his moral sense operate without the
intervention of sympathy?
for

Hume,

that is just the

We
way

could conclude with
it

is,

and constitution of our species. "^2

The key

to

what

I

"owing

to the

But there

Kemp Smith

that,

peculiar fabric

is a better

answer.

take to be the proper interpretation of

Hume

68

is

found in the following two passages which, because
of their

importance,

Now

will quote at length:

I

tis certain, there are certain calm desires
and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little
emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects
than by the immediate feeling or sensation. The ss desires
are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the
genera l appetite to good (viz. pleasure] and aversion to
_
_evil [viz.
pain] consider'd merely as sucTT7t71x^T 7;
italics mine).
1

,

,

,

"Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or
pleasur e from any objec t, we feel a consequent emotion of
aversion or propensity, and are" carry d to avoid or embrace
what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction
'Tis also
obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us
cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects
are connected with its original one by the relation of cause
and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover
this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our
actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident
in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but
is only directed by it.
'Tis from the prospect of pain or
pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any
object And these emotions extend themselves to the causes
and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by
reason and experience (T, p. 414; italics mine).
1

.

:

That

is,

human

beings are naturally constituted so that the idea of

personal pleasure tends to induce a feeling of satisfaction or
"propensity,

"

while the idea of personal pain tends to induce a feeling

of uneasiness or "aversion. "

These

feelings, through a process of

association based on cause and effect relationships, come to be
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directed toward the causes of our anticipated
pleasures or pains.

Hume

also points out that the case

is the

same where

the pleasures

or pains arc actual rather than imagined*

The mind by an origin al

instinct tends to unite itself with
the good, and to avoid the evil, tho'
they be conceived merely
in idea, and be consider'd as to
exist in any future
Hod
of time.
But supposing that there is an immedi
aression
of pain or pleasure, and that arising
from an object related
to ourselves or others, this does not
prevent the propensity
or aversion
That propensity, which unites us to the
object, or separates us from it, still continues
to operate
(T, pp. 438-439).
.

.

I

want

propensity,
is itself,

the

argue that this "consequent emotion of aversion or

" this

"uneasiness or satisfaction,

e.

,

" to

which

Hume

when generated under the proper conditions, defined

moral sentiment, and

that there is

refers
to be

no moral sense properly so

The proper conditions are; adopting

called.

(i.

to

.

the

moral point

of

view

ignoring personal interests and desires ana considering the

effects of behaviors and actions on society at large), and sympathiz-

ing with society at large.

Hume
nor

is it

is not stipulating this definition of the

taken

of ideas, " or a

to be

an expression of what

necessary

a "definition in use, "

from

truth.

Rather,

Hume
it

is

which Hume discovers

a cautious observation of

human

life ...

moral sentiment,

calls a "relation

what might be called

in his

"experiments

.

.

as they appear in the

.
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common course
affairs,
in fact,

of the world,

by

and in their pleasures"

when men, both

men's behaviour
(T,

p.

in

Hume

xix).

company,
is

in

claiming

that,

in the past and present,
have referred to

moral sentiments, they have referred

to this

generated under the proper conditions.

We

aversion or propensity,

see the same sort of

empirical derivation of a definition in
Hume's discussion of cause

and effect.

Hume’s

definition (actually, he gives two)
of cause is

obtained by examining "with the
utmost accuracy those objects,

which are commonly denominated causes
and effects"

How does
suppose

I

the

moral sentiment come about?

dislike milk and

be a glass of that liquid.
in
is

me

My

host places before

p.

170)

For example,

me

what

I

take to

idea of the unpleasant taste produces

an aversion, which becomes directed
at the milk

an interested sentiment, proceeding as

dislike for milk.
I

my

(T,

Or, suppose

my

it

does from

This

itself.

my

personal

friend is in the habit of stealing.

might taxe a very limited view of the situation, and
sympathize

only with the pleasures
doing,

I

my

friend receives from his actions.

experience pleasure myself, which becomes the object

of an emotional propensity or attraction.

me

this

sympathetic pleasure

disposes him

Thus,

In so

my

to

is

my

The "object" which affords

friend,

whose criminal nature

commit these crimes which accrue

propensity soon directs itself to

my

to his advantage.

friend, and to his
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penchant for mischief.

moral sentiment, for
a

my

them
in

it

in this

my

extend

my

view
I

to include the

experience

moral sentiment:

moral

I

victims

sympathy with

in

I

experience

friend, and a feeling of aversion will arise in

will soon "extend" to

feelings which
the

I

will (most likely) outweigh the agreeable feelings

me, which
is a

example,

of all.

friend, the disagreeable feelings

sympathy with

is not the

proceeds not from the moral point of view,

view which considers the interests
If,

of

Again, however, this propensity

it

is

my

friend's character.

This, then,

an emotional reaction to unpleasant

experience as a result of a sympathy extended by

point of view.

This new interpretation of the moral sentiment explains much
of what has been unclear in

Hume.

postulating the existence of

some mysterious

sense.

"

Moral

distinctions are

more mysterious

No longer do we see Hume as

now seen

than the well-known

faculty called the "moral

to be rooted in nothing

human

instinct to be attracted

to pleasant feelings and repelled by unpleasant ones.

merely giving conditions
that

Hume

more

Rather than

for the activation of a

moral sense, we see

moral sense

itself into principles

really does resolve the

general.

No longer must
moral point

of view is

it

remain unexplained why adoption

necessary for

of the

the experiencing of the

moral
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Hume

sentiment.

considered
tnat

it

has told us that

in general,

"
'

Tis only when a character

without reference to our particular interest,

causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates

good or evil"

(T, p.

is

it

As long as we understand Hume

472).

morally
to be

holding a moral sense theory, this statement must be taken as

mere

empirical, a

description of that "peculiar fabric and consti-

tution of our species.

statement

is

seen

"

On my

to be a definition;

why we can't experience
the

moral point

a

number

the present interpretation.

the

and no longer need we wonder

moral sentiment unless we

the

Hume's

first adopt

of view.

There are

tite to

interpretation, however,

of other

areas that lend themselves

According

to

good, and aversion to evil" which,

moral sentiments under

Hume,
I

to

"the general appe-

maintain, constitute

the proper conditions,

produce

little

same

point

emotion in the mind,
and are more known by their effects than by the immediate
feeling or sensation
they are very readily taken for the
determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from
the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood. Their nature and principles have been suppos'd the
same, because their sensations are not evidently different

tho' they be real passions,

.

(T,

p.

Significantly,

.

417).

Hume

specifically with the

later

makes

this

when he

is

dealing

moral sentiment:

Morality, therefore,

is

more properly

felt

than judg'd

of;
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llccli

x

caemoiance

Hume makes

to

each other

the statement that

from interest and morals, are
run into one another" (T,
interpretation.
the

same

My

p.

(T,

"

p.

470).

'Tis true, those sentiments.

apt to be confounded, and naturally

This also adapts well to

472).

my

feeling of aversion toward the glass of
milk

kind of impression as

my

aversion toward

my

friend's

criminal nature, and thus these impressions feel the
same.
the first
is a

impression

him,

is

A man

more aware

"of

temper and judgment,

when he has managed

of

to

personal interests and consider the interests of
better able to judge

Yet,

an interested sentiment whereas the second

is

moral sentiment; they are differentiated only by

of their genesis.

was

when

as

Hume

describes

overlook his own
all,

and thus

is

his feeling of aversion or propensity is a

moral or an interested sentiment.
get these sentiments "confounded.

For Hutcheson,

"

the conditions

the

A

less careful

man

is apt to

"

moral sense

is a distinct

God-given

faculty which affords a unique kind of pleasure or pain upon the

view of certain types
deny) benevolence.

of

human

behavior:

those which display (or

God could have designed our moral sense

differently, however.

For instance, as Hutcheson discusses

in
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one of lus examples, our moral
sense might have been constructed
so as to afford us pleasure from
the view of malice rather
than
that of benevolence.

of

Hutcheson realizes that this raises
the questiion

whether or not one type

of

moral sense could

be considered to

be (non-morally) preferable to
another; he concludes that there
must
be such a preference, based on a
particular

formability to the

more fundamental human

moral sense's condisposition to be

attracted to pleasure and repelled by pain:

A

Sense approving Benevolence would disapprove
that Temper,
which a Sense approving Malice would delight in.
Any
rational Nature observing two Men thus
constituted, with
opposite Senses, might by reasoning see, not
moral Goodness
in one Sense more than in the contrary,
but a Tendency to
the Happiness of the Person himself,
who had the former
Sense in the one Constitution, and a contrary
Tendency in
.

.

the opposite Constitution; nay, the

Persons themselves might
Thus one Constitution of the moral Sense"
to be more advantageous to those who had
it,
than the contrary; as we may call that Sense of
Tasting
healthful, which made wholsome Meat pleasant;
and we would
observe this
might appear

.

.

.

call a contrary Taste pernicious. ^3

But Hume, on

my

interpretation, has no need to show that

our moral sense, as actually constituted, accords with our natural
propensity toward pleasure because this sense

is

resolved into our

basic emotional reaction to pleasure and pain, conditioned

proper way by a general sympathy.
this point in the following

Hume seems

to be

in the

making

passage taken from the section entitled

"Conclusion of this book, "and there can be

little

doubt that he has
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Hutcheson

in

mind here.

Those who resolve the sense of morals
into original
of the human mind [for instance,
Hutcheson], may

instincts

defend the
cause of virtue with sufficient authority;
but' want the advantage which those possess, who
account for that sense by an
extensive sympathy with mankind.
According to their
system, not only virtue must be approv'd
of, but also the
sense of virtue; And not only that sense,
principles, from whence

it is

presented on any side, but what
(T, p.

but also the
So that nothing
^ is

deriv'd.
is

619)

laudable and *good

This resolution of the moral sense into an
interplay between

two of the most basic principles of human nature,
sympathy and the
natural emotional reaction to pleasure and
pain,
of

Hume, who

is

is quite in the spirit

constantly seeking for hypotheses susceptible to

Occam's razor.

The following are examples

references

need for keeping the number of basic principles

to a

to the

of

Hume's many

minimum.

Besides, we find in the course of nature, that tho' the
many, the principles, from which they arise, are
commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an
unskillful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality,
in order to explain every different operation.
How much
more must this be true with regard to the human mind
To invent without scruple a new principle to every new
phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain
proofs, that none of these principles is the just one, and
that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover
our ignorance of the truth (T, p. 282).
effects be

.

.

.

'tis

absurd

to

imagine, that

in

every particular instance.
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these moral sentiments are
produc'd by an original quality
and primary constitution
Such a method off^ee dim, i s
not conformable to the usual
maxims, by which nature is’
conducted, where a few principles
produce all that variety
we observe in the universe, and every
thing is carry'd on
in the easiest and most simple
manner (T,
.

.

.

p.

There

is

473)

no need to postulate the existence of
a separate sense

or faculty in order to account for moral
sentiments; Book
the Treati_s_e is

appealing only

Hume's attempt
to the

human reactions
Where,
preted

it,

tried to
to

to

to

show how

III

of

this can be done by

principles of sympathy and the instinctive

pleasure and pain.

does Hume's moral sentiment, as I've inter-

then,

belong in his classification of the impressions?

show earlier, Hume seems

to contradict

maintain that the moral sentiment

pain) and a passion.

is

himself

As

I

attempting

in

both a kind of pleasure (or

Unfortunately, there

is

nothing in

my

inter-

pretation which eases this inconsistency.

The moral sentiment, on

Most important

of a passion.

has an object

-

it

is

my

interpretation, has all the

of these is that the

an aversion or propensity

to

moral sentiment
something.

two kinds of impressions, those of sensation and those
(the passions),

Of the

of reflection

only the latter are said to have an object for Hume.

Moreover, the moral sentiment seems
arises directly

marks

(i.

e.

,

to be a direct passion,

for

without the operation of the principle of the

it
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association of ideas or that of the association
of impressions)

from pleasure or
I

pain, actual or contemplated;

"By direct passions

understand such as arise immediately from
good or

pain or pleasure

(T,

p.

276).

As

from

such, the moral sentiment can-

not be a kind of pleasure or pain, as
its

evil,

sensation, as that of all passions,

Hume

may

so often insists, though
be pleasant or pain ml.

Thus, the difficulty of placing the moral sentiment in
his scheme of

impressions remains a crucial problem for Hume.

9

78

REFERENCES

“T"

Shaftes

^ry, Hutcheson's
predecessor' LTon'
whether or not he did indeed
espouse'“a
instance, William K. Frankena,
"Hutcheson's Moral

’

UrPal

o

Evil,

L

83.

p.

3

Ibid.

Ibid.

6 Ibid.
7

8

HiSt ° ry

-

Ideas

Ibid.

Ibid.

9 in

363-388.

No.

3 (1955),

74.

,

p.

,

pp.

,

p.

72.

,

p.

175.

,

p.

394

,

pp.

72-73.

.

156-157.

Sellars and Hospers, Readings in Ethical
Theory, pp.

9 in

Journal of the History of Ideas
357-358.
-*-

xv l.

-

Hutcheson's " An Inquiry concerning
Moral Good and
British Moralists, ed. Selby-Bigge
(New York, 1964),

4 Ibid.
5

—

From

" in

pp.

~

357-3gF

pp.

Sense

,

XVI, No.

3 (1955),

Henning Jensen, Motivation and the Moral Sense
Hutcheson 's E thical Theory (The Hague, 1971), d. ~48~
,

12 Broad,

pp.

13 Hutcheson,

14 Smith,

p.

369-370.
p.

43.

73.

in

Francis
'

79
1

Strictly speaking, actions in themselves
are morally
neutral for Hume, and are included in moral
considerations only
as indicators of underlying qualities of mind or
motives, which do

have moral value.
16

Smith,

See, for example, (T,

p.

477).

173.

p.

17 Ingemar

Adolf Phalen in
18 Ibid.
1

,

Hedenius, Studies in Hume's Ethics, repr. from
Memoriam, Uppsala 1937.
461.

p.

Ibid.

2D

^Smith,
21

22

Ibid.

,

pp.
p.

174-175.

197.

Ibid.

^Hutcheson,

p.

410.

9

80

CHAPTER

IV

THE DOMAIN OF MORAL SUBJECTS
1

There are a few occasions whore Hume seems

moral sentiment with

a sentiment of

to equate the

moral praise or blame.

For

instance.

To have

the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a

character.

miration

This, as

which

is

it

(T,

The very feeling constitutes our praise or adp.

turns out,

more

471).

is a

misleading statement of Hume's position,

clearly stated here:

The pain or pleasure, which arises from

the general survey
or view of any action or quality of mind, constitutes its vice
or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which
is nothi ng but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred
T, p. 614; second set of italics mine)

The object

of love or hate,

Hume

has told us, is always another

person; thus, moral praise or blame,
directed at another person.

it

Yet clearly

would seem,

Hume

often morally praise or blame ourselves; but

always

would allow that we

Hume

love aid hate are always directed at another (T,

is

p.

has told us that
329).

However,

pride and humility are closely related to love and hate, and are
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directed at our selves.

We

might paraphrase Hume, then,
by

describing mora! self approbation
or blame as nothing but a
fainter
and more imperceptible pride
or humility. The cause
of an indirect

passion

always a "separate pleasure or
uneasiness,

is

closely associated with the
object of the passion.
pains, as

we have seen, often stem from

desires.

But only

if

"

which is

Such pleasures and

the satisfaction of personal

the pleasure or pain is a

moral sentiment, as

described in the last chapter, will
the consequent love or hate
(or
pride or humility) be
Ultimately,

mora l

Hume

an object of love or hate
subjects.
it:

it

praise or blame.

relies on an entity's potential for
becoming

in

order

to

determine the domain

Consider the moral sentiment as

is the

I

have so far described

of a

sympathetic pleasure or pain, con-

sequent to the adoption of the moral point
of view.

much

to satisfy

to be directed

a robot,
the

moral

pleasure of an attraction or the pain of an
aversion

toward the ultimate cause

in too

of

Hume,

for this would allow

But this would

moral sentiments

toward inanimate objects and animals.

programmed

moral point

to

of view,

maim

innocent people.

let

1

Let us imagine

We might

adopt

and in sympathizing with the victims we

experience painful sentiments; our aversion to our
painful feelings
is

soon directed, via a chain of cause and effect reasoning,

robot itself.

Or, we might imagine a wild tiger

to take the

to the

place of
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the

i

obot in the example.

By a similar process, we come

to ex-

perience toward the tiger that peculiar kind of pain which, according
to

Hume,

constitutes aversion.

The question then arises

inanimate objects and animals to be subject
another way, will

or, to put

it

examples

to be

in

that gives

him

Hume

to

moral

must

will allow

distinctions;

allow our aversion in these

counted as a moral sentiment?

that such a decision

Hume

whether or not

of

be arbitrary; but

the basis for an answer.

At

Hume

first,

appears

it

finds a criterion

In his view,

it is

a contra-

diction for an object to be potentially virtuous or vicious and not be

potentially an object of

moral praise or blame.

For instance,

denying that individual actions can have moral value,

Hume

in

gives

as the reason that individual actions "have no influence on love or
hatred, pride or humility" (T,

p.

The hidden premise

575).

is

that what cannot be the object of love, hatred, pr ide, or humility

(and hence what cannot be the object of

cannot be virtuous or vicious.

But

moral praise or blame)

Hume

holds that only people can

be the objects of love or hate, pride or humility.

Since, then, in-

animate objects and animals cannot be the objects of moral praise
or blame, they cannot, on Hume's assumption, be virtuous or
vicious; and propensities or aversions directed toward them cannot

be counted as

moral sentiments.

Thus,

Hume

has added a further
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condition to his (implicit) definition of the
moral sentiment:

must

be directed toward another

human

being.

We

it

find this condition

stated in the following passage;

Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited,
when there
is any thing presented to us, that both
bears a relation to
the object of the passion, and produces a
separate sensation

related to the sensation of the passion. Now
virtue and vice
are attended with these circumstances. They
must necessaril y bp Plac'd either in ourselve s or others,
Imd" excite
either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore
must give rise
to one of these four passions; which clearly
distinguishes
them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate
objects, that often bear no relation to us
And this is,
perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice
have upon the human mind (T, p. 473; italics mine).
:

There

is

yet a further restriction on what can count as a

moral sentiment, and again
on the indirect passions

it

stems from the "original" restrictions

of love

and hate.

As we saw

in

my

discussion of these passions, the pleasure or pain caused in

earlier

me must

be strongly associated in idea with another person in order to cause
in

me

love or hate.

The case

is the

same with

which constitutes moral praise or blame.
hunter accidentally shoot his companion.

that love or hate

Imagine that

I

witness a

might take the moral

I

point of view, and experience painful sentiments in sympathy with
the injured

cause of
it

man;

my

my

aversion soon directs

itself to the ultimate

uneasiness, namely, the first hunter.

would seem,

is a

moral sentiment.

This

This aversion,

is not the

case however.
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Unless this pain of aversion can be strongly
associated with
the first hunter,
the shooting

cannot cause in

it

was accidental, and

me

did not

trait or intention in the first hunter,

with the hunter

-

the passion of hate.

my

Because

proceed from any character
pain is not closely associated

no hate, or blame, ensues.

My

aversion

is not a

moral sentiment:

If

any action be either virtuous or vicious,

tis only as a
quality or character. It must depend upon
durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions
themselves not pro ceeding from any constant prlncIpTeT have
no influence on love o r hatred, pride or humility; and

sign of

1

some

,

consequently are never consider'd in morality
This
reflexion is self-evident, and deserves to be attended to,
as being of the utmost importance in the present subject.
We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries
concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or
character from which the action proceeded. These alone
are dura ble enough to affect our sentiments concerning the
person (T, p. 575; second set of italics mine).
.

If I

.

.

suspected that the shooting was intentional, or resulted from

a habit of carelessness, the relevant association might become strong

enough

to

cause hate;

moral sentiment, and

Hume

my

feeling of aversion would then count as a

my

feeling of hate as

defines a virtue in terms of

moral sentiment.

A

moral blame.

its potential for

causing a

virtue is "whatever mental quality in ourselves

or others [which"] gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflexion,

and a vice

is a

mental quality

that "gives uneasiness" in the

same

"
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manner

(T, p.

Implicit in this definition of virtue are the

575).

conditions for the moral sentiment which

must

be directed toward a person,

trait of that person,
in

and

it

it

I

must

have developed above:

be traceable to a mental

must proceed from

scope by the moral point of view.

it

a

sympathy widened

•

2

A

virtue, then, is any quality of

plated from the

moral

point of view,

mind which, when contem-

causes a certain satisfaction,

and where this satisfaction stems directly from the experience
pleasant sympathetic feelings.
finds that

out

many

qualities of

As

a result of this definition,

mind which are usually taken

moral value must now be counted as

commonly

called "natural abilities";

virtues.

among those

of

Hume

to be with-

Such traits are
that

Hume mentions

are good sense, genius, wit, humor, patience, resolution, and
industry.

An analogous

situation obtains for what might ordinarily

be called "natural disabilities,

"

irresolution, and uncertainty (T,

such as "prodigality, luxury,
p.

611).

These now must

be

counted as vices.

Upon examination, Hume

finds that all traits which are con-

sidered as natural abilities share one or
characteristics:

more

of the following

they are useful to the possessor (as

is

wisdom).
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they are immediately agreeable to the possessor
(as

they are useful to others (as

agreeable

others (as is

to

is genius),

wit).

abilities cannot be distinguished
to be virtues.

Moreover,

if

is

good humor),

or they are immediately

In this respect, at least,

from those

we adopt

the

traits

moral

natural

commonly taken

point of view, and

allow ourselves a general sympathy with the possessor of a natural
ability and the people he affects,

we

find that

pleasure of a propensity or attraction
ditions are

met

in

order

The mechanism here

is

and

-

to christen this

exactly the

we experience

all the

the

necessary con-

pleasure a moral sentiment.

same as we have already

found

for those mental qualities which are normally taken to be virtues.

We

get a similar situation in the production of aversion

natural disabilities.

from

the

Also, as in the case of virtue proper, our

pleasure of attraction can cause love, and our pain

of

aversion can

cause hate; and these feelings of love or hate must be counted as

moral praise or blame.

On Hume's
and moral traits

Hume
p.

is

no distinction between natural

in their ability to affect

our sentiments.

But,

asks, what other criterion is there to differentiate them

607)?

The answer most commonly given

are "involuntary,
will.

view, then, there

Hume

"

is that

(

T,

natural abilities

while moral traits are subject to

human

free

believes that attention to this criterion is primarily
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"why moralists have invented"
abilities and

moral virtues

(T,

the distinction between
natural
p.

609);

however, he believes that

this invention is totally
unjustified.

First,

Hume

points out that, as a matter of
fact,

many

of

the qualities which are
ordinarily considered to be virtues
are as

constant and inalterable as those
traits considered to be natural
abilities.

such a

As an example Hume mentions

trait cannot be

of will, and

is

nurtured or destroyed by a short-term
act

next appeals to his definition of virtue
to show that

nothing

m the

definition which prevents an involuntary

from being counted as

quality

magnanimity

must be considered more involuntary than
voluntary.

Hume
there

the virtue of

a virtue:

Moral

distinctions arise from the natural distinctions
of
pain and pleasure; and when we receive those
feelings from
the general consideration of any quality
or character,

denominate

we

vicious or virtuous. Now I believe no one
will assert, that a quality can never
produce pleasure or
pain to the person who considers it, unless it
be perfectly
it

voluntary in the person who possesses

Finally,

Hume

well-known analysis

given in the Treatise

Book

(T,

p.

609).

attacks the voluntary-involuntary distinction itself

b y appealing to his

in

it

1

s

of free will and necessity,

section entitled "Of liberty and necessity,

"

II.

Still,

Hume

points out, there is an initially plausible argument

88

for a distinction between virtues and natural
abilities, even within

the structure of

Hume's own theory

may, indeed, be pretended,
{^natural abilities] produce,

somewhat
(T,

p.

different

607).

Even

from
if

this

of the

moral sentiment

"it

that the sentiment of approbation, which

besides

that,

were

its

being inferior

,

is

also

which attends the other virtues"

Hume

so,

continues,

it

does not

merit witholding the appellation of "virtue" from the natural
abilities;

according

to

Hume, "each

of the virtues,

even benevolence,

justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling
in the spectator" (T,
It

is

now

p.

607).

clear that

Hume

has

all

along been using "love"

(and "hate") as a generic term, denoting a class of resembling

passions.

from

the

The members are similar

same double

produced

relation of impressions and ideas, and are

whom we

directed toward another person with
idea of pleasure.

in that they are all

In addition,

Hume

associate a certain

implies, these passions are

similar in the way they feel when experienced; we have no difficulty
in recognizing

each as a kind of love when we feel

it;

'Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the
passions of love and hatred
'Twoul'd be as unnecessary
.

.

.

any description of them
because these passions
of themselves are sufficiently known from our common
feeling and experience (T, p. 329).

to attempt

.

.

.
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The kind

of love

pleasure which

which

is

is

produced depends on the nature

of that

associated with the object of the
passion, and on

the status of the object.

For instance.

Love and esteem are at
anse from like causes.

the bottom the same passions,
and
The qualities, that produce both

are agreeable, and give pleasure.
But where this pleasure
is secure and serious; or where
its object is great, and
makes a strong impression; or where it produces
any degree
of humility and awe; In all these cases,
the passion,' which
arises from the pleasure, is more properly
denominated

esteem than love

(T, p.

608).

Love, of any kind, is described by
approbation.

As we have

Hume

as a "feeling of

seen, love produced under the proper

conditions is moral approbation, and arises in
response to those
qualities of

mind we

call "virtues. "

But this love which constitutes

moral praise may vary with variations
is the

moi

in the

moral sentiment do occur.

.

.

.

al sentiment,

and

Hume

in the

pleasure or pain which

indicates that such variations

whenever we survey the actions and characters

of

men,

without any particular interest in them, the pleasure or
pain, which arises from the survey (with some minute
differences ) is, in the main, of the same kind"; tho '^perhaps
there be a great diversity in the causes, from which it is
deriv'd (T, p. 617; italics mine).

That such variations occur

in the

moral sentiment, and con-

sequently in the passion of love that follows, does not stop us from
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recognizing as virtues the various character traits
we observe.
Similarly,

way those
pensity

Hume

argues, when we contemplate in the appropriate

qualities

commonly termed

we experience may indeed

"natural abilities,

"

the pro-

be slightly different in sensation

than other moral sentiments; but this is no good reason
to deny
the status of a

it

moral sentiment, as those pleasures which arise

upon contemplation

of qualities

commonly taken

to be virtues

them-

selves vary from one to the other.

Thus, the kind of love inspired by a natural ability will
differ

from those kinds produced by virtues proper;

latter differ
to withold
of

among themselves.

from

We

but

even these

have no good reason, then,

the love inspired by the natural virtues the status

moral praise or approbation.

The characters of Caesar and Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are
both of them virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word; but
in a different way; Nor are the sentiments entirely the same
which arise from them. The one produces love; the other
esteem.
In like manner, the approbation, which attends
natural abilities, may be somewhat different to the feeling
from that, which arises from the other virtues, without
making them entirely of a different species (T, pp. 607-608).
.

.

Because the sentiments which are excited by natural

abilities are

similar to those excited by virtues, and because "virtue"
is

defined in terms of sentiments,

abilities

must

Hume

be counted as virtues.

itself

concludes that natural

Hume makes

this point
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succinctly in his essay "Of

Some Verbal Disputes":

Nothing is moie usual that for philosophers to encroach
upon the province of grammarians and to engage in disputes
of words, while they imagine that they are handling
controversies of the deepest importance and concern ... if,
in short, the sentiments are similar which arise
from
Cnatural abilities! and from the social virtues, is there
any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a word,
or disputing whether they be entitled to the der
ation
of virtues?

3

Hume

believes that any object, animate or inanimate, can

become an object

of affection (or approbation)

becomes associated with pleasure.

if it

in

some way

However, there are different

"species" of affections corresponding to different types of objects

Hume

does not

of object,

but

tell us

it

is

what the important divisions are

clear that

human

in types

beings and inanimate objects

are two such classes.

All the sentiments of approbation, which attend any particular
species of objects, have a great resemblance to each other,
tho' deriv'd from different sources; and, on the other hand,
these sentiments, when directed to different objects, are
different to the feeling, tho' deriv'd from the same source
(T,

What Hume

p.

617).

is

saying here can best be explained by example.

Inanimate objects can give us pleasure

in

many ways.

A

painting
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can give us pleasure through

its

beauty; a whirlpool bath can give

us physical pleasure; a wonder drug can
give us pleasure through

sympathy with those

it

cures.

Yet, even though these pleasures

are derived differently, "from different sources,

produced toward these inanimate objects will be
or species

" the

of the

they will be very similar in sensation.

-

people can give us pleasure in various ways.

A

affections

same

kind

Likewise,

person can give

us pleasure through a beautiful appearance, from
physical sensation,

from furthering our own

interests,

from

his virtue.

Again, though

the pleasures differ, the affections produced as a
result are of the

same

kind

-

in this

case love.

Thus,

Hume

is

saying, no matter

how

the pleasure is derived, our affections for inanimate objects

will

always be

of the

same

be of another kind, love.
the case even
is the

same

when

kind, and our affection for people will

Hume

goes on to point out that this remains

the pleasure received

from an inanimate object

as that received from another person.

sexual partner might give the

A mechanical

same physical pleasure

partner, but the affections produced will

still

as a

human

be different in kind.

Similarly, "a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause
not the

same

feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our

approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of
their utility"

(T,

p.

617).
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Hume's theory
that

it

its

is often

attacked on the grounds

mistakes a logical relation between passion and object for a

contingent

£md

passions

of the

i

A

elation.

object

passion for Ilume

is that entity to

experience the passion.

simple impression

whose idea we are

whenever we

led

The identifying characteristic

of a

passion

because we cannot be given the idea of an im-

is its sensation; but

pression unless we

is a

experience that impression,

first

Hume

can only

describe the passions "by an enumeration of such circumstances,
as attend them"

(T, p.

277).

the object of a passion

One aspect

that entity to

-

ever we experience the passion.
the objects a passion can have.

of these

circumstances

is

whose idea we are led when-

As we have

seen,

Hume

restricts

For instance,

'Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary,

have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self
Here
the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of
these passions
No one can doubt but this property is
natural from the constancy and steadiness of its operations.
'Tis always self, which is the obiect of pride and humility
.

.

.

.

.

.

277-280).

(T, pp.

... so the object of love and hatred is some other person
This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and
hatred are always directed to some sensible being external
.

to us

.

.

.

(T,

p.

A

passion

.

329).

Hume's restrictions on
contingent.

.

is a

the possible objects of passions are

simple impression, and

simple; as such, according to Hume,

its

its

idea is also

idea can have no logical or
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necessary connection with any other

idea.

The range

of possible

objects of a certain passion can only be derived
in experience; we

see that, as a matter of fact, the object of
pride

and the object of love

is

always another person.

is

always

self,

Although human

nature

is

(T,

280), that the idea of self always follows that
passion which

p.

Hume

so constituted, by "an original quality or
primary impulse"

calls

pride,

it

is

conceivable that the same passion be

followed by the idea of another; and even though the idea
of another

person always follows that passion which Hume calls "love,
conceivable that the

same passion

"

it

is

be followed by the idea of an

inanimate object.

However, Ardal argues

must

insist that

it

that "contrary to

Hume's view, one

would be logically absurd to suggest that a

might have the passion of pride, and,

at the

same

time, that the

object of this pride (in

Hume's sense

the person himself.

For Ardal, "pride" denotes more than

a feeling;

it

man

of 'object') is another and not
just

refers to a complex phenomenon which includes certain

overt behavior patterns.

Being proud

experiencing of prideful feelings, but
only proud when he

is,

of the feeling of pride,

may
it

may

and so long as he
and he

may

include the occasional

is,

in fact be

not.

"A man

is not

experiencing the glow

proud though he sin-

cerely claims that he does not have this glow ...

A man

is not at
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all the best

judge himself as to whether he

is a

proud man.

"4

/

Ardal agrees that there
price,

but

sense

in

is not that a feeling of

it

ourselves.

is a

Rather,

self-valuing.

It

is

it

is that

which

self is the object of

pride directs our attention to

pride

is

defined as an expression of

therefore logically impossible to have pride
with-

out this self- valuing.
I

think Ardal' s account of pride

insofar as
pride.

it

more adequately

But

Hume

is

is

more accurate

reflects what

we ordinarily mean by

not concerned with language usage.

point is that there are certain feelings which all

Some are

perience.

than Hume's,

His

human beings ex-

bodily sensations; others are what he calls

"passions" or "emotions.

"

These feelings can be named.

experience shows that certain of these feelings tend
certain circumstances;
pride, humility, love,

Hume

Now,

to arise

under

describes these circumstances for

and hate.

The circumstances surrounding

pride and humility include the thought of one's

self,

and those

surrounding love and hate include the thought of another; but there
is

no logical connection between these feelings and their attendant

circumstances.

The disagreement between Hume and Ardal may
as follows

.

Most

of us

know what

it

For Hume, "toothache" might name

is to

be illustrated

experience a toothache.

a certain kind of physical pain.
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If

we

did an empirical study,

we would

find that this sensation
is

usually accompanied by the
presence of a tooth which can be
shown
to be

decayed.

However, there

pain and the decayed tooth.

is

no logical relation between
the

This same pain might very well
be

induced in a toothless person by
placing an electrode
point in the brain.

For Hume, such a person would

a toothache even though he had
no teeth.

at the

proper

be experiencing

However, on an "Ardalian"

interpretation, this pain would not be a
toothache because, by
definition, a toothache

would involve the presence

As long as Hume

is

considering

mere

of a tooth.

feelings, he cannot be

accused of confusing logical and contingent
relations; and he makes
it

clear that this is just what he is doing
in his discussion of the

passions;

But not to dispute about words, I observe, that
by pride I
understand that agreeable impression, which
arises in the
mind, when the view either of our virtue,
beauty, riches or
power makes us satisfy' d with ourselves: And that by
humility I mean the opposite impression
Let us, therefore, examine these impressions, consider'd
in themselves;
and enquire into their causes ... T,
pp. 297-298).
.

.

.

(

It

may

very well

be,

as Ardal argues, that our concepts of passions

such as pride and love include more than just the ideas
feelings.

Yet,

it

of certain

does seem that there are certain distinct feelings

which are characteristic of pride and love; and these are the feelings
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with which

Hume

is

concerned.

Now Hume does

not deny that, in fact, different passions

have associated with them,

in addition to certain types of objects,

certain kinds of behavior patterns or dispositions.

For instance:

Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the
person lov'd, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred
produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the
happiness of the person hated (T, p. 367).

Such desires and aversions will tend

to

motivate certain kinds of

But once again, according to Hume, the passions of love

action.

and hate are logically distinct from their usual accompaniments:

Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such
desires, or their particular connexion might have been
entirely revers'd. If nature had so pleas'd, love might have
had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love (T, p. 368)

The most

that can be said against

taken in believing that there

which

is

side with

is a distinct feeling

characteristic of each of the passions.

Hume

in the

the wide range of the
osity, grief, fear,

seem

is that

he is mis-

or impression

Though

I

tend to

cases of love and hate, and perhaps pride and

humility, this criticism does

not

Hume

Humean

seem accurate when we consider
passions:

despair, etc.

envy, pity, ambition, gener

Contrary

to

Hume, there does

to be a different unique feeling peculiar to

each of these;
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and thus we

may

But even

these cases

in

accuse

Hume
it

is

of a failure iin his
introspections.

misleading

to

a logical relation for a
contingent relation.

accuse Ilume of mistaking

Such an accusation

implies that there really are
two or more entities whose
relation
has been mistakenly identified,
for instance, a feeling
on the one
hand and, on the other, the

complex consisting of

passion and a set of dispositions

to

behave

in certain ways.

the substance of the criticism
is that, for at least

Hume

may

the object of the

some

Bat

of what

calls the "passions, " there
is only the latter; and
though this

be so,

Hume's error

lies in believing that there
is the

former

also, and not in mistaking a
logical relation for a contingent
one.

*
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I believe it is here that Hume's
conflict as to the status
moral sentiment originates. On the one hand, Hume wants
maintain that the moral sentiment causes us to love or hate
e.
piaise or blame); in this capacity the moral sentiment
must

of the
to
(i.

,

be viewed as a kind of pleasure or pain, or
impression of sensation.
But, on the other hand, Hume wants to hold that the
moral sentiment
has an object - namely, those mental qualities which are
virtues
or vices; and in this capacity the moral sentiment must
be treated
as a passion, or impression of reflection.
See, for example, Ardal, pp. 23-27.

^Ardal,
4

Ibid.

,

p.

p.

23.
22.
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CHAPTER V
THE MORAL SENTIMENT IN HUME'S
AN inquiry CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
OF

MORALS

1

An In^Mry Concerning
in 1752;

it

is a

the Principles of

revision of Book

published twelve years earlier.

III

Morals was published

of the Treatise

The Treatise

which had been

,

itself

was largely

ignored by Hume's contemporaries, prompting
him to bemoan the

work as having

fallen

most part attributed

"deadborn from the press.

"

Hume

for the

the failure of the Treatise to a difficult
style,

one which did not appeal to the general reading
public.
dissatisfaction with the

T reatise came

to

run

Yet,

much deeper

Hume's

than a

distaste for its literary quality; his avowed goal in
the Treatise of

uncovering positive principles
to be the reflection of an

am

apt,

of

human nature

later

seemed

to

Hume

unwarranted youthful optimism:

in a cool

hour, to suspect, in general, that most
Reasonings will be more useful by containing Hints
and exciting People's Curiousity than as containing any
Principles that will augment the Store of Knowledge that
must pass to future ages.
I

of

my

Above

all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book £the
Treatise ]
and which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth,
so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it.
,

2
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years following publication of the
Treat ise, Ilume

In the

attempted

An

Treatise.
in 1748,

make amends by

to

revising separately each book
of the

Inquiry Concerning

is a revision of

which was published

Book

in 1757,

I,

Huma n Understanding

is a

serves a major role

which

forms"

m

(T,

origin of

Hume's principle

in the

Treatise

the natural, and to
13).

p.

many

to explain the

Hume

,

of the association of ideas

"here
to

is a

kind of

ATTRACTION,

have as extraordinary

itself in as

many and

as various

our complex ideas, such as that of substance, and

of

mechanisms

but its

shew

There are two

relies on the principle to explain the

of belief and

of association does appear in

standing

;

II.

and An Inquiry Conc erning

mental world will be found

in the

effects as

.

I

published

Dissertation on the Passions,

revision of Book

important differences between Book

Human Understanding

A

and

,

An

sympathy.

Inqui ry Concerning

importance there

is

This principle

Human Under-

considerably diminished,

in

accord with Hume's growing pessimism about finding such basic
principles of

human

role of the principle

nature.

Hume's strongest statement about

the

now becomes:

These loose hints I have thrown together in order to excite
the curiousity of philosophers, and beget a suspicion at
least if not a full persuasion that this subject is very copious,
and that many operations of the human mind depend on the
connection or association of ideas which is here explained
(IU,

p.

39).
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In later editions of the Inquiry
,

even this statement

is omitted,

along with several pages containing
illustrations of the workings
of the principle.

principle

In these later editions

reduced

is

to

no

more than

The second change concerns

Hume's discussion

three paragraphs.
the nature of the self.

of the -Treatise contains an entire section,
identity,

in

Book

I

entitled "Of personal

which Hume argues that we have no impression, and

hence no idea,

supposed

of the

of that

simple and unchanging existence which

to constitute the self.

We

have only a series

or perceptions, the ideas of which become associated

of

is

impressions

in the

mind

through the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation;
it

follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed entirely

from the smooth and uninterrupted progress

of the thought along

a train of connected ideas, according to the principles above

explain'd

'

(T, p.

We

260).

have seen how this conflicts with his

account of sympathy in the Treatise

which relies on "the idea, or

,

rather impression of ourselves which
with us"
that the

he

is

(T,

p.

317).

In addition,

is

Hume comes

mind never perceives any unity

assuming

the

very thing he wishes

continuing mental existence.

admits temporary defeat

In the

always intimately present
see that in arguing

in its distinct

to deny;

Appendix

in this matter;

to

perceptions

that there is a

of the Treatise

Hume
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In short there

are two principles, which I cannot render
it m my power to renounce
either of them,
viz. that all our distinct
erceptions
are
p
distinct existences,
and that jthe mind never perceives any real
connexion among"
distmct _existences ... For my part, I must pleadlhe
^Tlege
of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty
is too hard for
y understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it
absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself,
upon
more mature reflexions, may discover some hypothesis,
that will reconcile those contradictions (T,
p. 636)
consistent; nor is

m

.

Yet

apparent that whatever "more mature reflexions"

is

it

came upon

between

Human U nderstanding

cerning
to this

in the interval

problem

of the self

the

Hume

Treatise and An Inquiry Con-

they did not provide him with a solution

because

it

is

nowhere mentioned

in the

Inquiry.

A Dissertation
Treatise

;

it

is,

o n the Passions is a revision of

according to

Kemp

II

of the

Smith, "by general consent

the least satisfying of all his writings. "°

review

Book

It

is little

more than

a

of the "double relation" explanation of the origin of the passions

found in the T reatis e.

In the

Treatise this explanation relies

heavily on the principle of association and on an ever present im-

pression of the

self; but

on these two doctrines

fidence since the writing of the Treatise

Book

II

,

Hume

has lost con-

and his attempt to revise

with that in mind "is so shortened as to leave the argument

barely intelligible.

The main concern

of this present chapter, though,

is the
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relation between Book

P^n^iples

of

Morals

and

III

its

Kemp

.

"5

In spite of

sketch entitled

Morals

ciples of

Hume

"is of all

most important

sympathy and

the

some

to dispel

in his

Life, " that the Inquiry

my

III is

"the

short autobiographical

Concerning the Prin-

writings, historical, philosophical,

or literary, incomparably the best,
its

Inquiry Concern ing the

contrived to rescue almost

Hume's own claim,

"My Own

An

Smith believes that Book

one Book of the Tr eatise which
intact.

revision.

"

I

find

it

very unclear

to be

in

points, those regarding the relationship
between

moral sentiment.

In the following

I

shall attempt

of this unclarity.

2

Initially

Treatise

In

.

Hume's argument

order

first sets out to

have

in

considered

discover "the true origin of morals,

to

determine what

common.

As

when contemplated

Again,

A

end which

it

Hume

various types of virtues

he finds that those characters

virtuous character is one which pleases us

in a certain

Hume

is that

"

virtues all share the quality of being useful

to find those principles by

please.

it

in the Treatise,

to be social

to society at large.

in the Inquiry follows that of the

manner; as before,

then,

Hume

seeks

which the usefulness of characters can

argues that usefulness can please only

promotes pleases, and

this

end

is the

if

the

welfare of others.
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How,

then,

can the happiness and pleasures of
others please us?

And if we would employ a little thought on
the present subject
we need be at no loss to account for the
influence of utility
and to deduce it from principles the most
known and avowed
in human nature (I, p. 42).
The following crucial passage comes

Usefulness

a few pages later;

only a tendency to a certain end; and it
is a
contradiction in terms that anything pleases as
means to an
end where the end itself nowise affects us.
If usefulness,
therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and
if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference
to self,
it follows that everything which
contributes to the happiness
of society recommends itself directly to
our approbation
and good will. Here is a principle which accounts,
in great
part, for the origin of morality; and what need
we seek for
absti use and remote systems when there occurs
one so
obvious and natural? (I, p. 47).
is

Understanding "approbation" as we did
or "affection,

"

in the

Treatise to

mean

and remembering that these passions can be caused

us only consequent to the production of a separate pleasure,

again led to ask how

pleasure

in us.

"love"

it is

Hume

in

we are

that the pleasure of others can cause a

offers the following cryptic answer in a foot-

note to the above passage;

is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we
have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others? It is sufficient
that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature.
We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and
there are, in every science, some general principles beyond
which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No
It
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man

is

absolutely indifferent to the happiness and
misery
The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure,

of others.

the second pain. This everyone may find
in himself.
It is
not probable that these principles can be
resolved into
principles more simple and universal, whatever
attempts

may

have been made to that purpose. But if it were
possible,
belongs not to the present subject; and we may here
safely'
consider these principles as original - happy if we
can render

it

all the
(I;

consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous

This short footnote

is the

key

Hume's theory has undergone since
nevertheless,
it

it

is a

might seem that

principle in

human

to

understanding the alteration

the writing of the Treatise;

passage easily misinterpreted.

humanity

to be

nature, and from the

strengthened

in the following

reading,

to the

same

description that follows, this

This hypothesis

several pages, where

gives numerous examples of a "sympathetic

and uneasiness.

On one

and 'fellow-feeling" refer

principle might be taken to be that of sympathy.

seems

t

47).

p.

movement

Hume

of pleasure

"

In general,

certain that wherever we go, whatever we
reflect on or converse about, everything still presents us
with the view of human happiness or misery and excites
in our heart a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless
amusements, this principle still exerts its active energy
(I, pp. 48-49).

Kemp

it

Smith adheres

is

to this

humanity with sympathy:

present interpretation which identifies

"The Enquiry concerning the Principles

of

107

Mor_als is a restatement of [Book III of the
Treatise

,

]

almost

the only fundamental change being in respect
of sympathy, which

now treated as an ultimate propensity

now

in the

"6

'

Hume

sympathy

is

Thus,

abandoning the attempt

into principles

Treatise

.

In this

In the footnote

human

feeling,

"

nature.

Smith

which,

Hume

Hume

universal, " as was done

Hume's meaning.

of

discussing two different principles

is that of

as in the Treatise
In the

be saying

correct; but in misreading the

is

is

to

to resolve the principle of

"more simple and

One indeed

municate sentiments.
note

and which he

Smith interprets the footnote

passage he has gotten only half

of

Mind,

also entitles sometimes 'benevolence' and sometimes

'humanity.
that

of the

is

,

is

sympathy, or "fellowthe

human

ability to

pages immediately following

com-

the foot-

offers several detailed examples of sympathy in operation;

We

enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, wellcontrived apartment ..
The hospitable, good-humored,
humane landlord appears
His whole family, by the freedom,
ease, confidence, and calm enjoyment diffused over their
countenances, sufficiently express their happiness. I
have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy,
and can never consider the source of it without the most
agreeable emotions (I, p. 48).
.

.

Every movement

.

.

of the theater,

by a skillful poet,

is

com-

municated, as it were, by magic to the spectators, who
weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are inflamed with all
the variety of passions which actuate the several personages
of the

drama

(I,

p.

49).
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But mixed

in

with these illustrations of sympathy
are cases which

clearly are examples of something
else:

C he landlord! tells me that an oppressive and powerful
neighbor had attempted to dispossess
him of his inheritance
and had long disturbed his innocent and
social pleasures.
I feel an immediate
ndignation arise in me against such
violence and injury (I, p. 48; italics
mine).
i

But it is no wonder, he adds, that a
private wrong should
proceed from a man who had enslaved provinces,
depopulated
cities, and made the field and scaffold
stream with human
blood. I am struck with horror at the
prospect of so much
misery and am actuated by the strongest antipathy
the author

against

(I,

p. 48; italics

mine).

Where any event crosses our wishes and
happiness of the favorite characters, we

interrupts the
feel a sensible
anxiety and concern. But where their sufferings
proceed
from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy,
our
breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment
against the
author of these calamities (I, p. 49; italics mine).

These sentiments

resentment or indignation

of

that

we

feel

toward

an evil-doer and his actions are not derived from
sympathy with his
victim; the victim

may

his tormentor, or he

no sentiments at

all

himself experience no such sentiments toward

may even

be dead, and presumably experiencing

with which we might sympathize.

What, then,

according to Hume, are these sentiments?
In

reading the first appendix to the Inquiry, entitled "Con-

cerning Moral Sentiment,

ment
l

fit

"

the description of

we

find that these sentiments of resent-

moral sentiments:
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requisite a sentiment should here
display itself in order
3
ence to thc useful above the
pernicious tendencies
dencies.
This sentiment can be no other than
a feeling for
the happiness of mankind, and
a resentment of their
misery
since these are the different ends
which virtue and vice have
a tendency to promote. Here,
therefore, reason instructs
“S
VCral tendencie s of actions, and
humanity makes
.
a distinction
in favor of those which are
useful and beneIt is

m

,

ficial

Humanity

(I,

p.

is not

105).

sympathy, then.

others that allows us to share
that

produces

Although

it

is

in their feelings,

the propensity or

our sympathy with
it

is

our humanity

aversion we feel toward the human

causes of their feelings, and this propensity
or aversion

is

none

other than the moral sentiment:

The same sentiments

of the mind, in every circumstance,
are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and to
that of
humanity ... By all the rules of philosophy, therefore,
we
must conclude that these sentiments are originally the same,
since in each particular, even the most minute,
they are
governed by the same laws and are moved by the same objects

di p.

6i).

Returning

to the footnote,

fellow-feeling are different;
it

illustrate one,

some

every human heart!

some

the other.

we see now
of the

that

humanity and

examples which follow

"What sympathy then touches

What indignation against

the tyrant

whose cause-

less fear or unprovoked malice give rise to such detestable barbarity!

(I,

pp.

50-51); here again

of the sentiments involved

Hume

alludes to the duality

when we contemplate certain behaviors.

110

3

What

is

Hume's position

in the

Inquiry with respect to the

connection between moral sentiments and sympathetic
sentiments?

On
in

this point

Hume

extremely vague.

is

He does seem

several places that the operation of sympathy

is

to indicate

necessary for

the operation of humanity:

any man, from a cold insensibility of narrow selfishness
temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness
or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of
vice and virtue (I, p. 52).
If

of

these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so
deeply into all our sentiments and have so powerful an influence as may enable them to excite the strongest censure
and applause (I, p. 57).
.

We

.

.

are also told that the moral sentiment

presumably, pain:
views of
(I,

p.

".

.

utility into the

.

we resolve

a kind of pleasure or,

the pleasure

which arises from

sentiments of humanity and sympathy"

97).

I

nothing

have argued

more

that,

in the

Tre atise, a moral sentiment

is

than an instinctive aversion or propensity to pain or

pleasure, where this pain or pleasure
special conditions.
a

is

On

moral sense theory

case in the Inquiry.

is

derived under certain

this interpretation,

in the

Treatise.

Hume

is not postulating

This seems no longer

to be the

Ill

is not

probable that these principles [humanity
and symcan be resolved into principles more
simple and universal, whatever attempts may have
been made to that purpose ... we may here safely consider these
principles as
It

pathy.!

original

Kemp

(I,

47, footnote).

p.

Smith has interpreted the footnote from which

derives as saying nothing

more

than that

Hume

is

this quote

abandoning the

attempt to explain the mechanism of sympathy by
appealing to
principles

am

if I

he

is

more

correct,

basic, such as the association of ideas.

Hume

is also

doing something

However,

much more important

-

no longer resolving the moral sentiment, or the
sentiment of

humanity

,

into a

sentiment more basic, such as the natural emotional

reaction to pleasure or pain.

He has,

in fact,

come

to

embrace

a

legitimate moral sense theory, with the role of the moral sense
being played by humanity.

The picture we are given

in the Inquiry is of a partnership

between sympathy and humanity, each conditioning and reinforcing
the other.

Our sense

of

as the physical senses.

humanity
It

is "original, "

as fundamental

is so constituted as to give us a peculiar

kind of displeasure (or pleasure) upon the view or contemplation
of the

human causes

of

misery

(or happiness); this displeasure

variously describes as "indignation,
It

is

"

"resentment,

our sympathy that makes us more sensitive

misery or happiness

in others,

"

Hume

and "prejudice.

to the

presence

and thus increases the range and

of

"
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power

of

our sense of humanity.

of indignation

On

toward an evil-doer augments our
sympathy with his

victims, and allows us to share even
of

misery and

As

pain.

I

conclude that there

Inquiry.

I

am

is

more

intensely their feelings

showed earlier, Kemp Smith offers

similar interpretation of Book
to

the other hand, our
sentiment

III

of the Treatise,

and thus he

no major change in Hume's position

arguing that there

of the Treatise that our so-called

is a

a

led

is

in the

profound change, from the view

"moral sense" can

be resolved

into our (properly conditioned) natural
aversion to pain and pro-

pensity for pleasure, to the view of the Inquiry
that there

is in

human

beings a true moral sense, humanity, which
provides us with the

unique kind of pleasures and pains which are the
moral sentiments.

My

argument finds additional support

in

comparing

the

Tre a tise to the Inquiry with respect to treatment
of the moral point

^

of view.

In the Treatise

Hume

insists that

moral sentiment unless we have adopted
I

argued earlier,

if

why

it

the

moral point

left

is that this

Hume

definition that

in the

way

As

a

moral

with no explanation, nor can we expect

moral sense cannot operate unless

point of view has been completely and successfully adopted.

interpret

a

of view.

we interpret Hume as there advocating

sense theory, we are
any, of

we cannot experience

I

suggest, however,

we cannot experience

a

it

the
If

moral

we

becomes true by

moral sentiment unless we

first

113

take the moral point of view.

iLProposing

of

moral sense theory

a

now encounter

Now

am

I

maintaining that

Inquiry

in

;

Hume

does he therefore

a difficulty with the necessity of the

moral

point

view?

A

careful examination of the Inquiry reveals that he does
not,

for he no longer insists that the

moral

prerequisite for moral sentiments.
specifically mentions the
is that

humanity continues

moral

point of view is a necessary

More

than this,

point of view at

to operate,

and

to

all.

Hume never
His view now

produce the moral

sentiments, even though selfish considerations are not eliminated.

These moral sentiments may be over- shadowed by

the selfish

sentiments, but they exist nevertheless, and can be recognized

we are

if

careful;

Let us suppose a person ever so selfish, let private interest
have engrossed ever so much his attention, yet in instances
where that is not concerned he must unavoidably feel some
propensity of the good of mankind and make it an objecFoF
choice, if everything else be equal
And if the principles
of humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing
our actions, they must, at all times, have some authority
over our sentiments and give us a general approbation of
what is useful to society, and blame of what is dangerous
or pernicious. The degrees of these sentiments may be the
subject of controversy, but the reality of their existence,
one should think, must be admitted in every theory or
.

system

And

(I, pp.

.

.

52-53).

these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as
those which have a reference to private good, yet still they
must make some distinction, even in persons the most deif

114

praved and selfish, and must attach the notion
beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary

of
(

I,

good to a
p

.

55).
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CHAPTER

VI

1HE MORAL SENTIMENT AND MORAL EVALUATION
1

My

concern so far has been with the interpretation

origin and nature of the
to

moral sentiment

in

Hume.

determine the role of this moral sentiment

Hume never

in

of the

The task now

is

moral evaluation.

clearly tells us what he takes a moral evaluation to be;

one must go about the task of discovering his view by digging
patiently,

aware

of

by weighing different possible interpretations, by being

what

attention to

is

not said as well as what

Hume's clearest statements about moral

The most common interpretations
be divided into two general classes.

these interpretations

in detail.

different interpretations has its

accurately

and by paying strict

is,

to explain

evaluations; however,

I

will

In this

will try to

Hume on

this issue can

chapter

will

show

points

I

that

own unique strength,

some important
I

of

evaluations.

examine

each

of these

in that

Hume makes

it

seems

about moral

argue that both interpretations must

ultimately be rejected, as they conflict with other crucial statements

Hume makes
I

with regard to the characteristics of moral evaluation.

will then offer a third interpretation of

Hume

on moral evaluation,

one which seems to unite the strengths of the former interpretations,
while avoiding their most serious drawbacks.
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2

On

the first type of interpretation, which
Ardal

Emotionist

the

interpretation, the very experience of a
moral senti-

ment constitutes

a

act of killing and

I

I

terms

moral evaluation.

come

to

For instance,

if I

witness an

experience a moral sentiment as a result,

have, according to the Emotionist interpretation,
thereby morally

evaluated, or judged, the act and

its

perpetrator; the act of evaluating

consists in the having of the emotion, while the content of
the evaluation is the

emotion

itself.

Such an interpretation of

For instance, William

places.

Hume
K.

can be found

Frankena says

in

numerous

this;

LHume.] goes on to suggest that precisely because we need
or want a language in which to express, not just statements
peculiar to ourselves but sentiments in which we expect all
men are to concur with us, another language in which we
may claim that our sentiments are justified and valid, we
had to ... invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to
express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation
This kind of an account of our normative discourse
appears to me to be eminently wise. It is a language in
which we may express our sentiments - approvals, disapprovals, evaluations, recommendations, advice, prescriptions
and put them out into the public arena for rational scrutiny
and discussion. ^
'

.

Although

.

'

.

in this

passage Frankena

function of ethical language, he

is

primarily concerned with the

makes

stands an act of moral evaluation for

it

quite clear that he under-

Hume

to consist in the

ex-

-
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periencing of a certain sentiment.

We

find the. following in John

collection of essays by

W. Lenz's introduction

to a

Hume;

A second

tenet of both the Treatise and the
essays, that
moral and aesthetic evaluations are expressions
of sentiment
attacks the rationalist contention that one
can by means of
intellectual intuition know what is good
or bad
Hume's
view is that in finding something to be good or
bad, beautiful
or ugly, a person is reacting emotively to
it;
.

.

.

that in saying

something is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, a person
is
expressing his feelings of approval or disapproval
Because Hume is sometimes careless in his way of
putting
it, his position can easily be
misunderstood. His view is
not_ that in finding an object worthwhile,

ing or stating

how he

feels toward

Finally, Ardal also sees
to

Hume

it

...

a

person

is

describ-

^

as an Emotionist with respect

moral evaluation;

The Emotionist contends

that evaluations are emotions
the evaluation, iTseems, could not
be thought of as true or false, since feelings are not
assessed
in these terms ... I have stressed more than once
that Hume
most decidedly did not think his main concern was with moral

On

[this] interpretation,

langu age
It is Emotionism and not Emotivism that
I have
along been attributing to him
Approbation and blame
are called by Hume 'nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred' ... In attributing Emotionism
to Hume, we must bear in mind that he did not consider
feeling and thinking to be different in kind; but this does not
throw doubt upon the view that, to him, evaluations are
emotions. ^
.

all

.

There are numerous passages,

.

.

in both the

Treatise and

Inquir y Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which

Hume

An

can be
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taken to support the Emotionist interpretation.

Thus the course

of the argument leads us to conclude, that
since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by
reason,
or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some
impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to
mark the difference betwixt them
Morality, therefore, is
more properly felt than judg'd of
(T, p. 470).
.

.

.

.

.

.

To have

the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a

character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. (T, p. 471)
'Tis only

when

a character is considered in general, without
reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a
feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or
evil (T,

p.

472).

moral deliberations
all the circumstances of the case
are to be laid before us ere we can fix any sentence of blame
or approbation
The approbation which then ensues cannot
be the work of the judgment but of the heart; and it is not
a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling
or sentiment (I, p. 108).
In

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Emotionist interpretation accords well with Hume's
concern

to

show

the practicality of morality:

and produce or prevent actions" (T,

p.

457).

"morals excite passions,
According

to

Hume,

all

deliberate actions (and these are the only kind which fall within
the province of morality, indicating, as they do, durable principles
of the character)

mean
of,

proceed from an act of the

will;

"by the

will,

I

nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious

when we knowingly give rise

to

any new motion

of

our body, or
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new perception

our mind" (T,

of

399).

p.

In order,

then, to dis-

cover what will "produce or prevent”
deliberate actions, we must
consider what

Part

Hume

III

says about the causes of movements
of the

Book

of

will.

of the Treatise is titled
"of the will and

II

direct passions"; here (T,
p. 439)

he identifies with volition,

is

Hume

moved

tells us that the will,

which

only by the direct passions of

desire or aversion, which arise
spontaneously from pleasure or

pam, either actual
for this reason that

(in

impression) or imagined

Hume

actuating principle of the

(in idea). 4

It

is

later states that "the chief spring
or

human mind

is

pleasure or pain; and when

these sensations are remov'd, both from
our thought and feeling, we
are, in a great measure, incapable of
passion or action, of desire

or volition" (T,

574).

p.

Thus, because, according to Hume, moral evaluations

themselves are capable
because
will,

it is

in

of influencing our deliberate actions, and

only the direct passions that can directly influence
the

an interpretation of

Hume

on moral evaluations must reveal an

intimate connection between moral evaluations and the
direct passions

one

so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind,

place and have

its

it

must take

influence; tho' the difference betwixt these minds

be in other respects

immense and

infinite"

respect that the Emotionist interpretation

is

(T,

p.

most

465).

It

is in this

attractive, for here
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the act of
of a

moral evaluation

is nothing

more

than the experiencing

moral sentiment, which, as we have seen

direct passion of propensity or aversion

pleasures or pains, and thus capable

earlier, is itself a

arising from sympathetic

of influencing the will.

3

In spite of the appeal of the

Emotionist interpretation, there

are several important passages which
interpretation does not represent

suppose that

I

am morally

another character B;

if I

make

Hume's

it

me

clear to

final position.

A

and

B are

judge that the moral sentiment

templating
I

A

is of

I

mean

that

equal intensity with that of the moral sentiment

examples which show

made

and

experience as a result of con-

experience as a result of contemplating B.

are not

A

equally vicious or

virtuous, on the Emotionist interpretation this can only
I

Let us

evaluating a certain character

judge that

that this

in this

that often such

Hume

But

comparisons

of

offers several

moral worth

way, and thus that the Emotionist account

is

inadequate:

The approbation of moral qualities
proceeds entirely from
moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or
.

.

.

a

disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of
particular qualities or characters. Now tis evident, that
these sentiments, whenceever they are deriv'd, must vary
according to the distance of contiguity of the objects; nor
can I feel the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a
1
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person, who liv'd in Greece two thousand years
ago, that I
feel from the virtues of a familiar friend
and acquaintance.
Yet I do not say, that I esteem the one more than
the other
(T, pp. 581-582).

Our servant,

if diligent and faithful, may
excite stronger
sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus,
as represented in history; but we say not upon that account, that
the former character is more- laudable than the latter.
We
know, that were we to approach equally near to that renown d
patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree of
affection
and admiration (T, p. 582).
1

We blame

equally a bad action, which we read of in history,

with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day;

The

meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T, p.

584).

When ... a good disposition is attended with good fortune,
which renders it really beneficial to society, it gives a
stronger pleasure to the spectator, and is attended with a
more lively sympathy. We are more affected by it; and yet
we do not say that it is more virtuous, or that we esteem
it more
The case is the same, as when we correct the
different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from its different distances from ourselves. The passions do not
always follow our corrections; but these corrections serve
sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are alone
regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the
degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).
.

.

.

The moral sentiment, as

I

have interpreted

it,

is a

propensity

or aversion resulting from sympathetic pleasures or pains, consequent to taking the moral point of view.
the

moral point

of view,

Yet, even after adopting

the strength of our

according to distance, time, resemblance,

sympathy
etc.

will

vary

The strength

propensity or aversion will thus also vary with these factors.

of the

The
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above examples show that we

may

judge

A

to be equally virtuous

or vicious with B, even though the
strength of the moral sentiments
actually experienced as a result of
contemplating
widely,

is

it

hard

to

and B differ

see how the Emotionist interpretation,
under

which an actually experienced moral sentiment
could account for

A

is

an evaluation,

this.

Moreover, Hume suggests

that

we can make moral judgments

even though we are unable to adopt the moral
point of view, and thus
unable to experience a moral sentiment.

But however the general principle of our blame
or praise may
be corrected by those other principles,
tis certain, they are
not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions
often correspond entirely to the present theory. 'Tis seldom
men
heartily love what lies at a distance from them,
and what no
way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare
to meet with persons, who can pardon another
any opposition
he makes to their interest, however justifiable that
'

opposition
be by the general rules of morality.
Here we are
contented with saying, that reason requires such an
impartial
conduct, but that 'tis seldom we can bring ourselves to

may

it,

and that our passions do not readily follow the determination
of our judgment T, p. 583).
(

Once again

the Emotionist interpretation proves inadequate, for

implies that there

is

no moral evaluation

perience of a moral sentiment.
interpretation.

We must

The most common one

if

there

is

it

no actual ex-

look for an alternative

will be considered next.
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4

Hume makes

frequent reference to the correction
of the senti-

ments which arise when we consider
certain characters or

Sometimes we tend
the

way we look

to let

actions.

our personal interests and desires
influence

at a certain situation.

In such

cases we can try to

correct the interested sentiments which
result by reconsidering the
situation

from

the

moral point

of view:

lis therefore from the influence of
characters and qualities
upon those who have an intercourse
with any person, that we
bmme or praise him. We consider not whether the
persons
a ected by the qualities, be our
acquaintance or strangers
countrymen or foreigners. Nay, we overlook
our own interest
in the general judgments; and
blame not a man for opposing
us
when his own interest is particularly concerned
B_y this r eflexion we c orrect
those sentiments o f blame, which
so naturally arise upon any opposition
(T, pp. 582-583;
italics mine).
*

.

.

.

Of course, Hume
in all

is not

saying that such a correction

such cases, for we

all

are entitled

and their actions for personal reasons;

make

a

moral evaluation

that

desirable

to like or dislike

it

is

if

people

only when we wish to

we would attempt such

However, as we have seen, even

is

a correction.

we are successful

in

adopting the moral point of view, our sympathetic
sentiments, and
the resulting

moral sentiments,

in distance or

time

will

to the situation

vary according

we are

to

evaluating.

our proximity

For instance,
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suppose
to be

actually witness a father

I

murder

his infant child;

expected that the sentiments aroused
in

me

will be

intense, as the horror of the act
is played out before

Contrast this with

my merely

my

is

it

extremely
eyes.

reading about such an incident
that

took place hundreds of years ago;

it

is

natural to expect that the

sentiments aroused will be somewhat
tempered.

Furf

r,

the

vividness of the account itself can be
expected to influence the intensity of

the

my

same

emotions.

kind of act

Nevertheless,

we are considering

imagine that the moral worth of
dependent on
it.

So,

its

in all

-

these cases

it

and certainly we do not

a character or action is in

geographic or temporal relation

says Hume, we soon learn

to

precisely

is

to the

any way

one judging

correct for such variations

in

our moral sentiments when we make moral
evaluations.

Besides, every particular man has a peculiar
position with
regard to others; and tis impossible we cou'd ever
converse
together on any reasonable terms, were each of
us to consider characters and persons, only as they
appear from his
peculiar point ot view. In order, therefore, to prevent
those
continual contradictions and arrive at a more
stable judgment
of things, we fix on some stea dy and eneral
points of view;
g
and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them,
whatever
may be our present situation ... and by that reflection we
1

,

correct... momentary appearance

This

is to be

moral sentiments.

(T, pp.

581-582).

contrasted with another sort of variation
If I

in

our

witness first an act of murder and, shortly

afterward, an act of theft, we would expect the moral sentiment
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aroused

in the first

in the latter instance.

a variation in
in the

my

more

instance to be

intense than that aroused

Here, however, this variation

proximity

moral sentiments

is

to the

is not

due to

situations; rather, this difference

taken to reflect a real difference

in the

degree of moral turpitude of the actions.

The second interpretation
Heflectivist account,

seems able

of

Hume

on moral evaluation, the

to explain

how we can make

a

moral

evaluation without feeling a moral sentiment, and also gives some

sense to Hume's references

On

this interpretation of

to the

Hume,

the

correction of moral sentiments.

making

consists in the passing of a judgment about

terms

of the

moral sentiment

if

of a

moral evaluation

how one would

feel in

one were to contemplate a certain

character or action from the moral point of view; the content of such
a judgment would be the proposition assented

Such a judgment,

to.

and hence a moral evaluation, could be made though one had not
adopted the moral point of view and hence were not experiencing a

moral sentiment.

Further, the Reflectivist position can be refined

to correct for variations in

temporal or geographical distance.

Thus, the act of morally evaluating would consist
a

judgment about the degree

produced

if,

both,

of

moral sentiment

in the

that

making

of

would be

one were to contemplate the character or action

from the moral point

of

view and one were directly acquainted with
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the character or action.

In this

way we can

our actual sentiments, though, as

Hume

talk of "correcting"

points out, "our passions

do not readily follow the determination of
our judgment"
thus, for instance, though

would be much stronger
the

moral sentiment

that

I

if I

I

may

judge that

my moral

(T,

583)-

p.

aversion to x

were more directly acquainted with

x,

actually feel toward x will likely remain

the same.

Thei

e

are a number of passages

be describing such a view of

Our servant,

in

which

Hume

does seem

to

moral evaluation;

may excite stronger
sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as
represented in history; but we say not upon that account,
that the former character is more laudable than the
latter.
We know, that were we to approach equally near to that
renown' d patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree
of affection and admiration (T, p. 582).
if

diligent and faithful,

We blame

equally a bad action, which we read of in history,
with one perform'd in our neighborhood t'other day; The

meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the
former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position
(T,

p.

584).

All objects seem to diminish by their distance; But tho'
the appearance of objects to our sense be the original standard,
by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually
diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by
reflexion, arrive at a more constant and establish'd judgment
coricerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much
fainter than our concern for ourselves, and a sympathy with

persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons
near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in
our calm judgments concerning the characters of men
.

.

.
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And

tho' the heart does not always take part
with those
general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by
them, yet
are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our
purposes
in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and
in the schools

(T,

603).

p.

The following passage from An Inquiry Concerning
ciples of

Morals also suggests

the Prin-

the Reflectivist interpretation;

There

is no necessity that a generous action, barely mentioned
an old history or remote gazette, should communicate
any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue,
placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star which, though
to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous as the sun in
his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the senses
neither with light nor heat (I, p. 57).

in

Often, even those commentators who offer a Reflectivist

interpretation of

an account.

Hume

do not do

full justice to the potential of

For instance, Geoffrey Hunter attributes

view that "a moral judgment states that there

is a

to

Hume

such
the

causal relation

between the contemplation by the speaker of some actual or imagined
state of affairs and a certain sort of feeling or sentiment that he

has when he does the contemplating.
lation fails to

must

point of view.

g

However, Hunter's formu-

that the "contemplation by the speaker"

be of a very special sort

moral
a

emphasize

11

-

According

namely, contemplation from the
to

Hume, one cannot experience

moral sentiment unless one has adopted

the

moral

point of view.

Secondly, Hunter's formulation does not take into account variations
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in the

moral sentiment caused by variations

and hence makes no contribution
by the "correction” of

understanding what

moral sentiments.

make such

the capability to

to

in distance

Yet, as

I

and time,

Hume means

have pointed out,

a contribution can be built into a

Re-

flectivist account.

One
tations of

Treatise

.

most carefully formulated

of the

Hume

is

Reflectivist interpre-

found in Kydd's Reason and Conduct in Hume's

Kydd understands Hume

to be saying that for one to judge

that x is good is for one to judge that "x is the kind of
thing which,

considered without regard to the special relation in which
to

my

personal interests, arouses feelings

of

pleasure

other disinterested spectator of like susceptibilities.

formulation there

is

it

is not

Kydd elsewhere makes

lation in which

it

stands to

my

it

or any

In this

obvious from the formu-

clear that "the special re-

personal interests" includes "my

particular standpoint in space and time.
It

me

present the required reference to the moral

point of view; moreover, though
lation itself,

"7

in

stands

it

"8

should be noted in passing that Kydd’s reference to "disin-

terested spectators of like susceptibilities"

is

circular in her account,

because she offers no independent criterion for determining "like
susceptibility. "

Thus, someone who experienced pleasure when con-

templating, from the moral point of view, an act of murder would.
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on Kydd's account, not be a person of like
susceptibility.
on

my

However,

interpretation of the moral sentiment, "like
susceptibility"

could be defined without circularity:

it

would be the ability

sympathize with others, along with possession

to

of an instinctive

)

propensity for pleasure and aversion

to pain.

5

Although there

may

flectivist interpretations of
in

common; they

come

to believe,

be differences in formulations of Re-

Hume, they

all

have one characteristic

hold that to morally evaluate x

is,

believe that x is vicious (virtuous) is to judge or

to

or

that a certain kind of contemplation of x would

cause one to experience certain feelings; that

that

is to judge,

to judge or

come

come

to

to believe

contemplation of x from the moral point of view would cause one

experience the unpleasant (pleasant) moral sentiment.

in the

present section

kind which

Hume

I

wish

to

show

that such a

judgment

quite clearly denies to constitute a

However,
is of a

moral

evaluation,

and thus that the Reflectivist interpretation too must be rejected.

Book
to

I

of the Treatise

,

"Of the Understanding,

describing the intellectual faculties of man.

man

has the ability

to

and probabilistically.

reason

in

devoted

Hume argues

two different ways:

Demonstrative reasoning

" is

is

that

demonstratively

concerned with
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the

comparison

more

of ideas only,

and consists in the intuition of one or

of the following relations

between ideas;

resemblance, pro-

portions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality,
and contrariety (T,

p.

For instance,

79).

if I

"consider and compare"

the idea of twice two with the idea of four,

through an "act of the understanding,
an equality

immediately perceive,

that the ideas are related by

Hume sometimes speaks

number.

in

"

I

of

demonstrative

reasoning as the "discovery" of relations between ideas
Apparently,

between ideas

Hume

considers the discovery

to be equivalent to the assent to or

of

(T,

ideas of twice two and the idea of four and
of equality in

number

to hold

between them,

I

to

Hume,

idea of four before

if I

my

it

is

this by saying that

proposition that twice two
all

compare

Moreover,

impossible for

is

it

is

impossible

not equal to four.

me
in

to conceive,

number.

to

Such

Hume

conceive of the
is the

case with

propositions which express a relation between ideas; they are

immediately assented

to

the

thereby have come to

or imagine, them to be related by a non-equality

would express

I

really do have the idea of twice two and the

mind,

).

which asserts

discover the relation

believe the proposition that twice two is equal to four.

according

n.

formation of a

Thus, when
I

464

such a relation

belief in a certain proposition, namely, that proposition
that the ideas are related by that relation.

p.

upon conceiving them, and their opposites
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are "unintelligible"

(T,

p.

95).

Demonstrative reasoning, being concerned with the nature
our ideas only,
it

is

as close to certainty as

man

of

can ever achieve;

provides the basis for the "exact" sciences of algebra and arith-

metic, "the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of

reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect
exactness and certainty"

(T,

p.

71).

Probable reasoning, on the other hand, terminates

in the

belief in the existence (past, present, or future) of external objects

or their qualities which are not "immediately present to the senses"
(T,

p.

9

73).

Such reasoning

is also called

effect" or "matter of fact" reasoning.

reasoning
either

is the

The

I

first

phase

in all

such

experience of an impression of an external object,

from the senses or from memory

instance,

"reasoning by cause and

(T,

pp.

receive the visual impression of a

What follows immediately, according

to

84-86). 10

man

Hume,

For

kicking a

is the lively

ball.

idea

of the ball in flight; this lively idea constitutes a belief or expectation
in the

imminent

transition

flight of the ball.

from an impression

This complex phenomenon, the

of one object to a belief in another

object (or a belief in another state or quality of the
constitutes for

Hume

same

object),

an instance of probable reasoning.

Hume's analysis

of

cause and effect reasoning

is

perhaps his
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most well -inown philosophical

effort.

What Hume shows

such reasoning, though necessary and unavoidable

never be justified

in

is

that

in daily life,

any given instance; and for Hume,

can

to justify

the use of probable reason would be to show
that the conclusion

reached

(

i.

e.

is likely to

,

the proposition believed) as a result of
such reason

be true.

His first step

cause and effect reasoning
it

proof

is to

show

that

not demonstrative reasoning, in that

does not depend on the nature of our ideas alone.

(or impression) alone of a
to

is

in his

man

follow demonstratively; that

kicking a ball,
is,

From

the idea

no idea can be shown

starting with the idea of a

man

kicking a ball as a cause, we can conceive of anything as the effect,
for instance that the
kin.

Our idea

according

May
from

I

disappears and the ball becomes a pump-

of a cause and our idea of the effect are always,

Hume,

to

man

logically (demonstratively) unrelated;

not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling
the clouds and which in all other respects resembles

snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there
any more intelligible proposition than to affirm that all the
trees will flourish in

December and January, and

will decay
and June? Now, whatever is intelligible and can be
distinctly conceived implies no contradiction and can never
be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract
reasoning a priori (IU, p. 49).
in

May

Since cause and effect reasoning cannot be justified by an appeal to
the nature of our ideas alone, as can demonstrative reasoning,

if
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it

is

to

be justified

our experience.

In

must

it

be done by an appeal to the
nature of

our experience we see

many

instances of a

certain type of cause followed by a certain
type of effect.

might imagine, when

my

I

now receive

Thus, we

the impression of a similar cause

belief or expectation in the existence of a
similar effect is

justified

(

1

.

e.

,

likely to be true) because experience

shows

highly probable that such an effect will follow
such a cause.

Hume

that

is

it

Now

does admit that cause and effect reasoning requires
prior ex-

perience of similar sets of causes and effects:

'Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the
existence of one object from that of another. The nature of
experience is this. We remember to have had frequent
instances of the existence of one species of objects; and also
remember, that the individuals of another species of objects
ha^e always attended them, and have existed in a regular
order of contiguity and succession with regard to them
Without any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the
other effect and infer the existence of the one from that of
the other. In all those instances, from which we learn the
conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the causes
and effects have been perceiv'd by the senses, and are remember'd; But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning
them, there is only one perceiv'd or remember'd, and the
other is supply' d in conformity to our past experience
(T, p. 87).
.

.

.

,

But

Hume

denies that cause and effect reasoning

perience.

His argument

An

Con cerning Human Understanding:

Inquiry

is

is justified

by ex-

most elegantly and succinctly phrased

in
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inferences f i om experience suppose, as their foundathat the future will resemble the past and that similar
powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If
there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change,

For

3.11

tion,

and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience
become s useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.
It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments
from
experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the
future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance (IU,

To paraphrase Russell's synopsis
tell us

of the

p.

51).

argument, experience can

about the nature of past futures, for instance that they have

resembled past pasts.

But experience can

us nothing about the

tell

nature of future futures unless we assume what we are t^ing to show
by an appeal to experience;
the past.

*

Hume
matter

namely, that the future will resemble

thus concludes that, because the beliefs generated in

of fact

to experience,

intention to

reasoning cannot be justified by an appeal
they cannot be justified at

show

that

we reach such

arguments, because Hume's stroke

all.

But

it

to ideas or

is not

Hume's

beliefs on the basis of fallacious
of genius is his contention that

do not reach such beliefs by any argument at

all.

Rather,

we

Hume

cause and effect many

argues that when we experience a similar set

of

times, we involuntarily form a mental habit;

when we now experience

the impression of a similar cause, our imagination in stinctively and

immediately forms the lively idea

of the effect,

and this lively idea
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constitutes a belief or expectation;

Now

as

past

i

may

we

call everything CUSTOM, which proceeds
from a
epetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion,

we

establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which
follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely
from
that origin. When we are accustom'd to see two
impressions
conjoin'd together, the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other (T,
pp. 102-103)

Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that
principle alone which renders our experience useful to us and
makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events
with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom we should be entirely ignorant of every
matter

memory
Even
a legitimate

beyond what is immediately present
and senses (IU, pp. 58-59).

of fact

so,

Hume does

form

reasoning,

Hume

consider cause and effect reasoning to be

of reasoning; though, as

involved in such reasoning

to the

is far different

we have seen,
from

the process

that in demonstrative

maintains that both are functions

of

our intellectual

faculty, the understanding;

The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as
it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the
abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects,
of which experience only gives us information (T, p. 413).

Hume

maintains that when we reason we ''discover" or "per-

ceive" something.

When we reason from demonstration, we perceive

a relation between ideas.

cause and effect?

We

What do we perceive when we reason from

do not perceive any relation between cause and
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effect because, according to IIum.e, there
is none present to either

our senses or our intellect.

we are expecting,

for

Nor do we perceive

we have no impression

time that we are reasoning.
is a belief in the

more

the effect

of the effect at the

What we end up with

in

such reasoning

existence of an unperceived effect, which

than a lively idea of that effect.

Hume

which

is nothing-

equates this with the

discovery or perception of the proposition that a certain effect
has
(or will have) existence (T, pp.
of objects is

96-97

n.

,

pp.

97-98).

accomplished through the impressions

perception of propositions

is

Perception

of sensation;

accomplished by the understanding,

via its processes of demonstrative and probable reasoning.

seems clear

that in the following,

It

"objects of reason" refers to

propositions:

Reason

discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or
falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to
the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter
of fact.
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or
false, and can never be an object of our reason (T, p. 458).
is the

All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally
be divided into two kinds, to with "Relations of Ideas, "
and "Matters of Fact. " Of the first kind are the sciences
of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short,
every a ffirmatio n which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain
Matters of fact, which are the
second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the
.

same manner, nor

.

.

is our evidence of their truth, however
great, of a like nature with the foregoing (IU, p. 40).
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Both kinds

of reasoning, then,

demonstrative and probable, lead

to

the formation of a belief in a proposition.

Now

the Reflectivist interpretation of

morally evaluate x

is to

come

to believe

which asserts that contemplation
causes the experience

of x

of a certain

Hume

maintains that

to

or assent to a proposition

from

the

moral

moral sentiment;

point of view

thus,

to find x

virtuous (or vicious) is to assent to a certain matter of fact proposi-

Yet we come

tion about x.

to believe

such matter of fact propositions

only as a result of matter of fact reasoning; and
that a

moral evaluation

is

This denial comes

Hume

in the first section of

often is careless in

"

Book

III,

"Moral

One must be careful here,

making clear

to

which kind

Sometimes by "reason" Hume means

is referring.

explicitly denies

an instance of matter of fact reasoning.

Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason.
for

Hume

of

reason he

to refer to de-

monstrative reason only, as when he says "Reason or science

is

nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations" (T,

Hume means

p.

to

466); at other times

is not

is

clear that by "reason"

refer to both demonstrative and probable reason, as

when he says "we
inference

it

infer a cause immediately

from

its effect;

and this

only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest

of all others" (T, p.

97

n.

).

However, Hume leaves no question

that in the section of the Treatise

we are now considering, "reason"

refers to both demonstrative and probable reasoning;
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the thought and understanding were alone capable
of fixing
the boundaries of right and wrong, the character
of virtuous
If

and vicious must lie in some relations of objects, or
must be
a matter of face, which is discovered by our
reasoning.
This consequence is evident. As the operations of human
understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were
virtue discover'd by the understanding; it must be an object
of one of these operations (T, p. 463).

Hume

then goes on to argue in the remainder of the section that to

morally evaluate

The rules

is

of morality,

our reason

Moral
(T,
1

tis

p.

not to engage in a process of reasoning.

(T,

p.

therefore, are not conclusions of

457).

distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason
458).

impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and
can be made by reason (T, p. 462).

evil,

the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
relation of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason (T, p. 470).

The actual examination
that

Hume's arguments

of

moral evaluations are not instances

probable reasoning would lead
pose.

What

evaluate

is

is

important here

me

of either demonstrative or

too far afield of

is that

for the conclusion

Hume

my

present pur-

concludes that to morally

not to assent to or ''discover" a proposition;

Nor does

reasoning only prove, that morality consists
that are the
relations of ideas]]
i. e.
but if
demonstrative reason]
e.
examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not
this

not in any relations
objects of science [i.

,

,

,

;
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any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the
understanding (T, p. 468).
in

We

must, then, reject the Reflectivist interpretation of

moi al
ful in

evaluation.

Though

it

may

be

shown

Hume

that

Hume

is not

on

success-

proving that a Reflectivist account of moral evaluation cannot

be correct,

we can know

that

Hume's own account

is not

Reflec-

tivist.

6

It

to find a

appears that we have reached an impasse
coherent interpretation of

we take Hume's pronouncements
to adopt an

Emotionist account,

Hume on moral

at face value,

we

to the effect that

in the

attempt

evaluation.
initially

If

are led

an act of moral

evaluation consists in the experiencing of a moral sentiment.

But

this interpretation cannot account for certain evaluations that

Hume

says we do make,

in

particular in those cases where the character

or action to be evaluated

is

distant in time or place, or

are unable to adopt the moral point of view.

We

where we

than consider a

Reflectivist interpretation, to the effect that an act of

moral evalua-

tion consists in the assent to a certain type of matter of fact proposition.

This interpretation

is

able to explain

how we can morally

evaluate independently of the actual experience of a moral sentiment;
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we then

but
that

find that

it

is in

direct conflict with

moral evaluations are not determinations

Hume's insistence

of reason.

There are two conclusions which can be drawn.
that

Hume

at all.

may

It

be

does not give us a coherent theory of moral evaluation

Perhaps he really

is

maintaining either an Emotionist or a

Reflectivist position, without realizing the inconsistencies thereby

generated.
is

If

this is indeed the case,

on the side of holding that

Hume

is

I

think the weight of the evidence

an Emotionist with respect to

moral evaluations.
There
a theory of

is

yet the second possibility:

that

moral evaluation, neither Emotionist nor

which explains those features

of

moral evaluation

interpretations, taken singly, cannot.

In

Its

primarily from a rather strong conviction that
possibility without a struggle is to give up on

interpretation will rely on
it

my

is

describing

Reflectivist,

that the latter

what follows,

attempt to work out such an interpretation.

but

Hume

I

will

motivation stems
to adopt the first

Hume

too quickly.

My

account of Hume's moral sentiment,

can be adapted to other accounts of the moral sentiment,

including moral sense theories.

For Hume,

the contents of

moral evaluations are

not true or

false, for they are not objects of reason, or propositions.

theless, he implies that

some moral evaluations are

Never-

better than
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others, in that the former,

formative than the latter.

when communicated, are more
For example, expressions

preference are of limited value to society

announce that

I

be able to glean

from

this

my

quest for power.

did,

-

If I

those who know

some information about

character of Mr. A's action
in

A

what Mr.

like

at large.

for instance, that

it

of

me

in-

personal
publicly

well might

the general

was helpful

However, those who are strangers

to

me

to

me

nothing about the general nature of Mr. A's action from

my

declaration of personal preference, for they know nothing about

my

Co.n tell

personal tastes and interests.

Moral evaluations are more

socially useful than evaluations

based on personal factors because these very factors, which tend
vary from one individual
our personal preferences

moral

point of view.

to the next

differ,

and which thereby tend to make

are screened out by adopting the

Because, according to Hume, almost

are similar in their capacity

to

to

sympathize with others and

all

men

in their

natural emotional reaction to personal pleasure or pain, and because

moral evaluations are rooted

in nothing

more

qualities of

man, when

action

as informative to a stranger as

it

is

As we have
of view, our

I

communicate

a

seen, however, even

than these

common

moral evaluation

if

it

of

Mr. A's

is to a friend.

we adopt

the

moral point

moral sentiments can be affected by distances

in

time

143

or place from that which is being evaluated.

element

ot variability into

This introduces an

moral evaluations, one which

is

based on

a purely personal and unique relation to that
which is evaluated,

much

as personal tastes and interests introduce that large
measure

of variability so characteristic of

non-moral evaluations.

element detracts from the social usefulness

of

This

moral evaluation

-

every individual occupies a unique spatio-temporal position, and
unless we know this position of one who communicates a moral
evaluation, the information

we obtain about what kind

of thing

it

is

that is being evaluated will be limited.

Therefore,

Hume

implies, a moral evaluation which takes

into account and corrects for this

than one which does not.

element

of variability will be better

Experience alone teaches us how

to do this:

In general,

all sentiments of blame or praise are variable,
according to our situation of nearness or remoteness, with
regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the
present disposition of our mind. But these variations we
regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking and dislike, in the same manner, as
if we remain'd in one point of view.
Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least,
of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable (T, p. 582).

Once again, however, we are faced with
pretation of

Hume's view

explains what

it

is to

of the nature of

the task of giving an inter-

moral evaluation, one

correct a moral evaluation.

To do

this,

I

that

be

-
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lieve,

requires that we take very seriously Hume's contention
that

the correction of a

moral evaluation

is

similar to the correction of

a perceptual judgment:

The case is here Qn moral evaluations] the same as in our
judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to
diminish by their distance; But tho' the appearance of objects
to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge
of them, yet we do not say, that they actually diminish by
the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflexion,
arrive at a more constant and establish'd judgment concerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much fainter
than our concern for ourselves, and a sympathy with persons
remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and
contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in our calm
judgments concerning the characters of men
And tho'
the heart does not always take part with those general notions,
.

.

.

or regulate its love or hatred by them, yet are they sufficient
for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the
pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools (T, p. 603).

Hume's

him.

to go

We

seems

on

is his

own impressions, or how

the object appears to

soon learn by experience that our impressions

object tend to undergo variations.

Some

in

our perceptual relation

of an

of these variations

tribute to changes in the object itself, while others

changes

to be the

In attempting to judge of an external object, all anyone

following.

has

point about perceptual judgments

to the object.

we

We

we

attribute to

are able to draw

such distinctions by comparing our impressions of the object
the impressions reported by observers
the object is constant.

at-

to

whose perceptual relation

to
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Thus, as

I

get farther

get smaller.

Yet,

I

from an

object, the object appears to

me

to

do not take this as an indication that the object

itself is getting smaller,

because I've learned from experience

that

similar circumstances, observers whose distance from the
object

in

remains constant experience no change
object.

same

Since the

same

change in

object,

my

I

0 f the

3

object cannot both be getting smaller and not

getting smaller, and since
the

in their percC;

we assume

that

attribute the change in

our impressions are

my

of

perceptions to the

relation to the object, rather than to a change in the

object itself.
In judging of objects,

according

to

Hume, we cannot hope

judge independently of our perceptions of the object.

reason for thinking that the appearance
object

more

pearance

of

is

no

largeness of a nearby

closely resembles the actual object than does the ap-

smallness of the same object

can be sure that the chang e
large to small as we

change

of

There

to

move

in the object itself):

in the

at a distance (though

appearance

farther away from
it

is just that

of the object
it

is not

we

from

caused by any

we must adopt certain con-

ventions in order to communicate effectively with others:

In order,

therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions,
and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some
steady and ^general points of view; and always, in our thoughts,
place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation
(T, pp. 581-582).
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Thus,

in

describing the size of an object, we base our
description

on our perceptions when near to the object;
of an object,

when

it

is

ventions,

in

describing the color

we base our description on our perceptions

illuminated by white

Hume

light.

argues, every man'

If

s

we

of the object

did not adopt such con-

description of the world would

be purely subjective; your description of an object wo:

information on what to expect should

my own

I

However,

the case even

will perceive should
if I

point of view,

I

no

you describe

if

the object relative to a "conventional" point of view,
I

me

observe the same object from

unique perceptual point of view.

idea of what

i.ve

I

then get an

observe the object;

this

remains

do not observe the object from the conventional

because experience teaches

me how

changes in per-

ceptual relations to an object alter the impressions of the object.

Let us consider a specific example.

yards away from

a fire,

so that

I

feel only a slight

This sensation of slight warmth that
as such,
of

Hume

tells us,

such a degree as

its

Suppose

I

am

several

warmth from

experience

is

an impression;

strength and vivacity

is

automatically

I

to constitute belief.

1

3

Moreover, Hume con-

siders the reaching of any belief, propositional or not, an act of

judgment; thus,

all

sensations are, for Hume, perceptual judg-

ments^:

Thus

it

it.

appears, that the belief or assent, which always
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attends the memory and senses, is nothing but
the vivacity
of those perceptions they present ...
To believe is in this
case to feel an immediate impression of the
senses
Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception,
which
constitutes the first act of judgment
(T,
.

.

p.

.

86)

The only existences

of which we are certain, are perceptions,
which being immediately present to us by consciousness,
command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation
of all our conclusions (T, p. 212).

But experience teaches

judgment by appealing

from

me how

to the

to

"correct" this

-

and in the case of sensible

objects the conventional point of view

I

have when

when

I

I

am

I

is

one of proximity, under

know from experience

very close

imagine myself close

perceptual

impressions which would be experienced

the conventional point of view

"standard" conditions.

initial

to a fire; that is,
to a fire,

I

in

the kind of sensation

Hume's terminology,

am immediately

presented

with an idea of a certain kind of painful sensation.

All objects seem to diminish by their distance; But tho'
the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they
actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflexion, arrive at a more constant and establish'd

judgment concerning them

By "correcting

(T,

p.

603).

the appearance by reflexion"

at the idea of certain

Hume means

arriving

impressions (namely, those which would be

experienced by the perceiver while maintaining a certain conventional
point of view) via a process of probable reasoning.
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Hume maintains
the

same manner

as

that

we correct our aesthetic judgments

in

we do our perceptual judgments:

external beauty is determin'd merely by pleasure;
and
'tis evident, a beautiful countenance
cannot give so much
pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces,
as when
it is brought nearer us.
We say not, however, that it appears
to us less beautiful: Because we know what
effect it will have
in such a position, and by that reflection
we correct its
.

.

.

momentary appearance
Our

initial

ment.

impression

(T,

of pleasure

582).

p.

must count as an

However, experience has taught us what

of pleasui able

aesthetic judg-

to expect in the

way

sentiments should we perceive such a countenance

close proximity

-

that is,

when we imagine ourselves

to

in

perceive the

countenance from a closer point of view, we are immediately presented with the idea of a greater pleasure.

corrected aesthetic judgment, and

if

our judgment to another,

idea that

to the initial

as follows.

is

and

I

is this

we have need

to

we refer

communicate
to

rather than

impression of pleasure.

What, then,
it

it

This idea serves as a

is

When

Hume's theory
I

of

moral evaluation?

I

believe

contemplate a certain character or action,

experience a moral sentiment (or lack of a moral sentiment),

I

have thereby morally evaluated or judged the character or action.
Thus, the Emotionist interpretation

is

Emotionist account goes wrong

assuming

is in

so far correct.
that all

Where

the

moral evalua-
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lions for

Hume

assuming

that all perceptual

are of this type.

experiencing of sensations.

This

However, as

moral evaluations.
ing

I

how

Hume argues

Similarly,

correct

I

similar to the error of

judgments for Hume consist

corrected perceptual judgments consist

impression.

is

my

have tried

I

of view; the corrected

it

show,

an idea rather than an

in

that there are corrected

initial

moral sentiment by imagin-

the character or action would affect

be directly acquainted with

to

in the

and should

I

me

emotionally should

adopt the moral point

moral evaluation consists

in the resulting

idea of a moral sentiment.

Let us consider a specific example.

newspaper account
rich.

My

ot a thief in

Imagine that

seeing the rich suffer a
view, and screen out

bit.

my

read a

Australia who steals only from the

reaction is one of approval, for

initial

I

But

I

I

take pleasure in

then adopt the moral point of

jealousy of the rich; in sympathizing with

the unpleasantness experienced by the victims,

I

too experience un-

pleasantness, and this becomes the object of an aversion, which

moral sentiment.
Australia

is far

inhabitants;

I

now have made

away and

I

feel

a

very

moral evaluation.
little

are going through.

I

a

However,

association with

it

moreover, the brief newspaper account gives no

about the victims, and

is

or

its

details

can only imagine what these faceless people

These things together lessen

my

ability to
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sympathize with the victims, and as a result,

my

sympathetic pain

and consequent aversion, or moral sentiment, are quite
weak.

However,

I

am aware

fected this way, and so

I

my moral

that

endeavor

There have been numerous times
proximity to acts of

theft;

I

sentiments can be af-

to correct

in

my

my

when

life

initial evaluation.

I

have been

in close

have witnessed them, or have had close

friends who have been robbed, or perhaps have committed such acts

myself.

each

In

from the moral point

moral sentiment.
Australia,
that,

I

of view,

When

imagine that

I

is of

am
I

I

have contemplated the act

have experienced a very strong

my

initial

judgment

close to his deeds and

This then

is

I

I

of the

man

in

imagine also

contemplate his deeds from the moral

Because experience has taught

under such circumstances,
sion.

I

correct

I

while in that position,

point of view.

when

of these cases,

am

me how

I

am

affected

led to the idea of a strong aver-

an idea of a moral sentiment because the idea

an aversion which follows adoption of the moral point of view.

This very idea of an intense moral sentiment now serves as

my

corrected moral evaluation of the

man

describe the degree of viciousness of the
this idea of a strong

my

my

initial

man

moral evaluation.

If I

and his deeds,

moral sentiment which serves as

description, rather than the rather

constitutes

in Australia.

wish
it

to

is

the basis for

weak moral sentiment which
It

might now appear as
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though the Reflectivist interpretation

moral evaluations
Reflectivist, a

go,

is

accurate so far as corrected

but this is not the case.

moral evaluation

According

for Ilume consists in a proposition

which connects the idea of a certain contemplation
certain sentiment.

However,

I

to the

am

to the idea of a

arguing that a corrected moral

evaluation consists in an idea of a certain sentiment alone.

content of a moral evaluation for

pression or
I

it

can consist

in

Hume,

then,

The

can consist in an im-

an idea of that impression.

shall call an "original" evaluation, while the latter

I

The former

will refer to

as a "corrected" evaluation.

So far,

we correct

a

I

have given the following picture of what occurs when

moral

evaluation.

Initially,

we adopt

the

of view, and contemplate a certain character or action.

experience a certain degree of moral sentiment.
realize that this initial, or "original,

"

moral

We

point

then

However, we

evaluation might be affected

by our distance in space or time from that which
then set out to correct the initial evaluation.

We

is evaluated;

we

imagine that we

are contemplating the same character or action from the moral
point of view, and also that

character or action.

we are directly acquainted with

Our imagination, by

a

customary

the

transition,

then produces an idea of a certain degree of propensity or aversion,

and this idea now constitutes the corrected moral evaluation.

152

Yet,

is

it

clear that this

same process may

without the initial or original moral evaluation.
quite

common

view

in certain

crime,
I

in

be

undergone

For instance,

it

is

ourselves unable to adopt the moral point of

to find

circumstances.

Suppose

evaluating this action

my

brother commits a

would be a rare person indeed

I

if

could separate myself from the intense personal
influences in-

volved.

Since

I

cannot adopt the moral point of view,

perience a moral sentiment; that

is,

cannot

I

I

cannot ex-

make what

I

have been

calling an "original" evaluation.

However, as
case to make what
tion.

I

interpret

Hume,

have been calling

it

a

is still

possible in such a

"corrected" moral evalua-

can imagine myself contemplating this act from the moral

point of view.
of

I

I

Experience has taught

such a contemplation;

I

am

me

what

to expect as a result

presented, via the mental habit, with

the idea of a strong sentiment of aversion.

This idea, then, con-

my

brother and his action,

stitutes a negative

my

even though

all

positive.

is this

It

evaluation of

my

moral evaluation

of

actual sentiments toward

idea to which

I

my

refer should

brother
I

may

be

express a moral

brother's action;

The passions do not always follow our corrections; but these
corrections serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract
notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in
general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue (T, p. 585).
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There

one which

tion,

also another sense of correcting a moral
evalua-

is

Hume

come about when,

says very

little about.

Such a correction can

after morally evaluating a certain character
or

action (either in an original or a corrected evaluation),
we get

information about the kind of character or action

my

friend's ethnic jokes might

believe that they
of view, and

amuse others as

I

well.

experience

moral evaluation.

is

a

my

However,

I

may

can adopt the moral point
I

imagine

find out that, in fact,

If I

now adopt

sympathy with these others

my moral

this evaluation too

in that

it

the

will cause

my

friend's

my

moral

me

to

friend's

point

share

in

sentiment will be one of aversion.

would be original

perience of an actual sentiment,

proved evaluation

might mistakenly

moral sentiment, and constitutes an original

their displeasure, and

Although

For instance,

d he subsequent pleasurable propensity

jokes are disagreeable to others.
of view,

I

I

sympathize with the pleasures that

joke telling brings to otners.
that

amuse me, and

it is.

new

it

in that

it

is the

ex-

can be considered to be an im-

stems from a better understanding

effects of that which is being evaluated.

Still,

it

of the

cannot be said that

the first evaluation is false, and the second true, because the content
of neither is a propositional belief.

Hume

gives a similar example of such a correction in

Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals:

An
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determinations of morality, this circumstance of
public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever
disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life,
concerning
the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means,
be
decided with greater certainty than by ascertaining, on any
side, the ti ue interests of mankind. If any false opinion
embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail, as
soon as fur tner experience and sounder reasoning have given
us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first
sentiment and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and
In all

evil.

Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised, because
it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent.
But
when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness
and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as
a weakness than a virtue (I, pp. 12-13).

There

is

one important difference between corrected per-

ceptual judgments and corrected moral evaluations (that
that consist in an idea rather than a sentiment):

comprised

of beliefs

whereas

the latter are not.

is,

those

former are

the

An impression

of

an object constitutes a perceptual judgment, as, for example, the
sensation of slight
tion

warmth from

we are soon drawn

a distant fire.

By

a habit of imagina-

to a lively idea of intense heat,

and this

lively idea constitutes a belief;

All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived
merely from some object present to the memory or senses
and a customary conjunction between that and some other
object; or, in other words, having found, in many instances,
that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold,
have always been conjoined together: if flame or snow be
presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom
to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does
exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach (IU,

p.

60).
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This lively idea or belief
but

Hume

corrected perceptual judgment;

is the

insists that an impression of the object is necessary
to

give the consequent idea intensity enough to be belief;

make

a third set of experiments, in order to know,
whether anything be requisite, beside the customary transition, towards the production of this phaenomenon
of belief.
•

•

•

I

therefore change the first impression into an idea; and
observe, that tho the customary transition to the correlative idea still remains, yet there is in reality no belief nor
persuasion. A present impression, then, is absolutely
requisite to this whole operation (T, p. 103).
I

1

If I

merely imagine

is not a belief,

still

the

a fire, that is,

if I

have an idea

"customary transition"

take place, and

I

in

my

of a fire

which

imagination will

will receive the idea of intense heat; but

since the initial perception was an idea rather than an impression,
the consequent idea will not be a belief.

When
impression.
lief) of

I

correct a moral evaluation,

Rather,

I

I

do not start with an

begin with an idea (one which is not a be-

a certain contemplation of an action or character

certain spatio-temporal position.

when

I

Experience has taught

from

me

a

that

do actually so contemplate similar actions or characters from

that position, a certain sentiment follows; that is,

habit of expectation borne

idea of that contemplation,

from custom.
I

am

ment; but since this transition

is

I

have a mental

Thus, when

I

begin with the

led to the idea of that certain senti-

from idea

to idea rather than

from
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impression

to idea, the

consequent idea of the sentiment

is not a

belief.

So far as corrected moral evaluations are concerned, then,
the Reflectivist interpretation is

place,

I

wrong on two counts.

In the first

have tried to show that a corrected moral evaluation

a belief in or assent to a cause and effect proposition.

wrong about what

is the Reflectivist

moral evaluation
involved at

all.

-

he

is

wrong

in

is not

But not only

believed in a corrected

is

maintaining that there

is belief

^
7

Both the Emotionist and the Reflectivist interpretations have
strong points in their favor; but they each have weaknesses which,
I

believe, are sufficient for rejecting

Hume's theory
a

new

of

moral evaluation.

them as accurate accounts
In the last section

interpretation, and in the present section

whether or not

this interpretation

ing the weaknesses of the two

common

evaluation and action.

Hume

On my

wish

to

have given

examine

shares the strengths while avoidinterpretations.

The Emotionist account was attractive
the intimate connection that

I

I

of

in that

it

provided for

believes to hold between moral

interpretation this connection

holds for "original" moral evaluations, for here

my

account

still

is the
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same as
of the

the Emotionist:

such evaluations consist

in the

experience

moral sentiment.
However, on

my

interpretation a corrected moral evaluation

consists in the having of an idea of a certain sentiment, rather than
in the

experiencing of the sentiment

itself.

But an idea which

is not

a belief is motivationally neutral, and cannot affect our passions

or actions (T, pp. 118

ff. );

thus,

it

seems,

a corrected

moral

evaluation does not display that connection between evaluation and
action which, we have up to

moral evaluations.

Yet,

if

now assumed, Hume demands

we read Hume

carefully,

apparent that he does not demand this connection

in

it

of all

becomes

corrected moral

evaluations:

But however the general principle of our blame or praise
may be corrected by these other principles, tis certain,
they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions
often correspond entirely to the present tneory (T, p. 583).
'

The passions do not always follow our corrections

(T,

p.

585).

be experienced as
Sentiments must touch the heart £i. e.
impressions']
to make them controul our passions; But
be exthey need not extend beyond the imagination [i. e.
to make them influence our taste
perienced as ideas]
,

,

,

,

(T, p.

We
because
of

it

586).

found the Emotionist interpretation to be inadequate
could not explain what

moral evaluations, nor could

Hume means

it

explain

how

by the correction
it

is that

we can make
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a

moral evaluation without

ficulty is

overcome by

a corrected

the

moral sentiment.

feeling a

new

moral evaluation

This

interpretation, according

dif-

to which

an idea of a sentiment rather than

is

a sentiment itself.

The Reflectivist interpretation had

the advantage of being-

able to explain the correction of moral evaluations, and

can

make

My

interpretation too has this capacity.

had

to be rejected

a

moral evaluation without

because

it

feeling a

But the Reflectivist account

contentions to the effect that to

make

come

a proposition.

overcomes

this difficulty as well.

on this interpretation, consists

Hume's theory,

all

moral sentiment.

clearly inconsistent with Hume's

is

to believe, or assent to,

in

a

An

moral evaluation

original

My

is not to

interpretation

moral evaluation,

an impression; and though, on

impressions are beliefs, they are not what might

be called "propositional beliefs.

"

A

corrected moral evaluation

consists in an idea of a sentiment, an idea which

same

how we

is

produced by the

type of mental habit which underlies probable reasoning; but

unlike probable reasoning, which begins with an impression and

terminates

in

propositional belief, a corrected moral evaluation
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begins with an idea

with an idea

(of a

(of a

certain act of contemplation) and terminates

certain sentiment) which is not belief.

Therefore,

my

interpretation does

seem

to

combine the

strengths of the Emotionist and the Reflectivist interpretations,

while at the

same time avoiding those inadequacies which caused

their ultimate rejections.

8

My

primary concern

tion of what constitutes a

with interpreting
for this:

among

I

Hume

to this point

has been with an examina-

moral evaluation

for

on moral discourse.

Hume, rather than

There

is

good reason

do not find any theory of moral language in Hume.

others, agrees with

In the Treatise,

me

Ardal,

here;

Hume

explains the nature and origin of
evaluations; but he is not concerned with evaluative language ..
Hume does not give us, in the Treatise, a theory
of moral language, but an account of the nature and origin
of evaluations.
If Ethics is defined as the analysis of
moral discourse, Hume's Treatise does not contain much
in the way of Ethics.
What it does contain is an account
of the way the concepts of virtue and vice have their source
.

in

That

human

Hume

emotions-*-

'

avoids linguistic analysis should not be surprising

we remind ourselves

of

what

Hume

is

if

attempting to accomplish in

the Treatise and in the Inquiries which followed:

the development
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of a "science of

affirms

human

Now

this.

nature.

"

The

full title of the

Treatise itself

the use of language is a characteristic of

human

nature; but the use of a particular language, or of particular linguistic expressions (and the concepts they express), is not.
linguistic analysis, unless

it

Thus,

be concerned with discovering struc-

tural similarities in all languages, does not have a place in

Hume's

philosophy.

What does occupy such

a place,

understanding" and "of the passions,

is a

study "of the

elements which are

common

humankind; and one of the most important of the passions

to all

the

"

however,

moral sentiment:

common

to all

"The notion

is

morals implies some sentiment

of

mankind, which recommends the same object

to

general approbation and makes every man, or most men, agree

same opinion or decision concerning

in the

study of this moral sentiment, and of

or decisions,

"

that

Hume

a philosopher of morals.

its

it"

(I,

role in

p.

.

.

.

engage

It

is the

moral "opinions

finds to be the proper object of study for

Those philosophers who pay

attention to language "encroach upon the province of

and

93).

in disputes of

too

much

grammarians

words, while they imagine that they

are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern"
(I,

pp.

127-128).

Of course,

it

is entirely possible,

and perhaps probable.
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that

Hume

did have a theory about

municated.

there are any signs of such a theory

Ii

has given us,

how moral evaluations are com-

it

seems

to

interpreted as pointing to

me

that these signs are

some form

of

in

what

Hume

most easily

emotive theory of moral

utterances, for Ilume occasionally talks of "expressing" our moral

sentiments or "communicating" them. 18 On

Hume

my

interpretation of

on moral evaluation, this emotivism would have to be of a

strangely modified form; what I've called an original evaluation

would be communicated by expressing a moral sentiment, but a
corrected evaluation would have to be communicated by expressing
an idea (or concept) of a moral sentiment.
It

would be natural, then,

to

ask how we could know whether

another's communicated moral evaluation was an expression of a

sentiment or of an idea of a sentiment.

seems

to be that

But that does not matter for Hume, for

in either

the other's utterance is all

cannot know.

we are gaining
namely, that
the

moral

causes

it

the

we have

to go one,

same information about

is the

that

we
case

the thing evaluated:

kind of thing which when contemplated from

point of view, and

in the

The answer, assuming

from

a spatio-temporal proximity,

judger a moral sentiment.

That

is

why Hume can

maintain that corrected moral evaluations are "sufficient for discourse.

1
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The kernel

of

Hume's argument

is

contained

in the

follow-
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Moials excite passions, and produce or prevent actions
Reason ol itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The
rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our

reason

Hume means

(T, p.

457).

to include

by reason here both demonstrative and
probable reason. But Hume admits that probable reason, unlike
demonstrative, can prompt or excite passions. For instance, I
am walking along a country road when I see a juicy red apple on a
tree.
Probable reason informs me that eating this apple would be
a pleasant experience, and I come to experience the direct passion
of desire toward the apple.
Certainly this must count as a case of
reason exciting a passion (T, p. 459), and thus one of Hume’s pre-

misses is, by his own account, false.
Hume seems to realize this, for he next argues

that,

though probable

reason can excite passions in certain cases, nobody has ever considered such reasonings to be either moral or immoral.

A person may
or pleasure to

be affected with passion, by supposing a pain
lie in an object, which has no tendency to

produce either of these sensations, or which produces the
contrary to what is imagin'd
But tho' this be acknowledg'd, tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far
from being the source of all immorality, that they are
commonly very innocent, and bring no manner of guilt upon
the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. They
extend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have
not generally suppos'd criminal (T, p. 459).
.

.

.

'

Reason and judgment may, indeed, be

the

mediate cause

of

an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion: But it
is not pretended, that a judgment of this kind, either in its
truth or falshood, is attended with virtue or vice (T, p. 462).

But Hume is confused here. When he states that "morals excite
passions, " he is referring to moral evaluations or judgments; for
instance, my judgment that stealing is wrong can excite passions in
me, and prevent me from committing such an act. Hume now wants
to show that such evaluations cannot be matters of probable reasoning.
He attempts to show this by arguing that judgments of probable
reason are never themselves judged to be virtuous or vicious. However, this is entirely consistent with moral judgments themselves
being judgments of probable reason. Hume cannot show that moral
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evaluations are not probable reasonings by showing that
acts of
probable reasonings are not morally evaluated.
For another and much more detailed examination of Hume's argument. that the rules of morality
are not conclusions of our
reason, " see Rachael M. Kydd's Reason and Conduct in Hume's
Treatise.
.

.

.

13

Belief, then, need not necessarily be reached by reasoning; all impressions, whether of sensation or reflection, are
beliefs.
It is important to notice, however, a crucial
difference in
beliefs leached through reason and those which are impressions.

A reasoned

belief is a lively idea, and can be expressed propositionally. An impression, however, can not be expressed
propositionally. Still, for Hume there is only one kind of belief,
and this is because belief is defined by him in terms of the vivacity

or intensity of a mental content, a content being either an impression or an idea.
14 For

Hume,

then, to judge is not necessarily an act of the

understanding.
1

s

The following should not be confused. My idea of an impression can be of varying intensity; if it is intense enough, it
constitutes a belief in the existence of the impression. But my
idea is also of a more or less intense impression; that is, my idea
is of an impression that has a certain intensity.
I can have an idea
of a slight headache, or I can have an idea of one that is severe.
°This is not to say that we cannot come to believe, after
making a corrected moral evaluation, the proposition that a certain
contemplation would cause a certain sentiment. But the act of
a corrected moral evaluation is not itself the assent to
such a proposition.

making

l^Ardal,

p.

190 and

p.

l^See, for instance, T,

212.

p.

582;

I,

p.

93;

I,

p.

95.

l^In the case of an original evaluation, contemplation of
the character or action is actually causing a moral sentiment,
whereas in the case of a corrected evaluation, the character or
action is of a kind whose contemplation from the moral point of view
has caused the moral sentiment in the past, and thus formed that
mental habit which is the basis of the corrected evaluation.
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CHAPTER
HUME'S ETHICS:

VII

AN OVERVIEW
1

No

detailed interpretation of

Hume's

ethical theory can be

considered complete without a discussion of the by now notorious

passage

of the

Treatise which reads as follows:

cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation,
which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being
of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead
of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is_ not, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
This change is imperceptible;
ought, or an ought not.
For as this
but is, however, of the last consequence.
relation
or afnew
some
expresses
ought, or ought not,
firmation, t is necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are
But as authors do not commonly
entirely different from it.
use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to
the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention
wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let
us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd

I

'

by reason (T, pp. 469-470).

This passage

On

the

is

of both historical and

contemporary importance.

one hand, a proper interpretation of the passage requires
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a proper interpretation of the whole of

Hume's

On

ethics.

the

other hand, the question of whether or not, or how, moral judg-

ments are related

A

issue.

to factual

judgments

a live

chapter to this thesis, because any proposed inter-

Hume's ethics should provide

pretation of

tion of the passage; and once

here, we have

some

The mistake
of

a coherent interpreta-

we understand what Hume

basis for placing

Hume

saying

is

in the ancient,

I

believe

Hume

is

charging to

morality with which he's met

content of a moral judgment

systems attempt

to

moral judgments.
that

do

is

is

a proposition.

to give

Now, quite

is the

^

all the

other

assumption that the

What these other

arguments or proofs for various

justifiably, these other

moral propositions are

in

some way

systems also

different

those that express matters of fact or relations of ideas.

however,

matters

make

but

controversy of fact versus value.

still active,

assume

very much

discussion of this passage, then, makes a useful and

fitting final

systems

is still

all

For Hume,

propositions express either relations of ideas or

of fact.

So,

Hume

is

demanding

that these other

clear just what this new kind of proposition

"observ'd and explain'd.

Hume.

A

is,

that

systems
it

be

"

But Hume's attack does not stop there.
of proof for

from

There are two kinds

demonstrative proof employs demonstrative
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reasoning, and involves the comparison of ideas.

Such reasoning

will

have as premisses propositions which are relations

and

its

conclusion must also be a proposition which

A

of ideas.

of ideas,

is a relation

probable proof employs probable reasoning, and

is

based on those mental habits which are generated by experience.

Such reasoning will have as premisses

which

is a

of fact.

systems:

matter

So

Hume

of fact,

is

and

at least

one proposition

conclusion must also be a matter

its

issuing this further challenge to the other

"Let me, for the moment, allow you your new kind of

proposition.

You seem

to

maintain that such a proposition can be

proved, employing as premisses propositions which are either
relations of ideas or matters of fact.

But so far as

I

know, there

are only two methods of proof or reasoning; and as long as we have
as premisses propositions which are either relations of ideas or

matters

of fact,

the conclusions

we can reach by proof must

either relations of ideas or matters of fact.

your new kind

Show me,

then,

of proposition can be proved, or deduced,

ordinary propositions as premisses.

"

Hume

be

how

from

concludes that

if

the

defenders of the other systems would try to meet these challenges,
their ultimate failure would force

are not "perceiv’d by reason"
at all.

-

them

to see that

moral evaluations

that is, they are not propositions
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To make
show,

is

a

moral evaluation

for

Hume, as

not to assent to a proposition;

it

is to

Hume

for

is

to

morally evaluate

a proposition,

arrived

at

is

M

or belief,

not to assent to or

Hume's theory denies

that a

in a

proposition.

come

to believe

moral judgment can be

the question of the relation between fact and

regarded as the question

nature of this latter question
the

proof, or deduc-

by a deduction.

Now
is often

A

a process of reasoning (either demonstrative or

probable) which generates "assurance,

Because

to

experience a certain

sentiment, 01 to have an idea of that sentiment.
tion,

have tried

I

term "autonomy.

"

It

is

seems

of the

autonomy

moral value

of ethics,

and the

often obscured by the ambiguity of
to

me

that those

who use

usually have in mind one of two different meanings.

this

term

According

the first, to say that ethics is autonomous is to say that

to

moral

evaluations cannot be inferred (or, in Hume's terminology, "de-

duced") from non-moral premisses.

Hume

indeed

is

In this

sense of the word,

maintaining the autonomy of ethics.

But according to the second sense, to say that ethics

autonomous
no

more

is to

is

say that the act of making a moral evaluation

is

than contingently related to the experiencing of certain

sentiments or attitudes.
sense, for

Hume

Hume's

ethics is not autonomous in this

maintains that to experience a moral sentiment
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is logically

original

equivalent to making a moral evaluation

moral

(at least,

an

evaluation).

2

Contemporary philosophers
spirit in

Hume,

in nature.

must

find a kindred

for his ethical theory is primarily meta-ethical

What Ilume

the nature of

of ethics

is

attempting

to

provide

is

an analysis of

moral evaluation; when one morally evaluates

pre

cisely what is one doing?

That

and he believes

answered only by observing actual

it

is to be

is the

central question for Hume;
in-

stances of such evaluation;

We must

therefore glean up our experiments

in this

science

from

a cautious observation of human life, and take them
as they appear in the common course of the world, by
men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously

collected and compared,

we may hope

to establish on

them

a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will

be

much superior

hension

(T,

What Hume
is to

p.

in utility to

any other of human compre-

xix).

finds is that to

make an

original

experience a certain kind of sentiment.

what has come

moral evaluation

In this he

presages

to be called the "noncognitivist" theory of

moral

judgment, a theory which denies that moral evaluations are judg-

ments

that

something

is the case.

On such

a theory,

moral
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judgments have no truth value.

So

it

with Hume, for feelings

is

are not the sort of things which are true or false:

Truth or falshood consists

in

an agreement or disagreement

either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence
and matter of fact
Now 1 i s evident our passions
are
not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement
'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either
true or false (T, p. 458).
1

.

.

.

.

.

But perhaps no other moral philosopher has examined
great detail the nature of this moral sentiment.

found the moral sentiment, as

I

interpret

.

in

such

we

In the Treatise,

to be the instinctive

it,

propensity or aversion toward (sympathetic) pleasures or pains,

consequent to adopting the moral point of view.

sometimes accused

of unjustifiably

assuming

Now Hume

that all (or

is

almost

all)

people who are fully informed as to the facts concerning x will make
the
this

same moral judgment about
assumption

in

x;

Hume because

and

if

about how

his theory is that a

all,

think that people look for

they think he needs

theory of moral evaluation coherent.
tion only

I

“

Yet

it

to

Hume needs

moral judgment

make

this

is a factual

his

assump-

judgment

or most people, properly informed and objective,

would feel about the thing evaluated.

This,

I

have tried

to

show,

is not his theory.

Nevertheless,

it

is true that if

there were not a general
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unif

ormity

way people react to similar

in the

The

discourse would break down.

moral discourse

utility of

does depend on a general uniformity

in the

moral

things,

way people react

emotionally to similar things when regarded from similar points
of view.

of others,

give

me

there were not this uniformity, the moral judgments

If

even though made from the moral point of view,

would

no information whatever about the things evaluated; some

people might experience the moral sentiment of approval upon

contemplating acts of cruelty, while others might experience the
of disapprobation

moral sentiment

the expression of the

from acts

moral sentiment

of

of kindness.

Thus,

approval or disap-

probation would become useless as an indicator of the nature of
the thing evaluated; the expressions of

moral judgments would

convey no more than autobiographical information.

Moral

course would lose that social function which

real value.

But

Hume

informed people

will

that

almost

all

It

is

men

make

the

a

matter

element

of fact,

Hume
in

all

same moral judgments,

have the capacity

though to varying degrees.
to be a universal

its

does not need to assume that most

theory of the moral sentiment as given
for its truth.

is

in the

dis-

factually

for his

Treatise provides

confirmable by observation,
to

sympathize with others,

finds this ability to sympathize

human

nature.

Nor can

it

be disputed
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that

most

aversion
the

all

men have

to pain.

But these facts,

moral sentiment

who are

fully

view, will

an instinctive propensity for pleasure and

(

together with Hume's theory of

Treatise

in the

)

guarantee that most

informed and who have adopted the moral point

make similar moral judgments.

usefulness of moral discourse

is

men,

all

of

In this way the social

retained within Hume's theory,

without the need of an apparently unwarranted assumption.

3

My

main concern

than critical.

We must

understand what

can evaluate what he says.
to devote

some time

However,

I

Hume

is

propose, in this last section,

For instance,

his

I

find

work on

Hume's work

clear piece of philosophy.

theory

is

is a

marvelously

Yet, his ethics suffers by comparison.

different interpretations that have been given of his ethical

ample evidence

of this.

what he takes a moral sentiment

Hume
to be,

related to a moral judgment.

My

make

Hume

the

to be highly

induction, in both the Treatise

and An Inquiry Concerning Hu man Understanding,

The many

saying before we

to this latter task.

In terms of exposition,
erratic.

has been historical, rather

in this thesis

most sense

of

what

just does not

make

it

clear

nor how this sentiment

interpretation

seems

says; even so,

it

to

me

raises

is

to

many
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questions.

For instance, what motivates Hume
theory

in

An Inquiry Concerning

to adopt a

moral sense

the Principles of Morals, after he

has devoted so much of the Treatise to working out an alternate
account of the moral sentiment?

Is

Now we know

"ardor of youth"?

it

that

mental associationism primarily

is

a retreat

Hume's

lost confidence in

of

sympathy, treating symThis notwithstanding,

pathy in the Inquiry as an ultimate principle.

he

still

could have followed the scheme of the Treatise

moral sentiment

is

from the

responsible for his abandoning

mechanism

the attempt to explain the

merely

,

where

the

treated as the emotional reaction to sympathetic

pleasures and pains.

There seems

to adopt a

moral sense theory

In light of

Hume's antipathy toward

to

in the

have been no need for

Inquiry

,

as

I

Hume

believe he does.

the adoption of unnecessary

ultimate principles, this transition from the Treatise to the Inquiry
is all the

more

puzzling.

Hume seems

to hold the

same theory

both the Treatise and the Inquiry

theory

is the

.

of

moral evaluation

But the weakest part of this

account of the correction of moral evaluations.

have interpreted this part

of

Hume's theory,

a corrected

evaluation consists in the idea of a moral sentiment; and
that this is the only

way

to

in

interpret what

Hume means

As

I

moral
I

believe

here, without
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contradicting his denial that a moral evaluation involves propositional belief, and without ignoring his statements to the effect
that

we can make

a

moral evaluation without having

the

moral

sentiment.

But a theory which holds that a moral evaluation can consist
in

an idea of a moral sentiment hardly seems satisfactory.

moral sentiment

whether on the account

itself,

on that of the Inquiry

of the Treatise or

cannot be experienced by an act of the

,

any more than can physical pain on Hume's theory.

moral evaluation

act of

is

taken to consist

moral sentiment, as Hume does
a result that one cannot

in the

experiencing of a

certainly a desired result,

in the

But

if

if

kind of

moral discourse

it

all its ideas,

pleases"

over

is to

(T,

have any social

ways possible"

Hume

tells us

it

seems,

with respect to a certain

"The mind has

the

command

and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as
623-624), and "The imagination has the

pp.

all its ideas,

this is

an act of moral evaluation can consist

make whatever moral judgment one wishes

over

get as

moral evaluation one

having of an idea of a moral sentiment, one can,

character or action, for

we

for original evaluations,

make whatever

will,

Thus, when an

wishes with respect to a certain character or action; and

usefulness whatever.

The

and can

(T,

p.

join,

629).

and mix, and vary them

command

in all the
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My

Let us again consider a specific case.
an act of murder;

I

wish

brother commits

pass a moral evaluation, but

to

unable to take the moral point of view.

find

I

cannot then experience a

I

moral sentiment, and thus cannot make an original moral

Hume,

But, according to
I

I

make

can

a corrected

imagine myself adopting the moral point

my

brother's action.

that

I

am

What happens

of

next, as

evaluation.

moral evaluation.

view and contemplating
I

interpret

Hume,

is

presented, via a mental habit, with the idea of that feeling

which has

in the past followed

contemplations of similar actions.

This feeling, presumably, would be an aversion, and
this aversion

The
imagine

myself

now counts

form

idea of

as a corrected moral evaluation.

difficulty with this,

(that is,

my

however,

is that,

if I

wish,

I

can

the idea of) any feeling to follow the con-

templation of this act from the moral point of view, including a
pleasurable propensity; that
habit
so,

of

it

my

might have

I

seems

I

it

seems,

I

can overcome any mental

respect by an act of the

will.

This being

can make whatever corrected moral evaluation

brother's action that

sibility

which

that

in this

is,

I

please.

It

is

clear that such a pos-

destroys the very purpose of corrected moral evaluations,

is to

"correct the momentary appearance of things, and over-

look our present situation"

Hume's

(T,

p.

582).

difficulty is the result of

two intuitions

that he

never
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successfully reconciles*
in

human

that

feeling, and that

moral ev&luution

human

is

ultimately rooted

feeling alone cannot provide a

suitable foundation for the social usefulness, or objectivity, of

moral discourse. Hume's account

of the correction of

tions is the focal point of this failure,

our estimate of

to color

Hume

Yet,

we should

moral evaluanot allow this

as a moral philosopher, for

if

we

consider philosophy to be a certain kind of mental activity, under-

gone with a very special dedication of spirit,

Hume

philosopher

is a

par excellence:

When we
of human

we have arrived at the utmost
extent
reason, we sit down contented
And
as this impossibility of making any farther progress is
see, that

.

.

.

to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a
delicate satisfaction from the free confession of
his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that
error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their
conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most,
certain principles. When this mutual contentment and
satisfaction can be obtained betwixt master and scholar,

enough

more

I

know not what more we can require

(T,

p.

xviii).

of

our philosophy

177

REFERENCES
^For ail excellent sampling of the variety of interpretations
given of this passage, see the collection of articles on this topic
in Hume ed. V. C. Chappell, (Notre Dame: 1968), pp. 240-307).
,

^See, for instance, C. L. Stevenson's Ethics and Language
1975), pp. 274-275.

(New Haven;

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ardal, Pall. Passion and Value in
University Press, 1966."
Broiles, R. David.

Hague:

The

Mo ral

Hume 's

Philosophy

Treatise,

of

Edinburgh:

David Hume.

The

1954.

Chappell, V. C.

London;

,

editor.
Hume A Collection of Critical Essavs.
University of Notre" Dame~Pres’s, T9 667
:

Frankena, William K.

Ethics.

Englewood

Cliffs-

Prentice Hall

1963.

Frankena, William K. "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory. " Journal
of the History of Ideas XVI (No. 3, 1955), 357-358.
,

Grieg,

J.

Y.

T.

,

editor.

The Letters

of

David Hume.

Oxford,

1932.

Hedenius, Ingemar. Studies in Hume’s Ethi cs.
Stockholm, 193 5.

Upsala and

Hendel, Charles W. Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume.
Princeton, 1925.

Hume, David.

A Treatise

Selby-Bigge.

of

London;

Human

Nature.

Edited by L. A.

Clarendon Press, 1973.

Hume, David.

Of t he Standard of Taste and Other Essays. Edited
and intro, by John W. Lenz. New York; Bobbs -Merrill,
1965.

An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Edited and intro, by Charles W. Hendel. New York; The
Liberal Arts Press, 1957.

Hume, David.

An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Edited and intro, by Charles W. Hendel. New York; The
Liberal Arts Press, 1955.

Hume, David.

179

Hunter, Geoffrey. "Hume on Is and Ought, " in The Is-Ought
Q uestion edited by W. D. Hudson, Bristol: iHacmTTlan
,

1969.

Jensen, Henning. Motivat ion and the Moral Sense in Francis
_
Hutche son's Ethical Theory
The Hague" 197l7
.

Kydd, Rachael M. Reason and Conduct
York; Russell and Russell, Inc.

Hume's Philosophy

Laird, John.

Hume's Treatise.

in
,

Human

of

New

1964.

Nature.

London;

Arckon, 1967.

MacNabb,

M

D.

G.
orality

David Hume; His Theory of Knowledge and
London; Hutchinson House, 1951.

C.
.

Pears, D. F.
editor.
David Hu me
St. Martin's Press, 1966.
,

;

A Symposium. New

York:

Price, Kingsley Blake. "Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?" Journal of Philosophy,
XLVII (1950), 425-434.

Selby-Bigge, L. A.
editor.
Merrill, 1964.
,

Smith,

Norman Kemp.
St.

Oxford:

British Moralists.

The Philosophy

of

Bobbs-

David Hume.

New

London;

Yale

York:

Martin's Press, 1966.

Stevenson, Charles L. Ethics and Language.
University Press, 1975.

The Moral and Political Philosophy of David
New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Stewart, John B.

Hume.

Swabey, William Curtis.
Press, 1961.

Ethical Theor y.

New

York:

The Citadel

Sweigert, John. "The Distance between Hume and Emotivism"
Philosophical Qua rterly XIV (1964), 229-236.
,

Tranoy, Knut Erik. "Hume on Morals, Animals, and Men.
Journal of Philosophy, LVI (1959), 94-103.

"

Wand, Bernard.

"Hume's Non-Utilitarianism.

(1961 -1962),

Wand, Bernard.

"

Ethics, LXXII

193-196.

"A Note on Sympathy in Iiume's Moral Theory.
Philosophical Review, LXIV (1955), 275-279.

